Walden University

ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies
Collection

2018

The Effects of Computer Crimes on the
Management of Disaster Recovery
Tim Gene Proffitt
Walden University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Databases and Information Systems Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.

Walden University
College of Management and Technology

This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by
Timothy Gene Proffitt
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,
and that any and all revisions required by
the review committee have been made.
Review Committee
Dr. David Gould, Committee Chairperson, Management Faculty
Dr. Howard Schechter, Committee Member, Management Faculty
Dr. Richard Schuttler, University Reviewer, Management Faculty

Chief Academic Officer
Eric Riedel, Ph.D.

Walden University
2018

Abstract
The Effects of Computer Crimes on the Management of Disaster Recovery
by
Timothy Gene Proffitt

MS, SANS Technology Institute, 2010
BS, Sam Houston State University, 1998

Dissertation in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Management

Walden University
May 2018

Abstract
The effects of a technology disaster on an organization can include a prolonged
disruption, loss of reputation, monetary damages, and the inability to remain in business.
Although much is known about disaster recovery and business continuance, not much
research has been produced on how businesses can leverage other technology
frameworks to assist information technology disaster recovery. The problem was the lack
of organizational knowledge to recover from computer crime interruptions given the
maturity level of existing disaster recovery programs. The purpose of this Delphi study
was to understand how disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to
improve response to a computer crime caused business interruption. The overarching
research question in this study was to understand what factors emerge relative to the
ability of disaster recovery programs to respond to disasters caused by computer crimes.
The conceptual framework included a maturity model to look at how programs might be
improved to respond to the computer crimes threat. Research data were collected from a
3 round Delphi study of 22 disaster recovery experts in the fields of disaster recovery and
information security. Results from the Delphi encompass a consensus by the panel. Key
findings included the need for planning for cyber security, aligning disaster recovery with
cyber security, providing cyber security training for managers and staff, and applying
lessons learned from experience. Implications for positive social change include the
ability for organizations to return to an acceptable level of operation and continue their
service benefiting employees, customers, and other stakeholders.
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1
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Businesses must be able to recover from an unexpected interruption if they are to
continue to service their customers and maintain an advantage over their competition.
The management of disaster recovery activities is a critical role in restoring the business
after it has experienced an interruption. An interruption can include anything from natural
disasters to terrorism (Guidry, Vaughn, Anderson, & Flores, 2015). The goal of
information technology disaster recovery, a subset of the larger known emergency
management theory, includes planning and the resumption of applications, data,
hardware, digital communications, and other technology infrastructure. Technologycaused disasters require a response by technology resources to triage and resume the
business’s technology infrastructure. Information technology disaster recovery is
primarily concerned with the minimizing of the interruption of operations, ensuring
security, and producing a reliable data. Technology disasters can manifest from hard
drive failures, erroneous backup, or loss of a network segment, but computer crimes are
an emerging threat that organizations need to consider as an equal threat as a traditional
disaster.
In this chapter, I provide information about the importance of understanding the
impact of computer crimes on information technology disaster recovery. The disaster
recovery problem, purpose of the study, and theoretical framework are discussed. The
chapter concludes with the description of the research method, assumptions of the study,
delimitations, and significance of the study.
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Background of the Study
Interruptions resulting from computer crimes create damages to businesses in the
form of financial loss, reputation, data destruction, and privacy issues (Marinescu, 2015;
Mossburg, 2015; Mulla & Ademi, 2015; Tran, Campos-Nanez, Fomin, & Wasek, 2016).
Computer crimes are often executed against technology infrastructures through the acts
of hacking, denial of service, malware, ransomware, or phishing. The 2014 hacking of
Sony Pictures Entertainment caused the company to operate for several days without
computing resources while the technology infrastructure was being resumed from the
attack (Bidgoli, 2016; Solberg Søilen, 2016). In January of 2016, a milestone was
reached when a hacking group was successful in attacking regional power authorities in
Ukraine that led to the loss of power to over 225,000 customers (Lee, Assante, &
Conway, 2016). In February 2016, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center
emergency room was disrupted by computer crimes that resulted in the transfer of
patients to alternate hospitals (Kandel & Kovacik, 2016; Sittig & Singh, 2016). On June
27, 2017, the Heritage Valley Health System, based in Beaver, Pennsylvania, was forced
to suspend operations from a targeted cryptolocker attack that disabled computer systems
in two hospitals (Schwartz, 2017a). Computer crimes should be considered as significant
risks to an organization’s standard operating procedures. Business is being affected by
computer crimes that are causing significant interruptions. Computer crime interruptions
are becoming a bigger issue, as a business must position itself against a growing range of
risks (Allianz, 2015; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Morgan (2016) claimed the damages
from computer crimes and their interruptions are expected to reach 6 trillion dollars by
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2021. Businesses that are reliant on technology are experiencing significant interruptions
due to computer crimes, which lead to monetary losses, customer turnover, reputational
losses, and diminished goodwill (Brown, 2016; Ferdinand, 2015). Computer crimes can
initiate from multiple vectors and may leverage a risk that was not previously identified
by cybersecurity team or emergency planners. Computer crimes will continue to increase
as the number of technology devices is being leveraged in businesses.
Problem Statement
Although much is known about disaster recovery and business continuance, not
much research has been produced on how businesses can leverage other technology
frameworks to assist information technology disaster recovery (Bird, 2015; Brown, 2016;
Dines, 2012; Ignatius, 2015; Marinescu, 2015). The general problem, as Ferdinand
(2015) noted, was that the ability to resume a business has now become not just a
management goal, but a goal for critical technology infrastructures. The specific problem
was the lack of organizational knowledge to recover from computer crimes interruptions
given the maturity level of existing disaster recovery programs. Guidry et al. (2015) and
Ferdinand discussed the lack of a set of control procedures to allow understanding of how
business’s management can bolster disaster recovery programs to account for this type of
interruption.
Traditional information technology disaster recovery focuses on fire, flood, loss
of power, and technology hardware failures, but research conducted in the 2016 Cyber
Security Intelligence Index by IBM noted 60% of small to medium size businesses fail
following a cyber-attack (IBM, 2016). McCreight and Leece (2016) wrote that disaster
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planners might not respond to security events where they have no knowledge. Increasing
the understanding of the disaster planners, responders, and management teams improves
the ability to execute the recovery plan. This research may help close the gap by
increasing the understanding of how business may leverage cybersecurity frameworks to
modify information technology disaster recovery programs. The information from this
study might produce a framework for businesses to find additional capabilities in
responding to a computer crimes interruption.
Businesses that are unable to serve their customers do not tend to remain in
business for long. The ability to recover from an unexpected interruption is vital if the
business is to continue to service their customers and maintain an advantage over the
competition. Information technology disaster recovery (ITDR) emerged from the field of
emergency management and sought to resume the organization from a technology outage
quickly. Traditionally, businesses have needed to prepare for outages from fire, flood,
loss of power, and terrorism. With the increase in reliance on technology infrastructures,
businesses also need to prepare for computer crimes such as hacking, denial of service,
and malicious insiders in interrupting the business by causing a technology interruption.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to understand how information
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response
to a computer crime caused business interruption. This qualitative approach included a
focus on information technology disaster recovery participants to develop a new
framework of response. Twenty-two participants with at least 5 years’ experience in
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disaster recovery were interviewed until patterns or themes were detected. The inquiry
included a focus on the existing information technology disaster recovery frameworks as
they are executed by organizations in resuming the business into a state where normal
operations can be conducted. The new model was developed as an understanding of how
the information technology disaster recovery processes might be influenced by other
frameworks tailored to cybersecurity or computer incident response. A Delphi approach
was chosen over other qualitative research approaches, such as a case study, because I
aimed to learn what factors affect certain responses and how to improve the disaster
response process.
Research Questions
The research may help to build knowledge on several qualitative questions about
the current state of information technology disaster recovery and where integration of
cybersecurity methodologies would be advantageous. A qualitative inquiry was chosen to
allow for rich data analysis from a specific, expert population of participants and theory
generation to improve disaster response. The overarching research question in this study
is: What factors emerge relative to the ability of disaster recovery programs to respond to
disasters caused by computer crimes? Subsequent questions asked in the Delphi rounds
sought to understand how successful are disaster responders when following approved
information technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused
business interruption. What steps do the experts believe can be an improvement for
resumption from this type of threat? What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause
the response team to recover differently than a traditionally planned? What differences
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can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions caused computer crimes as
compared to those that do not? What common themes exist where the cause of the
technology interruption might have been significantly reduced by modification of the
information technology disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity
framework?
Conceptual Framework
This study used a disaster recovery maturity model as the conceptual framework.
A disaster recovery maturity model depicts multiple levels representing an organization’s
ability to resume the business within the desired recovery time objective (Randeree,
Mahal, & Narwani, 2012; Stewart, Allen, Dorofee, Valdez, & Young, 2015). Based on a
capability maturity model, the maturity level speaks to the state of readiness to recover
from a business interruption. An organization at the lowest level of ad hoc has minimal
planning and will scramble to recover the organization. The highest level of resilience
will exist where the organization has a detailed recovery plan, administrative oversight,
and established preventive measure. Assessing the organization’s disaster recovery
program against key factors such as documentation, recovery time objectives,
architecture, and scope provides an understanding of a state of readiness and what
processes need to be re-engineered for improvement. The disaster recovery maturity
model provided the ability to assign recommendations to improve maturity in actionoriented goals.
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Nature of the Study
A qualitative researcher aims to gather an in-depth understanding of a
phenomenon and the data surrounding that phenomenon. Woods, Macklin, and Lewis
(2016) described qualitative research as the combining of knowledge, experience, and
understanding to allow the researcher to make judgments about a phenomenon or
circumstance. A qualitative inquiry was chosen because it is the most appropriate design
for gaining an understanding of the problem computer crimes interruptions causes to
disaster recovery programs. A qualitative inquiry was selected over a quantitative study
because of the little knowledge on the subject of computer crimes affecting information
technology disaster recovery processes, and the difficulty of soliciting participants
willing to discuss their organization's failure. Although empirical survey data might be
collected on experienced disasters and a hypothesis designed about what impacts would
exist, the nature of a qualitative study allows for a rich data collection on the
phenomenon.
A Delphi design was selected over other qualitative approaches, such as case
study or phenomenology, because of the goal of the study was for prediction and theory
building. In a qualitative case study of an organization's disaster response, the data
collected from the small number of organizations may not fully develop a theory of how
other organization may leverage a different set of controls for resuming the business. The
Delphi design allows for the identification of controls or alternative frameworks that may
be used to improve the process by analyzing feedback from experts in the field of disaster
recovery. The findings from the data collection activity are triangulated from the
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responses of the participants and research during the literature review. The study was
exploratory because of the small number of studies on the topic of computer crimes as
they affect information technology disaster recovery.
While Delphi is a flexible approach for data collection and consensus generation,
the researcher must consider different designs to implement the method correctly.
Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) wrote that the initial Delphi questions are
typically broad, open-ended questions. Extra care must be made by the researcher to
ensure the initial set of qualitative questions set the proper path for the research. The
researcher may see limitations in the research by not executing Delphi with a proper set
of initial questions, not populating the panel with the correct expertise, and not correctly
communicate the requirements of the participants. To address these limitations, I worked
with the committee to refine the initial round of questions, conducted a pilot round to
solidify the questions and instructions, diligently sought the proper panel members, and
carefully crafted communications to each participant. The number of participants chosen
was a number large enough to allow for the loss of multiple panelists as well as to obtain
data saturation.
The topic of information technology disaster recovery activity resulting from
computer crimes does not raise an ethical concern. Delphi is used in an anonymous
fashion that allows for participants to provide their expertise on how the traditional
disaster recovery methods can be positively altered. The panelists are not affiliated with a
business so that there can be no negative perceptions of an entity or employer. Disaster
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responders and technology management are not considered a traditional protected class in
scientific research.
Definitions
Business continuity planning: Business continuity planning is the methodology
that ensures certain critical business functions will continue to operate regardless of the
disasters that may be encountered by the organization. Business continuance is mainly
business facing and will focus on planning (Thejendra, 2008).
Computer crimes: An act performed by a person, sometimes referred to as a
hacker that illegally uses, steals or destroys information. This individual or group of
individuals may destroy or corrupt the computer data (Schultz & Shumway, 2001).
Computer exploits: A technology exploit is a mechanism for executing an
unintended, potentially damaging process afforded by a technology vulnerability that
offers an advantage to an attacker (Sen & Heim, 2016).
Contingency: A contingency is something that has occurred out of the ordinary. A
contingency could range from a fire to a malicious insider deleting data (Togio, 1989).
Crisis management: Crisis management is defined as the process by which a
group of senior management will control conversing with the media, dialog with the
customers, and act as a panic prevention team (Tucker, 2014).
Cybersecurity incident responders: An incident responder specifically trained and
charged with resuming the organization in the event of an information security incident
(Schultz & Shumway, 2001).
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Disaster recovery: Disaster recovery is the planning and execution needed to
quickly recover from a disaster that is usually caused by technology (Tucker, 2014).
Disaster recovery site: A disaster recovery site is usually an alternative computing
site that can be used to run the technology the business needs if the primary site fails or
becomes unstable (Togio, 1989).
Emergency management: The managerial function of creating the framework by
which communities reduce vulnerabilities to disasters and how to cope with the disaster
when encountered (Hiatt, 2000).
Failover: Failover is the mechanism used to migrate the production system to a
redundant server upon the previous active backup (Grigonis, 2002).
First responders: Someone designated or trained to be the first to respond to an
emergency (Bishoff et al., 2015).
Recovery time objectives: The designated duration of time and a service level
within which a business process must be restored after a disaster to avoid unacceptable
consequences to the organization (Thejendra, 2008).
Resumption: The act of returning an organization into the state it was in before a
disaster or interruption (Thejendra, 2008).
Security: Security is defined as that state where an organization is free of
unacceptable risk (Mihut, 2014).
Assumptions
Several assumptions are considered in this research. First, there is an assumption
that the Delphi participants are experts in their fields of disaster recovery or cybersecurity
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and have sufficient knowledge about disaster response to propose solutions for the
problem. Each participant was selected based on interviews, recommendations, or their
visibility as a researcher in this subject matter. There is an assumption that the
participants would answer the questions from the Delphi design truthfully and provide
clear communication on answers that were deemed outliers from the Delphi round. I
assumed that participants who stayed for all three rounds of the study and, when asked to
provide additional data about an outlier, I gave the participant the proper amount of time
to give an answer. This study was a qualitative study to obtain rich, descriptive data.
Participants were guided through each round of the Delphi design and allowed a window
of time to provide their responses to keep the rounds allocated to a reasonable timeframe
to complete the study.
Scope and Delimitations
The participants of this study were selected from disaster recovery programs for
businesses that are large enough to plan regularly, conduct testing and have experienced
an interruption from computer crimes. Organizations including Information Systems
Audit and Control Association (ISACA), Information Security Certification (ISC2),
Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), and
the InfraGard were contacted for applicable participants in the United States. Experts
from the disciplines of emergency management, information technology disaster
recovery, and cyber resiliency were asked to rate qualitative indicators using the Delphi
design. I targeted experts from medium to large business in the United States. To reach a
quality panel of experts across the United States, I collected data via electronic mail. The
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ability to leverage the Internet allowed for the panel to have flexibility when they
provided data and the ability to reflect on their answers. When interviews were identified
as necessary, Internet-based video or a conference call was used.
The role of the researcher in the data collection process is to facilitate the multiple
rounds of the Delphi design and conduct interviews for outlier concepts after the Delphi
rounds are complete. Researchers have the unique ability to increase an understanding of
how participants experience the phenomenon being studied, which provides valuable data
for the research. I narrowed and filtered data as it was collected, without altering the data,
to be analyzed into patterns or themes theories, as recommended by Maxwell (2013). To
reduce the threat of bias in this research I performed triangulation with data collected
from participants and data found in the literature. Special attention was paid to collect
participant data in each round of the Delphi and conducted interviews.
For each round of the Delphi, the consensus was sought, and answers to the
questions were provided to the panelists for review and adjustment when requested. As
the data collection process from the Delphi study is electronic, presentation, importing,
and archiving were simplified. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) highlighted a significant
value of the Delphi design is in the ability to produce theoretical research. Zahidy,
Azizan, and Sorooshian (2016) wrote about the Delphi design being suited for a study
where there is incomplete knowledge about a problem where there are no correct answers
or incomplete knowledge.
I chose the Delphi design to provide for greater access to disaster responders
across multiple businesses and service offerings, anonymous responses, and the ability to
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produce theoretical data for an improved information technology disaster recovery
response. Interviews were conducted with certain participants for interesting disparities to
understand the deviation from consensus. Like disaster recovery planning, a Delphi study
by Pieko (2005) was successfully used to improve the quality of information technology
security audits. The panel of experts was asked to rate indicators on a Likert scale from 1
to 6 which were divided up into several categories such as data destruction, resiliency,
and disaster planning issues.
Limitations
The research was limited to the disaster recovery and cybersecurity participants’
understanding of information technology disaster recovery and cybersecurity incident
response. The research included how disaster recovery teams and cybersecurity teams
could better plan for and resume the organization from a computer crimes interruption.
My focus for the research study did not include the motive behind the cyber attackers,
describe the type of individuals or groups that comprise cyber hackers, or developed a
method for preventing the attacks. The findings from this research may not apply to all
organizations. I assumed that applicable organizations would have information
technology disaster recovery programs in place and the findings may not apply to very
small enterprises without dedicated incident responders or cybersecurity staff.
Significance of the Study
The research presented by the study is unique in that it is focusing on an underresearched area of information technology disaster recovery. The existing literature on
disaster recovery has yet to collaborate cybersecurity response to the traditional
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emergency response. The ability to recover quickly from a technology interruption is
crucial, and the need to prepare for computer crimes may not be as adequately addressed
as possible. The results of the study may provide insights into what areas of information
technology disaster recovery are weak as it pertains to computer crimes and what areas
can be supplemented. The findings may have a significant influence on how disaster
planning is conducted for organizations that have a strong reliance on technology
infrastructure. The study could have a significant influence on a business that experiences
significant computer crimes related interruption and could recover in a manner as to limit
the impact of the business offering and minimizing financial loss.
Building a new understanding of an information technology disaster recovery
framework that focuses on traditional business interruptions and security responses that
assist in resuming computer crimes would be beneficial to disaster recovery planners,
disaster recovery responders, and business owners. Organizations that rely on a
significant foundation of technology infrastructure may be able to apply or assess the gap
between their existing traditional disaster recovery methods and the new knowledge
being created in this study. The research presented in this study should be read by disaster
recovery managers, technology first responders, and business continuance planners for
the knowledge being created to improve the response to an emerging threat.
Significance to Practice
The ability to recover an organization’s data processing is directly related to the
prosperity of the organization (Marinescu, 2015; Mossburg, 2015). The improvement of
disaster recovery practices to respond to computer crimes offers an advantage to disaster
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recovery programs. Providing better planning and procedures to incident responders
should allow for reduced resumption times.
Significance to Theory
Information technology disaster recovery has been historically based on methods
borrowed from medical first response and military emergency management from the
battlefield. Guidry et al. (2015) and Ferdinand (2015) discussed the lack of organizational
understanding of how a disaster management program could modify measures to account
for computer crimes interruptions. Using the Randeree et al. (2012) and Stewart et al.
(2015) disaster recovery maturity model conceptual framework can allow for the
measurement of the effects of this study to improve organizational response to a
technology disaster. Supplementing the existing disaster recovery frameworks with new
controls to mitigate emerging technology risks provides an opportunity to modernize the
practice of information technology disaster recovery.
Significance to Social Change
The experience of information technology disaster recovery experts and
cybersecurity experts represents a section of information, which could facilitate a change
in the response and recovery from technology disasters. Technology disasters are a risk
that is increasingly affecting organizational survivability. Keeping a viable business
following a technology interruption, assists in the profitability of the organization and the
employees remain on the payroll. By improving the disaster recovery response to an
event, a community that is relying on vital services from the affected entity will
experience a reduced interruption as opposed to a prolonged disturbance. Hospitals,
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emergency response, local law enforcement, and transportation are examples of vital
services that can leverage an improved information technology disaster recovery response
to service the local community. Responses to disasters such as an earthquake can reveal
parallels for organizations recovering from technology disruptions. This study of
computer crimes as it pertains to disaster recovery is a relatively new topic and this
research places organization in a better position to respond to an emerging threat.
Summary and Transition
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how information
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response
to a computer crime caused business interruption. The risks to organizations continue to
rise as new technology threats emerge and more business processes rely on data
processing. Information technology disaster recovery must improve and cybersecurity
incident response may provide new methods that can be collaborated to reach a more
mature disaster recovery program. A better understanding of cybersecurity in the context
of disaster recovery may allow disaster recovery planners to improve their organizational
resumption processes. In the next chapter, I present a literature review I conducted on the
theories and practices for disaster recovery practitioners, review of the applicable law and
regulations for disaster recovery, information security frameworks, and the common
threats to organizations. The literature review describes where the information
technology disaster recovery concept has evolved and where the current research is being
conducted in response to computer crimes. Chapter 3 includes the research methodology
and the use of the Delphi design.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Businesses unable to quickly recover from a technology-caused interruption will
find significant barriers to servicing their customers and maintaining an advantage over
their competition. Critical technology infrastructure must be resumed to an acceptable
operating state that allows the service to the client. As technology becomes more
embedded in the core of business processes, the vulnerability to organizational
interruptions as technology fails to operate as expected becomes greater. Traditional
disaster recovery placed a high priority in recovering from the loss of power, fire, and
flooding. As the expertise of the underground criminal increases, the ability to cause a
technology interruption upon a business becomes a greater risk. Information technology
disaster recovery is primarily concerned with the minimizing of the interruption of
business operations, the risk of delays, ensuring security, producing a reliable data
backup, and restoration promptly. The management of the recovery activities plays an
important role in restoring the business after it has experienced an interruption. Chapter 2
includes a literature review of emergency management, information technology disaster
recovery, business continuance planning, cyber-attack interruptions, information security
practices, technology frameworks, and laws about disaster recovery. The literature
examined in this chapter was collected from disaster management books, online
repositories, disaster recovery journals, research studies, and disaster conferences. The
purpose of this literature review was to gain insight into the process, people, and threat
vectors that are considered when building and maintain an information technology
disaster recovery program.
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Literature Search Strategy
The search strategy for this review collected the primary sources from seminal
books, peer-reviewed journals, standards body websites, and federal government
websites. The Journal of Information Systems & Operations Management, Journal of
Business Continuity & Emergency Planning, Centre for Disaster Management and
Hazards Research, Disaster Recovery Journal, Disaster Prevention and Management,
and Computers & Security Journals are focused on for the relevant research in the last
several years. Additional journals were obtained from ProQuest, Business Source
Complete, InfoSCI, and ABI/Inform Global. The keywords used in the search were
business continuity planning, crisis management, cyber resilience, cyber terrorism, data
breach, disaster preparedness plans, disaster resilience, emergency response
management, and enterprise risk management. The range used in the search was limited
to 5 years and less from the anticipated time of this dissertation completion. I used this
strategy to identify the risk of cyber-attacks on organizations ability to recover systems
and the need to incorporate information security practices into the management disaster
recovery programs. The relevant articles were reviewed for application to the topic,
credibility, dependability, and transferability. I created Figure 1 to show the order and
method of the topics researched.
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Figure 1. The literature review method to understand the impacts of computer crimes.
Conceptual Framework
Recent headlines describe the increasing damages and disclosures caused by
cyber criminals and yet organizations are still lacking the necessary controls and
methodology needed to prepare for technology disasters (Rittinghouse & Ransome,
2011). A capability maturity model (CMM) has been a popular tool for the development
of an improvement program to transform an organization into a better operational state.
The purpose of a maturity model is to provide understanding for improving processes for
development and maintenance of products and services. The six common capabilities are
incomplete, performed, managed, defined, quantitatively managed, and optimized
(Barclay, 2014). Maturity model focus can include technology, a business initiative, or a
financial process (Latif, Arshad & Janom, 2016). A process of dependability can be
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determined using a maturity model, which assumes the positive movement towards a goal
in stages (Dorfman & Thayer, 1997). A popular way to evaluate the levels of a maturity
model is a five-point Likert scale as first seen in the Carnegie Mellon Capability Maturity
Model Integration (Latif et al., 2016). Leveraging a maturity model may provide a greater
understanding for improving processes that respond to computer crimes caused disasters.
One method to improve the standing of an organization’s disaster management is
the use of a disaster recovery maturity model (DRMM). Allen et al. (2015) encouraged
organizations to use defined maturity model, such as the CERT-RRM, to measure
progress and to assess their programs. Stewart, Allen, Dorofee, Valdez, and Young
(2015) claimed that a disaster recovery program’s effectiveness comes from direction and
approval from the executive levels of the organization. The DRMM is used as a tool for
assessing the capability of the disaster recovery program (Al Hamed & Alenezi, 2016;
Lindström, Samuelsson, & Hägerfors, 2010; Randeree et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2015).
The DRMM provides the ability to communicate outcomes with ease based on the data
ranking in the model, allows organizations to recognize shortfalls, and the identification
of improvements over time. The ability of the DRMM to provide dashboards and metrics
that can be reviewed by executives provides a mechanism to justify the DR investment
and the organizational readiness for implementing a business continuance program. A
DRMM should eliminate subjectivity, reduce disaster planner bias, and provide a clear
picture of an organization's stance towards readiness. Lindström et al. (2010) explained
the need for a less abstract way for senior management to understand disaster recovery
and to use a concept that would be familiar with a common decision-making tool.
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Randeree et al. (2012) claimed a maturity model proposes a life cycle that is explicitly
defined, managed, and measurable. By using a disaster recovery maturity model, an
organization may identify strategic areas where improvement could be made to amend
the recovery from computer crimes.
The process of the maturity concept implies growth in the process, capability, and
consistency of the program. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016) proposed a model based on
their research that consisted of an evaluation of a process quality dimension versus a
scope capability dimension. The vertical axis represented the maturity stages from
initiated, planned, implemented, controlled, integrated and optimized. The horizontal axis
represented maturity stages where each stage builds on the previous level. The Carnegie
Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute developed the CERT Resilience
Management Model (CERT-RRM), which focuses on enterprise management of
operational resilience (CMMI, 2007; Lindström et al., 2010 ). The CERT-RMM defined
processes for 26 functional areas that are organized into enterprise management,
engineering, operations and process management. Stewart et al.’s (2015) research used
the CERT Resilience Management Model to define a more granular maturity scale for
organizations that need a greater depth of detail than the original CERT-RMM. The Allen
(Dorofee et al., 2015) model defined four maturity levels of incomplete, performed,
managed, and defined with an additional component of Maturity Indicator Levels (MIL)
for describing upward progression. The MIL was described as incomplete, performed,
planned, managed, measured, defined, and shared. Lindström et al. (2010) research
intended to improve the process of explaining BCM to senior management by increasing
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the organizational understanding of the current disaster recovery maturity level it belongs
to and what is required to improve the standing of the current level. The staircase
methodology presented by Lindstrom was applied at the organizational and department
level to highlight risks that are deemed necessary to mitigate known disaster events.
Randeree et al. (2012) proposed a disaster recovery maturity model developed using
focus groups with 10 United Arab Emirates banks and their BCM experts. Randeree, et
al. argued that the BS25999 BCM standard missed necessary components of a framework
for organizations to benchmark themselves as a maturity model is necessary for
measurement. The U.S. Department of Energy Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model
(C2M2) is a public-private effort established to improve the energy sector’s cybersecurity
capabilities (Department of Energy, n.d.). The C2M2 is comprised of three cybersecurity
capability maturity models. With the capability maturity model being a popular tool for
the improvement of a program, organizations should consider the use of a disaster
recovery maturity models to improve the disaster response to computer crimes.
The topic of the effects of computer crimes on disaster recovery was examined,
through the lens of a DRMM, throughout the literature review. The multiple levels of the
DRMM represented the ability to recover the organization, which allowed for the
analysis of methods that could improve the disaster response to a technology caused
service interruption.
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Literature Review
History of Disaster Recovery
Disaster planners, first responders, and organization management teams should
understand how information technology disasters came to be an important aspect of
organizational risk management and how disasters have affected organizations over time.
A disaster can be experienced in many degrees of severity and, according to Lord (1981),
should be approached through a lens of contingency planning. An up to date, wellrehearsed disaster recovery plan can be the difference between restoring to a state of
normalcy in a matter of hours or restoring the system in months or years (Hiatt, 2000).
Emergency management. Emergency management seeks to control the activities
of evacuation, recovery, and relocation of people and resources. Development of an
emergency management plan requires a role of a recovery coordinator to designate teams
and responsibilities to various recovery tasks. Without an emergency management plan
for coordination of activities, inefficiencies will lengthen the time to resume the entity.
Emergency management has been identified as an aspect of disaster recovery that is often
difficult for disaster responders (Togio, 1989). Existing research on emergency
management tries to understand organizational interactions, the analyzation of key
indicators, and the critical structures within the event (Kapucu & Hu, 2016).
To assist the public sector in the United States, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) was placed into existence by President Carter’s 1979
executive order 12127 to provide disaster-related responsibilities into a formal
government agency. The creation of FEMA consolidated the Federal Insurance
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Administration, National Fire Prevention Administration, National Weather Service
Preparedness Program, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and components of
the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Cutter et al., 2016; FEMA, 2017). The FEMA
mission statement is to provide the support, tools, and resources to ensure that the agency
can build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare, protect, respond and recover
from all hazards. Cutter et al. (2016) explained that FEMA, in the beginning, was focused
on attacks from abroad and then evolved to a focus on natural disasters under President
Clinton, and back to security and counter-terrorism planning under President Bush.
Kapucu and Hu (2016) claimed intergovernmental and cross-sector collaboration had
become the norm in emergency response due to the necessity of sharing resources. With
the development and maturity of emergency management in the government, efficiencies
from a dedicated budget, staff and education should shorten the time to resume the
impacted target.
Recent studies (Kapucu & Hu, 2016; Lachlan et al., 2016) have shown greater
success in disaster response due to the building of collaborative networks between public,
private, and nonprofit entities. Emergency planning teams for private organizations are
often grouped into concentrations such as a software applications team, network
recovery, communications, administrative support, offsite storage, and security (Togio,
1989). Corporate emergency management would plan the evacuation, recovery, and
relocation of employees and readiness of alternative locations for conducting businesses.
The use of planned, coordinated emergency management will place an organization in a
better position to respond to the disaster.

25
Crisis communications. Latif et al. (2016) noted it is crucial in disaster
management to communicate the right information to the right people in the right place at
the right time. Effective communication is the key to successful recovery (Bartock et al.,
2016; Bishoff et al., 2015). Houston et al. (2015) wrote that disaster communication is
focused on strategies that can protect the organization’s image during a crisis. A
comprehensive communication plan will describe the phone calling decision tree of
contacts, location of the continuance plan, basic communication script, who receives
press releases, plan for providing updated information, and inform third parties. Bartock
et al. (2016) claimed the most successful recovery teams would develop a clear and
concise communications plan. Key stakeholders will need to be provided sufficient data
about the disaster to understand responsibilities and decision-making steps. Key
stakeholders are often defined as organizational management teams, external partners,
technology teams, legal counsel, and customers (Bishoff et al., 2015). Failed
communication channels must be considered during planning and document alternative
solutions for use (Bishoff et al., 2015; Grigonis, 2002). Cloud communications solutions
such as SIP trunking, fax services, text messaging, virtual contact centers, and interactive
voice response are optimal alternatives for failed primary, on-premises solutions.
Organizations that dedicate resources to identifying effective communication may find
the key to successful recovery came from the communications plan.
A review of the crisis communication literature highlighted two common
frameworks. The Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model and the
Disaster Communications Intervention Framework were designed to protect an entities’
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image and to improve an understanding of how leaders should respond to a disaster
(Houston et al., 2015; Lachlan, Spence, Lin, Najarian, & Del Greco, 2016). Both models
use disaster communications to prevent injury, promote calm, and direct the entities
operational response. Research by Lachlan et al. (2016) and Matar, Matar, Balachandran,
and Hunaiti (2016) indicated that organizations have new avenues via social media
technologies that are likely to be utilized by affected audiences under disaster scenarios.
Technologies such as Facebook, YouTube, Reddit, or Twitter can quickly educate
and inform audiences that otherwise could be harder to reach through traditional means
of radio or analog phone calls. Research by Takahashi, Tandoc, and Carmichael (2015)
found that Twitter is a popular communication tool for the public with the intent of
assisting in the response and recovery efforts to the disaster. David, Ong, and Legara
(2016) wrote that Twitter has shown to be a valuable channel of information for
government and private sectors through the affected users posting updates, text, and
photos. David et al. highlighted the emerging advantages of social media for crisis
communications due to the features of information transmission, activity reporting, media
content sharing, back-channel capability, rapid dissemination, and the sharing of
experiences.
Traditional disaster recovery. Disaster recovery is often described as a response
to natural disasters such as fire, floods, and earthquakes (Alexander, 2015; Tucker, 2014).
Alternate descriptions include responses to human-made disasters such as hazardous
spills, terrorism, and technology failures. The disaster recovery literature lists the four
phases of disaster recovery as preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Berke,
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Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Elliot, Swartz, & Herbane, 2010; Mojtahedi & Oo, 2017;
University of Oregon, 2007). Disaster recovery often includes discussions on historic site
preservation, transportation plans, capital improvements, economic stimulus, Red Cross
Outreach, Health and Human Services programs, emergency operations, and natural
hazard mitigation plans (University of Oregon, 2007). Disasters are more than common
emergencies that are exhibited in car crashes or injuries to humans (Phillips, 2015). In a
disaster, local resources are reduced, eliminated, or exhausted and will directly affect the
community. Disasters can exist at a magnitude where state or federal agencies are needed
for assistance. Emergency services, public works, city planners, elected officials, local
business leaders, school districts, the local chamber of commerce, and department of
transportation are frequently listed as stakeholders (University of Oregon, 2007). A
disaster requires complex efforts for communities to recover (Philips, 2015).
Commitment to recovery planning is essential if the organization implements a disaster
recovery program (Bishoff et al., 2015). Research by the University of Oregon (2007)
indicated that for every dollar spent on disaster planning, communities could save four
dollars in response and recovery costs. In 1995, global disasters cost the insurance section
over $180 billion (Hiatt, 2000) and in 2013, $3.6 billion of damage was attributed to
tornadoes (Kantamaneni, Alrashed, & Phillips, 2015). Mojtahedi and Oo (2017) claimed
the annual spend on disaster recovery activities has increased to $200 billion since the
1980s.
Mojtahedi and Oo (2017) believed that certain disasters could not be completely
averted, even with proper planning and mitigating controls. Disaster insurance has
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traditionally been utilized for limiting loss and as a transfer mechanism to allow
organizations to be protected in the event of a disaster. Butler (1998); Rittinghouse and
Ransome (2011) wrote that disaster insurance has historically focused on buildings and
property and not designed to address technology needs. Modern technology risk has
created new vulnerabilities and new management objectives requiring an updated
insurance strategy from one a decade ago. Modern disaster insurance offers many plans
for organizations recovering from a disaster that has affected their technology
infrastructure (Siegel, Sagalow, & Serritella, 2002). A technology-focused insurance
policy will provide superior loss prevention which dovetails with an enterprise risk
assessment program. Determining the potential disaster and business impact allows
organizations to choose the right policy for the specific needs of the industry.
Business continuance planning (BCP). In 1969, a small airplane crash created a
disaster that crippled the Applied Data Research data center housing an IBM System 360
(David, 1969; Herbane, 2010). The Applied Data disaster is considered the first major
incident that caused organizations to consider hardware alternative sites for data
processing. Other researchers believed business continuance planning was developed
with the changing landscape of technology at the core of business processes in the 1970’s
(Jedynak, 2013). Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) believed business continuance
planning was not about technology but a new way of managing a business functionality
in all circumstances. In the late 1970s, Comdisco and SunGard housed more computing
resources than was needed for their data processing needs and the companies decided to
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lease out computing resources. Butler (1998) noted the Comdisco and SunGard concept
was considered the launch of the modern backup, alternate data center.
Business continuance planning is not a new concept but has gained momentum in
the last few decades. The initial interest in business continuance planning appeared in the
1950s and 1960s when organizations began to understand the criticality of certain
business data and the risk of availability if a disaster was encountered (Randeree et al.,
2012). In 1978 a seminal study at the University of Minnesota examined the maximum
amount of downtime that can be tolerated by specific industries before the recovery
would be impossible (Aasgaard, Cheung, Hulbert, & Simpson, 1978). The 1978
University of Minnesota study indicated that financial industries have the lowest
tolerance for downtime and insurance and manufacturing could tolerate up to five days of
interruption. Butler (1998) highlighted that in the 1990s the credit card and financial
sectors would lose between $5.6 million to $7 million per hour in downtime. Hiatt (2000)
claimed the business continuance planning process has evolved into an extensive set of
tasks that is filled with various pitfalls where the best-intentioned, seasoned planners will
unintentionally overlook critical processes. Planning is essential for organizations
charged with reducing risk to a business interruption. Hiatt (2000) claimed a wellplanned and rehearsed disaster recovery plan could mean the difference between an
immediate recovery or a set of devastating repercussions that can bankrupt a business.
Alexander (2015), Grigonis (2002), Iqbal, Widyawan, and Mustika (2016), Lam
(2002), and Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) defined the business continuance life cycle
as including the phases of enterprise risk analysis, business impact analysis, definition of

30
requirements for continuance, design of a continuance strategy, implementation of the
strategy across the organization, development of plans for technology, people and
premises, reoccurring testing activities, and continuous process improvement actions. I
created Figure 2 to capture the major components of business continuance planning.

Figure 2. A typical business continuance life cycle.
The risk analysis activity or business impact analysis being conducted for BCP
works to ensure that controls and expenditures are deployed in a way that reduces risk to
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the organization following a disaster. Bartock et al. (2016) wrote that most activities of
the BCP process come from the planning and documentation of the system before any
event occurs. Lam (2002) wrote that organizations should consider technology threats,
information threats, and people threats. When a risk analysis is conducted the
organizations assesses the likelihood and impact of the threat occurrence (Bartock, 2016;
Fallara, 2003; Grigonis, 2002; Lam, 2002).
The risk management process categorizes and prioritizes the threats according to
risk levels and ascertains levels of risk that are acceptable to the organization.
Organizations will need to consider which threats to ignore due to a significantly low
likelihood or inconsequential interruption. Yang, Ku, and Liu (2016) claimed most
organizations would use software tools to perform risk-based compliance analysis.
Organizations have options when dealing with risk. Risk response is a component of the
business continuance risk analysis. Organizations have options for a risk response in
avoidance, transference, mitigation, and acceptance (Bhoola, Hiremath, & Mallik, 2014).
Bhoola et al. claimed the identification of risks alone would not ensure the success of the
project, but an implementation of a risk response plan offers greater protection when the
risk is needed to be mitigated. Avoidance is often leveraged in a manner that has the
project being implemented in a way that the identified risk will not be encountered
because of changes to the plan eliminate the probability of the risk (Bhoola et al., 2014;
Lam, 2014). Risk transference will place the responsibility of the risk component with a
vendor or alternative stakeholder (Lam,2014). Risk mitigation reduces the risk by
applying a solution to reduce the vulnerability or threat (Bhoola et al., 2014).
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Organizations looking to mitigate the risk of a loss of power incident will deploy
uninterrupted power supplies to supplement the loss from the utility provider. Risk
acceptance recognizes the risk that remains after controls have been applied. McManus
(2003) pointed to the documentation of an evaluated risk as an advantage in the planning
process. Organizations that have a good understanding of how different risks will be
controlled have an advantage when it comes time to recover from an interruption.
Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016), Butler (1998), Fallara (2003), Grigonis (2002),
and Torabi, Soufi, and Sahebjamnia (2014) defined the business impact analysis (BIA) as
the activity that identifies critical functions and determines supporting resources for
critical business processes. Identification of business threats provides an understanding of
how resources can be affected by a disaster and the BIA should be used in decisionmaking when formulating resumption plans. The BIA is a key part of a business
continuity management system (BCMS) because the activity collects key processes and
critical functions to calculate the minimum business continuity objective (MBCO) and
the maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPD) according to Al Hamed and Alenezi
(2016). Torabi et al. (2014) research revealed that the data gathering and data analysis
phases are the two most time-consuming steps of the BIA. The main advantage of the
BIA is the early identification the risks and the data provided on requirements for a
continuance. Data from the BIA feeds into the subsequent phases of business continuance
planning. The risk analysis process is significant because most of the remaining planning
components will leverage what was indicated in the risk analysis phase.
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Testing is a major consideration in BCP as the activity will directly improve the
accuracy of the execution of the plan. Lam (2002) wrote that there are four main reasons
to test the business continuance plan, which included the validation of the effectiveness
of the stated service levels, identification of any shortcomings, assessment of the service
levels being achievable and realistic given the time constraints, and to provide confidence
in the plan. BCP testing should address as many applicable, conceivable disasters as
possible but still assume that the actual disaster will be a scenario that was not
specifically tested. Stanton (2005) argued that having a technology disaster recovery
processes is not the equivalent of having a complete business continuance plan in place.
Butler (1998) and Hiatt (2000) claimed business continuance testing of a resilience plan
would not completely align with what a real disaster will exhibit, and organizations
should consider that. Alexander (2015), Bartock et al. (2016), Fallara, (2003),
Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011), and Wold (2002) wrote that testing activities should
be implemented at a frequency that applies to the organization, has realistic objectives,
and assigned responsibilities to test the hypothetical disaster adequately. Organizations
that plan and execute on recovery testing will have a more accurate and practiced
resumption plan than an organization that does not.
Lessons learned is a major component of BCP. Bartock et al. (2016) and Hiatt
(2000) claimed periodic testing and disaster recovery exercises should be continually
scheduled to identify improvements from the lessons learned during the testing. The
lessons learned activity assists improvement in the recovery process and provided a
feedback mechanism for decision-making. The timing of the activity can be a factor in
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quality. Bartock et al. (2016) wrote the longer the period between testing and the lessons
learned activity, the less likely the lessons learned will be accurate. Togio (1998)
presented some guidelines for disaster planners to maximize the effort of training the
responders:


Disaster planners must develop a rapport with team leaders.



It is important to package the information in short, digestible amounts.



Target the audience for the proper level of terms and language.



There should be an attempt to address all questions to the extent possible.



Give team members copies of the sections that apply to them for their
review to return comments or suggestions.

Testing frequently and a timely review of the outcome can improve the disaster recovery
program.
Alexander (2015), Bartock et al. (2016), Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011),
Thejendra (2014), and Tucker (2014) wrote that a critical component of the recovery
comes from having guidance, playbooks, and plans to support the stated organizational
recovery objectives. Hiatt (2000) and Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) listed several
common recovery plans that included contingency, business continuance, business
recovery, continuity of operations, technology contingency, crisis communications, and
incident response. Written guidance and plans are often necessary because of the large
number of business processes that need to be recovered, clarity needed on what response
teams are assigned what actions, identification of the critical systems that must be
addressed according to the business, and the proper order of resumption. Clearly written
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playbooks that can be immediately accessed during a disaster offer a large advantage to
an organization as opposed to resuming business processes from management's
experience managing the procedures.
The use of a continuance strategy improves the chances of proper resumption.
The business continuity planning body of knowledge has provided multiple frameworks
and strategies described later in this chapter. Bajgoric (2014), Grigonis (2002), and
Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) concluded that a BCM strategy, when organized and
managed properly, would improve the performance of the recovery. The ISO17799 is an
international standard for business continuance planning and covers ten domains that can
be modified to accommodate most any business planning requirements (Aronis &
Stratopoulos, 2016; Choudhary, 2016; Junttila, 2014). Organizations looking to improve
the response to a disaster should consider the adoption of a BCP framework.
Information technology disaster recovery. Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011)
noted that leading up to the middle 1970s, most companies had no form of technologyfocused disaster recovery but instead relied upon traditional business insurance to
mitigate the losses to property. By the mid-1980s organizations had started planning for
alternate datacenters and by the 1990s recovery plans encompassed resilient networks
(Butler, 1998). Butler pointed to a new urgency of recovering from a disaster because of
the expanding role of technology found in critical business processes. The loss of
technology resources, reliability, or integrity of data can interrupt the normal processing
of business data. The Business Continuity Institute (2013) Horizon Survey reported in
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2013 40% of a sample of 730 international organizations was significantly disrupted by a
technology-induced outage.
Bajgoric (2014) argued that disaster recovery is typically part of a larger business
continuance program, which includes services outside of the technology department.
disaster recovery has become more relevant because of the growing need for computers
in business. Alexander (2015) and Neaga, Winters, and Laufman (1997) defined an
information technology disaster recovery disaster as an extended service interruption for
an organization where data processing could not be conducted and correction not
available within an acceptable time frame. Butler (1998), Hiatt (2000), and Togio (1989)
defined the technology disaster as an event that interrupts the business because of the loss
of critical information needed in data processing. Bishoff et al. (2015) claimed disasters
are not limited to physical phenomena but events that inflict the whole business
ecosystem. A generalized workflow for information technology disaster recovery is
defined in Figure 3. Although disaster recovery can be conducted outside BCP, disaster
recovery can leverage requirements gathering, data collection, risk assessment,
stakeholders, and planning from a larger business continuance planning program. Figure
3, which I created, describes the components of information technology disaster recovery.
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Figure 3. Typical disaster recovery cycle for interruption planning.
Traditional disaster events such as fire, floods, loss of power, earthquakes, and
hardware failures can represent a significant risk of an interruption of a business’s data
processing. Neaga et al. (1997) predicted that as organizations become more dependent
on data processing, the availability aspects of technology become increasingly critical. In
the mid-1970s, operating a computer mainframe such as the IBM 370 system placed the
main computing hardware in a datacenter far away from the end users who were using
dumb terminals. With the mainframe system in a single location, securing and preparing
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the mainframe for disasters was an easier solution than the inexpensive, distributed
computing now available. Information technology disaster recovery for the 1970s-era
mainframe had the disaster planners seeking hardened data centers, daily backups, and
alternate locations for migrating the mainframe (Grigonis, 2002). The 1980s introduced
the workstation and the client-server model of distributed computing. These added
complications to the disaster planner because now computing was being conducted at
multiple locations and within reach of the user. Disaster planners in the 1980s needed to
understand how to best provide recovery for not just the mainframe and data center, but
the workstations and the unstructured data that was being created outside the datacenter.
Present day disaster recovery planners focusing on information technology disaster
recovery may consider many technologies such as resilient networking, data in the cloud,
data in a private datacenter, server hardware, storage area networks, electronic data
interchange (EDI), personal computers in an office, mass media devices, where critical
data may reside, enterprise printing, and information and communications technology
(ICT).
The alternate data center can be an important component of an organization’s
recovery effort. Lord (1981), Neaga et al. (1997), and Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011)
noted the decision to operate an alternate data center site was vital for organizations to
consider when a fast recovery was required. Several things must be considered when
operating an alternate data center. The alternate site is often defined as a cold standby, a
warm site with no staff, or a hot site with full-time staff (Fallara, 2003). A cold site can
be minimalist building with environmental controls ready to take equipment to a site with
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some equipment but ready to be quickly built into a production environment. Thejandra
(2014) argued the cold site could be a non-IT facility that can be used for an extended
period. A warm site will have the technology equipment, but disaster recovery efforts
will need to be completed in major tasks to resume the system. A host site will normally
operate in an active-active state where data processing can be computed in the primary
data center or the alternate data center with only minor configuration changes (Jones,
2007; Thejandra, 2014). Hot sites will have near real-time backup data from
synchronization processes to ensure the data is available if there is a loss of a data center.
Distance is often discussed as a factor in determining where the alternate data center can
reside. Neaga et al. (1997) claimed you could have alternate sites in the same building
with fire being the only major risk. Jones (2007) argued that distance between data
centers was critical to avoid disasters from power grid failures, hurricanes, flooding, and
supply chain and distribution disruptions. The choice of a recovery site is an important
decision-making action. Organizations must choose the applicable strategy that can
maximize the use of the monetary investment in the data center. Recovery capacity and
availability of resources, during the interruption, must be considered for operating the
critical data processing and business processes.
The return on investment (ROI) is often discussed when disaster recovery is being
budgeted. Cybulski (2016), Hiatt (2000), Million (1997), Sarmiento, Hoberman, Jerath,
and Ferreira Jordao (2016), and Stanton (2005) argued the return on investment for
disaster recovery makes good business sense, and when a single event triggered the
response activity, the investment has been realized. The initial cost to an organization to
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start the planning process is a small investment in employee time to start the planning the
risk assessment phases of an disaster recovery framework. Sarmiento et al. (2016) wrote
the benefits from the BCM understanding how intangible components of the business
impact tangible decision-making can reap relevant ROI results. Stanton (2005) argued
that standard ROI calculations may not apply. Similar to the purchasing of insurance,
until the organization experiences the need to recover the business the ROI will not be
obvious. Once the disaster event is experienced, and the BCP program is leveraged, the
investment is justified (Sarmiento et al., 2016). The better argument for ROI may come
from the focus being placed on interruption risks to assure customers and partners that the
organization has placed priority on reducing risks to an acceptable level.
Traditionally the information technology risk assessment for disaster recovery has
been identified as a responsibility of the technical staff because they would have the best
understanding of what technologies comprise the infrastructure. Moreover, technology
risk assessments have typically been performed within the technology department with
little input from other departments. Schmitting and Munns (2010) claimed that a
traditional business risk assessment method had reached a limitation as technology
systems have become more complex and integrated into all aspects of the business. Hiatt
(2000) claimed that a technology risk assessment assists in planning, can improve the
business, reduce recovery problems, and produce better-managed disaster recovery
controls. The technology risk assessment may differ from traditional risk assessment
depending on the business sector. A technology risk assessment includes identifying a
large sample of technology threats, which include hacking, malicious administrative
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insider, computer fraud, the value of various types of data, and disasters affecting
technology infrastructure that would not normally be evaluated under a traditional risk
assessment (Schmitting & Munns, 2010). An information technology risk assessment can
be aided by recognized guidance from existing works such as the ISACAs IT risk
practitioners guide, CERT Guide to Threats, Council on Cybersecurity critical security
controls, NIST cybersecurity framework, and the OWASP top ten. The ISACA defined
the objective of the technology risk assessment is to understand the security
requirements, connected network architectures, information available, physical assets
available, the location of data repositories, applications in use, security components,
authentication mechanisms, regulation the organization must adhere to, and what
documented policies are used. Lanz (2015) argued that information technology risk is
like traditional audit risk and managers should consider the combination of detective risk
strategies and technology controls to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Lanz recognized
that firms might need to bring in a technology resource to address the cyber-risks and
complexities that may not be present from traditional audit staff. Each organization will
be different. Thus the decision of how to conduct the information technology risk
assessment, what to include, and how the risks will be prioritized will be dependent on
how that organization has their technology deployed.
The basic information technology disaster recovery planning contains recovery
scoping, processes and procedures for specific technologies, business impact assessment
actions, rules for invocation, identification of team’s responsibilities, backup strategies,
restoration procedures, stakeholders, plan maintenance, and required testing (Lam, 2002;
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Lord, 1981; Neaga et al., 1997; Rittinghouse & Ransome, 2011; Wold, 2002). Butler
(1998) claimed that most companies perform the least amount of disaster recovery
planning as possible and ignore the potential for disasters. Instead, many organizations
rely on redundant networks and computers to keep the data processing functioning. In
designing the plan, organizations will identify critical business services, establish
recovery time objectives, affirm key constraints, identification of possible strategies, and
the drafting of plans to meet senior management’s goals. Disaster plan scoping is an
important concept in the planning process.
The purpose of scoping is to gain a clear understanding of what systems the
information technology disaster recovery program will recover. Butler (1998) argued that
the recovering of computers and data following a disaster was no longer sufficient for
modern businesses as disaster recovery plans must now take into consideration all critical
business operations that use the same technology. Organizations must have a clear
understanding of the scope of the technology being resumed, or there will be a gap in the
disaster response.
Whether the disaster is sudden or an emanate event is on the horizon, human
judgment is needed to decide when to act on the disaster planning. The purpose of
planning for invocation is for the disaster recovery teams to understand when to stand
down and when to put the plan into action. A routine problem or maintenance downtime
should not be eligible to be a disaster and have the plan invoked. A data center power
anomaly may not invoke the plan, but a prolonged power outage that cannot be restored
before the uninterrupted power supply (UPS) fails may deem acceptable to invoke the
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plan. Hiatt (2000) and Thejendra (2014) wrote the decision of an emergency management
team or assigned figurehead, using the best available information, should be the authority
to invoke all or part of the plan. Hiatt (2000) and Toigo (1989) listed principles that can
be used contribute to the decision-making process to invoke the plan:


Can the organization maintain routine operations?



Can the damage be contained without affecting normal operations?



Are facts about the disaster being taken at face value and without bias?



Can the organization coordinate activities ahead of time to mitigate the risk?



Is this solely a technology problem?

Defining the point at which the organization will failover will differ depending on the
organization and the disaster. An advantage is leveraged when the organization has a
defined set of disaster scenarios metrics where the plan will be invoked when
experienced. Many organizations will have comprehensive, traditional disaster recovery
program but will be likely to invoke the plan only for very significant outages lasting
greater than a day. For those organizations in this state, invoking disaster recovery is seen
as a significant task and in dealing with the disaster plan is considered the lesser of two
evils.
Testing is a significant component in the quality of the information technology
disaster recovery program. Butler (1998) claimed the purpose of conducting disaster
recovery testing is to determine if the plan is working as expected by the stakeholders.
Lam (2002) highlighted the need for technology testing to rehearse the schedule of
events, assess the plan, identify the weaknesses for improvement, and to ensure the

44
distribution of the plan is at the correct levels. Neaga et al. (1997) pointed to research
indicating that during an actual disaster event the plan is rarely executed as planned. The
purpose of testing is to provide revisions to the plan that will mirror the changes being
conducted in the infrastructure and applications over time. No disaster plan is foolproof,
and there are limitations to disaster recovery strategies. Testing should include
unannounced drills, conducted during various times, targeted destruction, documentation
of test results, and a corrective action plan written (Butler, 1998). Hiatt (2000) wrote that
the only way to get reasonable assurance that the plan will produce the expected results is
to test the plan. Plans can be tested by conceptual group activities such tabletops or fieldbased simulations that will walk through the documentation and plans to understand how
the response will be conducted on paper. Alternatively, plans can be tested with an
activity to failover the organization’s primary to the designated alternative business
processes and locations for a period (Hiatt, 2000; Togio, 1989). Testing is important
because of the living nature of disaster recovery planning. As Togio (1989) pointed out,
plans must be maintained and tested to keep up with the ever-expanding technology
embedded in business processes.
The development of written disaster recovery policies and procedures should be
conducted for managing all major applications, technology infrastructure, data centers
and critical processes that rely on technology. Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) and
Wold (2002), wrote the disaster recovery plan should document the before, during and
after the activity of the affected system, application or datacenter. Rittinghouse and
Ransome commented that the documentation would normally overlap with other
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components of the business continuance plan and redundancy should be removed. Butler
(1998), Fallara, (2003), and Wold (2002) highlighted the importance of executive
management understanding and agreeing to use the written policy. The act of writing the
policy solidifies the work that has been conducted in the phases of the disaster recovery
lifecycle. Wold (2002) claimed that it is advantageous to an organization to develop preformatted policy templates to facilitate the writing process and provides consistency to
the teams using the plan. The written disaster recovery plan organizes the detailed
procedure, identifies chronological steps, and provides a roadmap for the maintenance or
creation of policies. A thoroughly developed information technology disaster recovery
plan will consider the team approach and have assignments for functional components of
the resumption.
Laws and regulations influencing disaster recovery.
In the U.S., presidents, federal, and state legislators have written several laws,
regulations, and executive orders influencing the disaster recovery field over several
decades. The regulations span from protecting public confidence to assisting
communities to recover from natural disasters. In some cases, the regulation applies to
government agencies while another regulation is assigned to the private business. This
literature research reviewed several applicable statutes but what is discussed is not
intended to be a comprehensive list. Organizations should consider the regulations that
may be applicable and if the intent of the regulation is being met by the controls in place.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 instituted an internal control mechanism for
corporations that placed responsibility on executive management for maintaining
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adequate controls over financial procedures and reporting (Law & Robson, 2014; SEC,
n.d.). The Exchange of 1934 act was passed to provide the public with confidence in the
financial data being presented and overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Benston (1973) wrote that the financial legislation is believed to have forced
organizations to pay closer attention to how financial data is generated, and more
importantly retained to mitigate loss from a disaster. The mid-1970s to the 1980s marked
the appearance of several regulations that were created which included disaster
management concepts for public organizations. These regulations would lead to the
business continuance movement known today. Dietel (2015) described the Flood Disaster
Act (1973) as the major introduction of disaster recovery plans to organizations that
would directly impact the communities where they existed. The Flood Disaster Act
allowed the government to offer subsidies to owners that accepted the requirements of the
program. The Flood Disaster Act intended to reduce flood damage throughout a
community by introducing an insurance mechanism (Dietel, 2015). The United States
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (1977) was a separate implementation of disaster
recovery planning for organizations. Elliot, Swartz, and Herbane (2010) claimed the
FCPA required public organizations to have internal mitigating controls to safeguard
assets from a disaster. Schreider (1996) wrote that the disaster recovery aspects of the
FCPA come in the Standard of Care wording that evaluated organizations on
mismanagement of data. The Office of Comptroller of Currency’s Banking Circular BC177 (1983) regulated financial institutions to implement disaster recovery plans. Hall
(1989) and Schreider (1996) described the BC-177 as a control that made banks prove to
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an examiner that a disaster recovery program was in place, had been tested, and it was
likely to succeed. The BC-177 was important because it made bankers aware of the
importance of a disaster recovery program. The United States Expedited Funds
Availability Act (1989) added to the need for disaster recovery and business continuity
plans in U.S. federal chartered financial institutions (Dahlberg & Guay, 2015). The
Federal Reserve (2016) defined the requirements for next-day availability and the need
for the institution to make transactions available by the next business day. The
Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
from 1980 were written to address the cleanup efforts following a human-made or natural
disaster (Revesz & Stewart, 2016). Davis, Strell, and Wallace (2005) wrote that CERLA
is well suited for responding to natural disasters because it was written to apply to a wide
array of substances including water, soil, and air. A critical component of Section 104(a)
of the CERLA defined the government authority to act when the substantial danger to the
public is determined (Davis, Strell, & Wallace, 2005).
New regulations emerged in the 1990s that forced organizations to build a set of
stronger mitigation steps to protect critical assets and customer data. Organizational
incident response strategies and resilience planning were targeted by legislators to be
mandatorily improved. A significant upgrade of disaster recovery legislation was written,
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) developed a DR standard
(Herbane, 2010). The ISO lead the disaster recovery movement into a more mature state
with roadmaps for organizations to gain improvements in their DR programs and
provided the ability to certify to the standard. The 1993 Office of Management and
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Budget (OMB) Circular A-130 sought to place attention to government records,
specifically strategic planning, to ensure record preservation is conducted (OMB, 2000).
Bartock, et al. (2016) noted the A-130 circular forced a redesign of organization’s DR
programs to leverage the use technology systems to preserve records in the event of a
disaster. The circular highlighted that information technology is not the sole solution to
the problem but one set of resources to meet the objective of recovery of critical records.
An important aspect of the A-130 was that the circular specifically called for federal
information systems administrators to be trained to manage the technology resumption
effectively. Aligning with business continuity planning, the A-130 circular specifically
pointed to risk assessment activities to understand the magnitude of the harm that would
exist from the loss or modification of federal information. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 is widely known as the privacy and
technology regulation that applied to the healthcare industry. Cervone and Cervone
(2016) claimed HIPAA’s primary purpose was not technology security but more
importantly designed to improve the resiliency of the data used for patients. The HIPAA
Security Rule Standard 164.308(a)(7) Contingency Plan was specifically written for
governing the use of the protected health information (PHI) and how the safeguards will
keep the data safe by the recovery strategies (Cervone & Cervone, 2016; Rittinghouse &
Ransome, 2011). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 was similar to HIPAA
in that the regulation intended to enhance the financial services sector by providing a
clear framework for regulation that included disaster recovery components (Rittinghouse
& Ransome, 2011). Executive management team members that are proven to have fallen
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short of compliance may be subject up to a $250,000 fine and a prison term for each
violation (Cervone & Cervone, 2016; Rittinghouse & Ransome, 2011). In 2002, the U.S.
Congress set into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 in response to a wave of
high-profile reporting scandals (Cervone & Cervone, 2016; Elliot et al., 2010; Garner,
Hutchison, & Conover, 2016). Although Sarbanes-Oxley does not specifically create
controls for BCP or DR, Cervone and Cervone (2016) and Elliot, Swartz, and Herbane
(2010) argued the requirements of the act invoke BCM concepts through a risk
management requirement that applies to public organizations. Sections 302 and 404 of
SOX require publicly traded companies to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal
controls protecting financial data. The GLBA and HIPAA regulations are unique in the
disaster recovery space due to the penalties that can be levied when an entity is found to
be out of compliance. Iguer, Medromi, Sayouti, and Tallal (2016), Samanta and Dugal
(2016), and Srinivasan (2016) claimed that providing disaster recovery controls is
commonly used as audit control evidence to show compliance by the organization.
The President of the United States has implemented controls over the years
through the issuing of presidential directives. In 2003, the Department of Homeland
Security published the Presidential Policy Directive 7 (PPD-7) that reinforced the need
for a risk assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources to terrorist attacks. The
PPD-7 pointed to an important fact that it is not possible to protect all critical
infrastructure but focusing on strategic improvements can lessen the impact of attacks
that may occur (Department of Homeland Security, 2003). Niglia (2015) wrote that
Section 7(d) of the directive is important in that it enhances protections that will assist in
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the capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the delivery of private sectors essential
services such as the energy sector, transportation sector, and nuclear sector. In 2011, the
Department of Homeland Security published the Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8)
that sought to strengthen the resilience of the United States via risk assessments focused
on terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and natural disasters (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2011). The goal of the PPD-8 was to account for concrete,
measurable, and prioritized objectives that could be used to mitigate risk. PPD-8 assigned
responsibility to the assistant to the President for Homeland to periodically review the
progress of the government's risk plan and to produce reporting metrics from meetings
with federal, community-based, and private organizations. The presidential directives
offer an advantage to disaster recovery teams in that the directives offer requirements and
raise awareness of the need to focus on disaster recovery practices.
Some disaster recovery guidance has come from national emergency management
agencies. Karter (2003) claimed that $12.4 billion in property damage was recorded in
2012 and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) develops publishes and
disseminates standards to minimize the effects of fire and other risks. The National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 (2010) recommended improved practices for
disaster management involving the fire code, life safety, and vehicle safety. The NFPA
1600 standard defined several elements for disaster recovery and emergency management
that included emergency response, responsibilities, actions to take to save lives, and
communication channels (Kellman, 2016; McLaughlin, 2005).
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Disaster Recovery Standards, Certifications, and Guidelines
One of the major challenges of disaster recovery and the need for management
involvement comes from the inability to recover all resources immediately following an
interruption. During the interruption, every application must wait in a priority queue to be
restored. The priority and procedures for determining how the organization will resume
the technology systems are at the core of the DR management practice. The body of
knowledge in information technology disaster recovery provided several models by
which an organization can choose to build and manage the information technology
disaster recovery program. The beginning of business continuance planning was a simple
component of technology and financial standards and over time evolved into an important
role for organizations to consider (Pasquini & Galie, 2013). Several models, guidance,
and frameworks have been presented by researchers and standards bodies such as the
International Organization of Standards.
The IT Governance Institute and ISACA collaborated to present the COBIT
framework. The COBIT framework’s main objective was to link business goals with IT
goals. One major advantage of the COBIT in DR came from the guidance of top-level
decision making within the organization as it pertained to disaster planning. The DSS04
objective of COBIT detailed the necessity to ensure continued services (Iqbal et al., 2016;
Pasquini & Galie, 2013). Butler (1998) described a general, six-step disaster recovery
model that has been widely adopted. Butler’s plan started with demonstrating the
business value of disaster recovery. Butler claimed the model’s strength came when
Management commitment is obtained, the current configuration is documented, DR
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planners compose how the business uses the technology, the disaster recovery budget is
funded, and the DR planners develop disaster recovery plans. Bishoff et al. (2015)
described a model by Miram Kahn detailing a four-phase disaster response that can apply
to any disaster. The Miram Kahn model included notification response, assessment of
damages, rescue and recovery, and resumption of services. Gibb and Buchannan (2006)
proposed a disaster recovery framework where the recovery process was compared to
phases of a project. The Gibb and Buchannan framework provided inputs and outputs for
nine project activities necessary to reach the organization’s resilience goals. Neaga et al.
(1997) presented a model where data categories were used to define the backup and
recovery, application, database, infrastructure and system to assist in finding the critical
systems needing to be recovered. Kadar (2015) provided a BCM risk index that allowed
disaster planners to conduct metrics and status of the BCM program. Kadar’s goal was to
allow organizations to align the risk index to the culture or the organization. The Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) addressed knowledge issues in the
organization and highlighted the critical role of knowledge in disaster risk reduction
(Weichselgartner & Pigeon, 2015). The SFDRR assisted in understanding disaster risk,
strengthening governance to manage risk, investing in risk reduction, and enhancing
preparedness for an effective response. The British standard BS25999 was published in
2006 and provided an agnostic approach that organizations could follow for their BCM
planning (Herbane, 2010). The ISO 17799 is an international security standard that
covers ten different sections. The ISO 17799 sections are defined as business continuity
planning, system access control, system development and maintenance, physical and
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environmental security, compliance, personnel security, security organization, computer
and network management, asset classification and control, and security policy (Grigonis,
2002). The ISO 22301 outlined the requirements to implement a disaster recovery
program. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016) and Bajgoric (2014) noted the ISO 22301 was
specifically written to be applicable to all industries and is the most influential standard in
the disaster recovery literature. The Department of Homeland Security published the
Ready.gov site to provide information to build an information technology disaster
recovery plan for businesses to leverage. The National Disaster Recovery Framework
(NDRF) provided an evolving framework for disaster planners to address disaster
recovery (Chand & Loosemore, 2016; Smith, 2017). NIST Special Publications (SP) 80034 series defined the contingency planning for information technology systems. Elliot et
al. (2010) wrote that the 800-34 publication had a clear focus on technology and the
planning methodology offered a similar approach to BCM planning. dPlan, an online
disaster planning tool for civic institutions, was released by the National Center for
Preservation Technology and Training (NCPTT) to allow for easy creation of a disaster
plan (Yeh, McMullen, & Kane, 2010). The dPlan program collects data through a
simplified questionnaire process to create a customized plan that can be maintained by an
organization. Yeh, McMullen, and Kane (2010) argued that although the dPlan could
develop a comprehensive plan, many found the plan lacked vital, necessary sections and
was considered time-consuming.
Bartock, Cichonski, Souppaya, Smith, Witte, and Scarfone (2016) wrote that
existing federal policies, standards, and guidelines exist for cyber event handling but
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none focus on improving cybersecurity recovery capabilities. Bartock et al. (2016)
claimed the fundamental information is not found in a single document but spread out in
security, contingency, disaster recovery and BCP plans. Although there are many models,
frameworks, and guidance, there is a gap when it comes to specifically preparing an
disaster recovery program for computer crimes induced interruptions. The generalities of
these models can assist an entity in preparing for a general response and recovery, but the
models found in the literature do not provide clear guidance on additional steps that
would address the emerging risk from computer crimes.
First Responders
A first responder is often associated with the personnel that is first to perform the
medical response at the scene of trauma. Bobko and Kamin (2015) defined the first
responder as fire, police, medical personnel, and in some cases civilians. Bobko and
Kamin claimed that in most of the cases following a disaster the first responder is not a
formally trained person. Bystanders are often thrust into situations where they can take
actions to stabilize the situation until trained first responders can arrive. Similarly,
organizational employees can often be pulled into disaster response without having any
formal knowledge of how to successfully recover the business during the interruption.
Butler (1998) wrote that once a disaster is experienced, the first responders must know
their roles if the organization plans to maximize the success of the recovery. Bishoff
(2015) and Lam (2002) claimed the organization should consider who is assigned to the
response team as the members of the team should be able to perform when placed under a
significant amount pressure from the disaster recovery. Rabjohn (2013) explained that
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first responders could experience trauma through the exposure to a human suffering from
the effects of the disaster. A law enforcement officer may work a murder one day, a fatal
car accident the next day, and witness a human drowning the next. The psychological
stress can compound according to Rabjohn (2013) and reduce the capacity of the
response. After the incident has been experienced, the first responders initially gather and
triage the casualties (Butler, 1998; Kamali, Bish, & Glick, 2017). The triage process will
categorize the known casualties based on the severity. Kamali et al. (2017) and Tucker
(2014) claimed the purpose of the first responders conducting the triage process is to use
the available resources most efficiently.
There are several methods used by first responders when conducting the triage.
The Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment Method (SMART), Homebush, Triage Sieve,
Sacco Triage Method (STM) and CESIRA are the more popular found in the literature
(Jain, Ragazzoni, Stryhn, Stratton, & Della Corte, 2015; Kamali et al., 2017; Lea &
Tippett, 2017). The Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (C-TECC) took
experience from military events learned from the battlefield and applied the knowledge to
improving the civilian first responder activities. C-TECC is overseen by a broad range of
leaders focused on high-threat medicine, fire, rescue, emergency medicine, emergency
medical services, police, and the special military operations community. Pennardt et al.
(2016) wrote that the TECC had become a professionalized, national, standard core of
competencies that created a common language for incident response capabilities
regardless of the situation. Pennardt et al. (2016) pointed out that despite major efforts by
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government agencies, there are still no nationally agreed-upon standards for first
responder certification or training.
Rodriguez (2016) wrote about the differences between an information technology
disaster recovery incident responder versus the traditional medical responder. Rodriguez
claimed the technology-focused first responders operate with ROI as the primary
consideration and would assess and prioritize technology tasks based on the urgency or
recovery time objectives. Rodriguez (2016) stated the triage process that is utilized by
medical first responders is transferable to technology management. Technology first
responders can take concepts from mature incident response models and use them when
recovering technology systems. Ning, Wong, and Shi (2015) wrote that the technology
incident response at the core is simply an approach for commanding, controlling, and
coordinating the recovery team’s effort. Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) claimed the
technology first responder must focus on the business effect of the disaster as opposed to
a damage assessment.
Entities that do not focus on obtaining the correct talent for the initial response
risk the responders failing to execute the plan as expected. Organizations looking to
improve the quality of disaster response will place time and effort into choosing and
training the people that will make up the first responders. By training responders and
running testing scenarios, organizations can keep the knowledge necessary for disaster
recovery fresh in the minds of those responsible for the task.
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Disaster Planners
Alexander (2015) and Lam (2002) defined disaster planners’ activities as a
coordinated process of preparing to match urgent needs with available resources. The
phases include research, documentation, dissemination, testing the plan, and revising.
The disaster plan is a living document that is continually evolving to match the changing
business procedures needed in the emergency response. Disaster planning involves a
combination of plans and procedures, informed by planners, to be used by the incident
responders. Alexander (2015) wrote that disaster planning must be realistic and pragmatic
activity but also a collaborative process. There is no use in planning to use resources that
would not likely be available during a disaster and planners should highlight where
resources may be a problem in the recovery. The role of planners must consider the
scarcity of resources during the recovery. To avoid an omission or major flaw in a
disaster plan, disaster planners should have experience and training. Alexander (2015)
and Smith (2017) wrote that the planning profession had been described as a vehicle to
transfer knowledge, expand alternatives, generate social change, inform citizens, foster
sustainable improvements, and identify vulnerabilities. Disaster planners are commonly
employed by the organization to project manage the activity of disaster recovery.
Stakeholders, a component of the planning team, are integral to disaster planning.
Mojtahedi and Oo (2017) defined a stakeholder as the entity involved in decision-making
and benefits from the resumption of the organization. The main goal of the stakeholder is
to improve the performance of the disaster recovery project. Mojtahedi and Oo’s (2017)
research found where stakeholders exhibited legitimacy and urgency in the planning
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process were where a reduced the effect of disasters was experienced. Alexander (2015)
and Smith (2017) claimed that disaster planners should not be frightened of a black swan
or unanticipated events because the black swan has been replaced by the red herring.
Alexander claimed very little in the future that had not occurred in some form from the
past. Disaster planners hold a significant role in the success of the resumption of the
organization. Planning, testing, pre-coordination with the teams and education are all
major components found in the literature. Organizations that can dedicate resources to
proper planning improve the ability to resume from a technology disaster quickly.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a large component of disaster recovery programs. Butler
(1998) defined risk as the product of impact and probability. Al Hamed and Alenezi
(2016) and Grigonis (2002) described a risk management plan as a systematic and
analytical tool which establishes the likelihood and a known threat where harm would fall
on the organization. To decrease risk to the organization, a disaster recovery management
team should plan to minimize the effect of a disaster by understanding the specific
exposures to their organization. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016), Bishoff et al. (2015), and
Neaga et al. (1997) pointed to the need to conduct a risk assessment before any disaster
recovery solution could be constructed. The purpose of conducting the risk assessment
activity was to quantify where potential problems the organization may be exposed. The
risk assessment is an avenue for selecting the applicable mitigating controls. Lord (1981),
Toigo (1989), and Tucker (2014) claimed risk assessment is a commonly misunderstood
aspect of disaster recovery planning and poorly written or missing risk assessments will
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lead to failure to recover. Grigonis (2002) described where a simple matrix of events
could be used to document how resources can be affected by disaster events. Lord (1981)
wrote the tough part of risk assessment is found in accepting that there is an unknown
quantity, in the future, where an estimated loss must be made. The ability to recover all
technology components of the organization during an interruption is extremely difficult
and may be costly depending on the type of disaster. Neaga et al. (1997) wrote the risk
assessment activity allows business processes to be evaluated for their negative impact on
the organization when they are unavailable. A successful risk assessment should result in
the required preventative measures, the type of recovery required, and acceptance of risks
not being addressed.
There are multiple risk assessment frameworks leveraged by organizations across
the globe. Yang et al. (2016) wrote that the NIST SP 800-30 Risk Management Guide for
Information Technology Systems provided a common baseline for all levels of personnel
and the 800-30 framework can be used to support the risk management process in disaster
recovery. The CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology (CRAMM) was
developed by a British government organization to calculate risks from vulnerabilities
and assets. Yang, Ku, and Liu (2016) claimed the CRAMM provided organizations with
the ability to pick the risk appetite for important versus unimportant assets. The
Information Security Risk Assessment Model and the InfoSec Assessment Methodology
(IAM) are leveraged by multiple U.S. Federal agencies to assist federal managers to
implement an enterprise information security risk assessment process. Clark, Dawkins,
and Hale (2005) argued the InfoSec Assessment Methodology provides a means to gain
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an understanding of critical systems but does not adequately draw relationships between
the assets and the objectives of the assessment such as recovering from a disaster. The
Vendor Risk Assessment and Threat Evaluation (V-RATE), Security Attribute
Evaluation Method (SEAM), Risk Filtering, Ranking and Management Model (RFRM),
Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA), Control Objectives for Information and related
Technology (COBIT), and Operationally Critical Threat Asset and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE) are all well known risk assessment frameworks that can be used
to streamline and optimize the assessment of technology risks for organizations (Allen, &
Sledge, 2002; Axelrod, 2016; Haimes, Kaplan, & Lambert, 2002; Snyder, 2014; Yang et
al., 2016).
Organizations must understand how critical processes will be impacted by an
interruption and which will need to be resumed first. Regardless of the risk model or
framework that is used, any form of risk analysis done properly will establish likelihoods
and threat to the organization. By building an understanding of the risks that can impact
the organization, management teams can spend money and resources to mitigate the
threats and document the recovery plans needed to resume the process.
Dangers of Disasters to Organizations
Organizations have multiple threat vectors that can affect standard operating
procedures. Some threats have been a risk since the beginning of civilization while other
threats have evolved. Lord (1981) recorded that it was estimated in 1985 that there would
be $30 billion dollars of loss due to computer fraud. Liao, Balasinorwala, and Rao (2017)
claimed that in 2017 the estimation of computer fraud reached $100 billion and is
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estimated to be two trillion by the year 2019. To better understand the risks to an
organization, planners must look at traditional threats and the emerging cybersecurity
threats.
Traditional threats. Natural disasters negatively affect homes, businesses,
infrastructure, and communications which ultimately affect people. Not all disasters are
equal events, and not all people are affected in the same way. Flooding from
thunderstorms, tornadoes, dam breaks, snow melts, or storm surges was the most
common type of disaster to affect communities in the United States (Philips, 2015).
Flooding brings damage to electronics, furniture, buildings, roads, and in some cases
wastewater treatment needed for clean water. In the 1990s, flood damages to people and
businesses in the United States neared $50 billion (Koenig, 2016). Storms as a natural
hazard can vary in damage and impact. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 claimed 23 lives, cost
the state of Florida and Louisiana over $26.5 billion, and displaced entire communities
(Logan, Issar, & Xu, 2016; Philips, 2015). Texas, Kanas, and Oklahoma hold a high risk
of tornados which can reach wind speeds of 200 miles per hour. Winds at this speed can
level entire commercial buildings and residential homes. Research by Kantamaneni et al.
(2015) revealed that tornado research in 2013 recorded 54 fatalities with damages of $3.6
billion. Lord (1981) and Wold (2002) alleged the fire had been the highest probability of
being the disaster as compared with other general threats such as flooding or ice storms.
In some cases, as in a 1997 North Dakota flood, fire is a result of an initial, separate
disaster which will do more damage than the initial event (Kweit, & Kweit, 2004).
Fallara (2003) noted the threat of fire is the primary reason organizations backup systems
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to offsite locations. Earthquakes are determined by magnitude, motion, and duration.
Depending on the earthquake and the construction standards of the buildings,
considerable damage can be experienced. The Kobe Japan earthquake of 1995 was
considered the costliest earthquake to have occurred with losses of a $132 billion. In
2010, a magnitude-seven earthquake was experienced in Haiti, which led to over 32,000
deaths (Miura, Midorikawa, & Matsuoka, 2016; Philips, 2015). The high death toll of the
Haiti earthquake was linked to substandard building codes and may serve as a warning to
disaster planners choosing data center locations for organizations. Modern technology
and communications systems run on stable, waveform electricity. Blackouts, dropouts,
brownouts, surges, and phase shifts can damage and create anomalies in technology
infrastructure. Electrical anomaly problems and complete outages exist as a threat to
organizations in the number of millions of dollars each year and thousands of hours of
downtime (Grigonis, 2002). Organizations will deploy uninterrupted power supplies
(UPS) and diesel generators to supply clean power to the data center in the event of
anomalies or service interruptions and to mitigate the risk of electrical issues. Sizing of
the UPS should be considered. Small office home office (SOHO) or mid-sized UPS may
not handle the power needs of a larger organization when a complete power failure is
experienced. The right choice of a UPS can prevent a disaster (Butler, 1998; Grigonis,
2002).
Hazardous materials are another threat that must be considered. Toxic spills,
chemical explosions, train derailment, or debris from severe storms can become
expensive problems for affected organizations. Philips (2015) wrote that 4.5 million
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facilities in the United States work with some form of hazardous materials and could
cause a disruption in a business process of production, use, transportation, or disposal.
The United States has installed a super fund from the Comprehensive Environment
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) from 1980 that was allocated to
repair the damages from a hazardous materials disaster (Revesz & Stewart, 2016).
Regulations from the state and federal level will need to be considered when dealing with
a hazardous materials disaster. Disaster planners should consider what chemicals are in
use in the organization and understand how they could create a disaster scenario.
Terrorism can be a difficult hazard due to the nature of the deliberate and
unexpected attack on innocent people and organizations (Philips, 2015). Terrorism’s goal
is to cause physical and psychological harm to people, infrastructure, communities, and
nations. Terrorism can be domestic or international and negatively affects governments,
organizations, and individuals. Brooks (2011) wrote the terrorist attack on September
2001 that leveled World Trade Center buildings created a disaster that took the lives of
many Americans and due to the destruction, ended the ability for some organizations to
stay in business. Grigonis (2002) wrote about the actions of a nefarious individual or
group could spell disaster for an organization. When an individual has internal access to
the technology infrastructure with malicious intent, the organization could be disrupted
by undetermined means. Hiatt (2000) and Lord (1981) wrote that people must be
considered when listing hazards and studies have shown that the greatest risk involving
computer-related disasters come from people. Patterson et al. (2002) claimed human

64
operators will always make errors, even when they have a clear understanding of what to
do.
Natural and human-made disasters are a common and reoccurring threat to
organizations. Although the threats are wide-ranging, organizations should be able to
identify and craft controls that can mitigate the risks of these disasters. The body of
knowledge on natural disasters is large, and the responses that were taken to recover the
technology infrastructure is available. Organizational planners should look closely at
what natural disasters the organization may be vulnerable to and apply the necessary
mitigating controls to the disaster plan.
Current cyber-attack threats. Devastating losses can emerge from an
interruption of technology infrastructure. Butler (1998) and Schultz and Shumway (2001)
noted when an organization is conducting any aspect of business on the internet, risks are
introduced that must be considered. In the 2015 state of cybercrime survey (PWC, 2015),
76% of the respondents claimed they were more concerned about cybercrimes than in
previous years. Vaidya (2015) claimed that cyber-attacks not only cause billions of
dollars in damage but have lasting psychological effects on the victims. Raiyn (2014) and
Schultz and Shumway (2001) listed the common cybersecurity related threats as
reconnaissance, access, reputation, harassment, denial of service, eavesdropping,
extortion, pornography trafficking, subversion, and hoaxes. Rittinghouse and Ransome
(2011) listed categories of internet fraud as financial, gaming, communications, utility,
insurance, government, investment, business, and confidence. The 2016 ISACA State of
Cybersecurity RSA conference survey revealed the threat from computer crimes, and
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other information security breaches continue unchecked, and the financial impact of those
losses increases every year (ISACA, 2016). According to the survey, 28% of the ISACA
respondents reported a loss of intellectual property to cyber incidents at least quarterly,
25% indicated intentional damage to computer systems at least quarterly, 42% indicated
they would be able to detect only simple cybersecurity issues, and 31% recorded
cybercriminals had exploited their organization within the last year. While attacks have
become more sophisticated and the motivations behind them seem to evolve each year.
Barber (2001), Butler (1998), and Gagneja and Gagneja (2015) claimed the primary focus
of company breaches led to financial gain, extortion, intellectual property theft, and
disruption of service.
The emerging cyber threat continues to flourish because the computer crimes
vector is cheaper, more convenient, and less risky than other vectors of attack (JangJaccard, & Nepal, 2014). Stalans and Finn (2016) wrote that the Internet invites deviance
and crime by providing a mechanism for alternative justifications and viewpoints into a
form of cybercrime. The exponential growth of the business conducted on the internet
and by the technology used in core business processes has led to significant growth in
cybercrime. As of 2016, 96% of data breaches involved external actors with financial
motivation (Verizon, 2017). The literature on cybersecurity attacks contains a significant
number of high-profile events that were directed towards critical infrastructure,
companies, government agencies and the public. Several of these events were first-time
scenarios and pointed to the capability of future attacks. In 1988, Burleson was convicted
of a third-degree felony in the United States’ first computer virus trial. Burleson planted
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malicious routines into data processing software being utilized in a securities and
insurance firm (Marion, 1988). The malicious software destroyed data and erased volatile
memory thirty days after Burleson was terminated from the organization. Burleson’s
attack caused an undisclosed amount of damages to his company in recovery and
reputation. The 1999 Melissa virus, written by Smith, was designed to replicate
exponentially by exploiting Microsoft Word and internal email systems (Ford, 1999;
Simons, 1999). Melissa damages were estimated at $1.1 billion, and even though the
virus did not have a malicious payload, it did cause a considerable denial of service to
corporate email servers across the globe. The Code Red worm of 2001 infected over
350,000 computers in less than half a day by exploiting the Microsoft IIS service and
damages to organizations were estimated at $2.6 billion (Vaidya, 2015). The Blaster
worm and Slammer worm created havoc on the internet in 2003 causing a denial of
service attacks and affecting Microsoft SQL Server (Moore, Paxson, Savage, Shannon,
Staniford, & Weaver, 2003). The Stuxnet virus attack of 2010 physically destroyed over
one thousand nuclear reactors in Tehran and significantly set back the Iranian atomic
program (Singer, 2015; Steiner, 2014). Stuxnet was a multifaceted virus, and the
complexity of this type of attack had not been seen before the release. Stuxnet attack had
four never-before-seen, targeted, vulnerability exploits and used digital signatures that
were stolen from legitimate organizations. Singer (2015) claimed the Stuxnet malware
was the first specially designed cyber weapon designed by a government agency to do
physical harm. In 2011, over 217,000 Citibank customer records were stolen by external
hackers, resulting in a multi-million-dollar loss to the company (Aspan & Soh, 2011;
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Vaidya, 2015). The Citibank attack consisted of hackers using keyloggers to gain user
access to critical servers to defraud the company (Vaidya, 2015). In 2004, the Sasser
computer worm infected global technology systems including Delta airlines which
resulted in disabled technology systems for transatlantic flights and several hospitals
were unable to operate until the technology could be repaired (Schultz, 2004; Steiner,
2014; Vaidya, 2015). The Estonia attacks of 2007, from a pro-Kremlin terrorist group,
used ping floods and botnets to denial of service banks, newspapers, government
systems, and communications for several days (Shackelford, 2009; Vaidya, 2015).
Estonia was a disastrous attack in that it was the most technology-centric country in
Europe where 90% of banking and government interfaces were delivered over the
Internet. Shackelford (2009) pointed out that Estonia was built to operate how a future
society would, and this is what made the attack more effective and was named the first
information warfare event on society. The Sasser worm of 2004 spread using a buffer
overflow in the local security authority of Windows 2000 and Windows XP operating
systems. The Sasser worm damage attributed to organizational outages was estimated at
over 550 million dollars (Schultz, 2004; Vaidya, 2015). Zimmerman and Restrepo (2009)
reported the Sasser worm disrupted an oil and gas platform for several days before the
systems could be restored and the platform usable. Bidgoli (2016), Solberg Søilen (2016),
and Vaidya (2015) commented on the Sony PlayStation network being compromised in
2011 by cyber hackers that caused $2 billion dollars in damages and the data exfiltration
of 77 million users credit card numbers. Sony experienced a 24-day outage as the
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company incident response team, which did not have a contingency plan, restored
systems and mitigated the vulnerabilities that allowed the breach (Solberg Søilen, 2016).
Cybersecurity experts believed that malware is the key weapon of the new cybercriminal (Jang-Jaccard, & Nepal, 2014). Ransomware, a form of malware that encrypts
data until a ransom is paid, is on the rise. A recently significant change to ransomware
has seen the attack move away from single targets and targeting vulnerable organizations
(Cabaj & Mazurczyk, 2016; Verizon, 2017). The largest ransomware payment to date, 1
million dollars, was recently paid by a web hosting firm after the technology department
realized that the backup to the systems needing the restoration was also encrypted
(Schwartz, 2017). Kharraz et al. (2015) claimed that cryptolocker ransomware has
infected over 250,000 computers and disrupted several critical infrastructures in the last
three years. Kharraz suggested that organizations need to invest in mitigating controls to
counter the significant, growing risk of this type of attack. Cabaj and Mazurczyk (2016)
argued that developers of the ransomware are constantly improving the attack and make
any existing countermeasures ineffective. Cabaj and Mazurczyk claimed that
organizations that can quickly find and block the communication between the infected
machine and the command infrastructure of the attacker could prevent the encryption of
the target. Lacking technical visibility poses a significant challenge for incident
responders as they lack the tools or required response time to act. Organizations would
need to provide monitoring technologies to the incident response team. The sharp rise of
this risk has created a response by a few organizations. The nomoreransom.org coalition
is comprised of 57 security vendors, law enforcement, and technology organizations to
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assist victims in the recovery of the encrypted data without paying the ransom (Allman,
2016; Mansfield-Devine, 2016; Verizon, 2017). Many organizations will need to rely on
disaster response and backup administrators to respond to a ransomware attack by
restoring infected systems to a known good period before the attack initiated. In the case
of the hosting entity, backup media needs to be protected and available to responders.
Phishing, coined on AOL in 1996, is a social engineering technique to acquire
information such as credentials or financial information to mascaraed as the user.
Alsharnouby, Alaca, and Chiasson (2015) claimed the assumption by the attacker is that
they will be able to deceive users into believing the communication is legitimate. The
2017 Verizon breach report recorded over 2400 major incidents due to social engineering
techniques with phishing being the entry point 90% of the time. Alsharnouby, Alaca, and
Chiasson (2015) and Khonji, Iraqi, and Jones (2013) highlighted the weakness in humans
being able to spot the attack allows the exploit to be difficult to mitigate and have led to
many organizations being breached. Organizations may find that they have been
compromised by external attackers acting as internal administrators via the stolen
credentials. In a major attack against the security company RSA, phishing was successful
in allowing attackers to compromise the organization and subsequently allowed the
attackers to pivot to Lockheed Martin (Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013). Researchers point
to the first line of defense in a phishing campaign is detection by the user (Khonji, Iraqi,
& Jones, 2013; Verizon, 2017). There are multiple lines of defense against a phishing
campaign that can be deployed (Alsharnouby et al., 2015; Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013;
Verizon, 2017):
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Organizations can work to take down the shared host by the phisher.



Users can be continually notified of various types of social engineering.



Organizations can deploy toolbars to rewrite HTTP links eliminating the
hidden destination that the user is being sent.



Blacklists and whitelists are frequently used block communications to the
Internet protocol of phishing webservers.



DNS-based blacklists use the DNS specification to inform on malformed
links that may be used by phishers.



Programmatic toolbar helpers can detect phishing activity through data
mining to alert users of the malicious intent of the link.

Education and awareness may not be enough to protect an organization from a phishing
attack. Disaster recovery responders should understand if the cause of the service
interruption is due to compromised credentials from a phishing campaign. If the
attacker’s intention is a disruption of the business, disaster responders may see services
that have been restored will be taken back offline. Complete eradication of the intruder's
stolen credentials will need to be conducted before the organization can be resumed.
Barber (2001) called the Denial of Service (DoS) attack one of the most infamous
attacks conducted by hackers to cause harm and had increased in size and complexity
over the last ten years. Long and Thomas (2001), Moore, Shannon, Brown, Voelker, and
Savage (2006), and Schuba et al. (1997) claimed a DoS attack leverages a weakness in
the TCP/IP protocol and cannot be corrected without significant changes to the standards
of the protocol. A DoS is initiated by an attacker by sending too many connection
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requests to the victim that causes the victim to allocate all available resources and
denying legitimate connections (Raiyn, 2014). DoS can be a significant nuisance to an
organization that is conducting business over the internet; unable to process legitimate
requests the organization will appear offline. Research by PWC (2015) indicated the DoS
has become increasingly damaging and is one of the most frequent types of attacks.
Schuba et al. (1997) claimed that organizations could defend against the DoS attack by
allocating more resources, reducing timeouts, modifying routers to block flooding SYN
packets, utilizing the firewall as a relay, and sending reset packets. The drawbacks to the
defenses are cost, stability, delays in communication, and continual monitoring by the
incident responders (Schuba et al., 1997). In 2015, a DoS attack affected the Microsoft
Xbox Live service for a week causing substantial connections problems for their gaming
customers. November 2016 a large distributed denial of service impacted half of the
internet as attackers targeted the Dyn domain name service company serving many of the
world’s largest organizations. In September of 2016, Krebs on Security was hit with a
DDoS that was 20 times larger than any DoS that had been previously recorded on the
internet and is thought to have been in retaliation to an article being published by the
researcher (Shuler & Smith, 2017). The Verizon 2017 breach report noted the finance,
retail, and technology sectors experienced more than one million DoS during 2016
(Verizon, 2017). Verizon Research has shown that incidents involving a web application
are caused by 80% denial of service, 20% malware and the remaining percentages are
due to stolen credentials. The Internet of Things (IoT) has become a risk point for denial
of service attacks. With more of the consumer electronics being manufactured having the
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ability to connect to the internet, the more hackers are finding ways to leverage the
devices maliciously. Organizations must understand what their capabilities are to
mitigating DoS attacks and how the incident response team will react to mitigate the
attack. Making the monitoring of the network data available, response planning to
firewall rulesets changes, and contact numbers at the telecom provider can greatly assist
the disaster responder in mitigating the attacks.
A web service is commonly described as an application or service that is made
available from an organization’s exposed internet server. Research on web services
attacks indicated hacking against web services are on the rise (Raiyn, 2014; Razzaq et al.,
2014; Salini & Shenbagam, 2015). Razzaq et al. (2014) wrote that web services have
greatly improved the profitability of organizations and at the same time increased the risk
to cyber-attacks. A web application attack is an incident where the internet exposed
application was the vector of the attack. The attack includes code-level vulnerabilities,
data exfiltration and the circumvention of authentication schemes (Verizon, 2017). Gupta
and Gupta’s (2017) research revealed 55% of the banking industry’s web services are
always considered vulnerable and 21% frequently vulnerable to attack. Salini and
Shenbagam (2015) claimed web application security is the primary concern for ebusiness and their research indicated 75% of hacking is being deployed at the application
layer. A 2013 survey by WhiteHat Security claimed the Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
vulnerability is the top weakness among web applications, has the capability to DoS, and
contributes to a significant data leakage problem. Martin and Lam (2008) described XSS
as a JavaScript code injection attack that allows for a malicious script to be run in the
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victim's browser to gain access to sensitive resources on the backend server. Wang and
Zhang (2016) described the 2013 Yahoo attack where accounts of Yahoo’s users were
exploited by an XSS vulnerability causing a massive malware and spam campaign. Cao,
Yegneswaran, Possas, and Chen (2012) and Gupta and Gupta (2017) described how XSS
vulnerabilities produced the Boonana, SpaceFlash, Renren, Samy, and Yamanner worms
that created damage to millions of users and workstations. Gupta and Gupta (2017)
suggested that organizations should consider XSS attacks to be a serious threat and
deploy mitigating controls to safeguard data and systems. A SQL injection attack
(SQLIA) is a web service attack technique that can damage and exfiltrate sensitive data
from databases. Pearson and Bethel (2016) argued the SQLIA lead the threat to web
services instead of XSS. Sharma and Jain (2014) and Pearson and Bethel (2016)
described the SQL-structured query language as the means for web applications to
interact with a database. When applications are not properly hardened in the coding, the
very popular SQL-injection attack can change the intended logic of the application to a
malicious logic that returns data that was not authorized to the attacker (Sharma & Jain,
2014). The malicious input from the injection causes the interpreter to execute
involuntary commands to the database without proper authorization. Finding the design
loophole allows the attacker unlimited access to the database. The literature on SQL
injection describes multiple attack types including orderwise injection, blind, doubleblind, database fingerprinting, authentication bypass and remote commands against the
database. Regardless of the attack leveraged, SQLIA can exfiltrate data, plant malware,
and drop database tables resulting in a complete loss of data. Incident response teams
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should understand the ramifications of SQLIA on the organization's web services and
what would be needed to recover from modified or deleted data from the database.
Cyber-attacks are becoming more destructive and are a threat that can strike any
private or public organization (Solberg & Søilen, 2016). Cyber-attacks can be initiated by
foreign entities, government intelligence apparatus, universities, organized crime, or
competitors. The PWC (2015) study showed that 75% of cyber-attacks would spread
from the first victim organization to the second victim organization within one day and
40% of those attacks will hit the next organization in less than an hour. A study by the
Ponemon Institute found that 70% of the entities responsible for critical U.S.
infrastructure had experienced at least one annual technology interruption from a cyberattack (Mansfield-Devine, 2014). The Ponemon study also documented only one in six
respondents claiming their technology security program as mature and capable of
responding to a cyber-attack. Malicious hacking is a risk to any organization with
systems connected to the internet. Stalans and Finn (2016) claimed the accessibility and
availability of the Internet in supporting societal institutions cultivates cybercrime as
there is no centralized government body to establish rules or enforce criminal laws in
specific countries. Solberg Søilen (2016) compared the cyber army of the twenty-first
century as what the military air force was a few decades ago. Militaries all over the globe
are fortifying cyber-attack personnel and cyber-warfare toolset after witnessing the US
Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran responded by cyber-attacking Aramco that
resulted in eight days of service interruption on critical systems (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas,
2013; Lewis, 2013; Solberg Søilen 2016). Raiyn (2014) claimed traditional cyber-attack
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detection has limitations in that it can only detect known attacks. Forums and chat rooms
on the Internet allow for trustworthy underground markets for the sale of drugs,
prostitution, sensitive data, and terrorism (Stalans & Finn, 2016). One common
mitigating control to hacking comes from an internal white hat hacker. The white hat
hacker is slang for an ethical computer hacker who specializes in testing and
methodologies to protect an organization from external hackers. The white hat tests the
technology infrastructure with the same techniques as a malicious hacker and may offer
organizations a better understanding of how they may be vulnerable to attack. The
increase in cyber-attacks should cause executive management to seek to understand how
the organization can protect itself from this type of specific risk. A strong security
program will reduce risk but cannot eliminate it. A mature organization should prepare
disaster recovery plans for resuming from a cyber-attack risk that applies to their Internet
offering.
Common Information Security Frameworks
There are many information security frameworks available in the information
security literature for an organization to align, and no single framework would be
applicable for all organizations. Implementing a security program by leveraging a
framework means the entity will have defined principles, policies, means, and methods.
Yang et al. (2016) claimed the security requirements of an organization’s framework
could serve useful for building a program and as simple as a checklist activity for
compliance. The common components of the security frameworks found in the literature
consist of planning, implementation, and verification (Mihut, 2014). Planning
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components included management processes, risk management, and security design.
Implementation components included implementing security metrics, security toolsets,
defensive technology, monitoring, and training. Verification components included
monitoring, audits, testing, and evaluations.
Yang et al. (2016) claimed the use of ISO 27001/27002 is considered the most
prevalent practice in the domain of information security management. Cefaratti, Hui, and
Wallace (2011) described the ISO 27000 as a framework designed to address the
essential controls needed to safeguard an entities technology asset. Gillies (2011) claimed
previous studies indicated the ISO 27000 framework had seen a slower adoption than
previous ISO frameworks such as the 9001 series. An ISO 27002 based survey by
Cefaratti et al. sought to measure the effectiveness of IT-related investments in best
practices and found that the respondents considered the effectiveness of the controls and
the investments by the organizations to be linked to positive results found by external
auditors. Research by Gillies (2011) revealed that 50% of the organizations holding an
ISO 27000 certification were from 50 or less employee, SME types of organization.
Gillies highlighted that 80% of the respondents indicated the 27000 certifications were
obtained for a competitive advantage in marketing the organization and not for improving
the security program. Gillies argued the adoption problem of the ISO 27000 framework
come from complexity and the $22,000 certification price for smaller organizations
without a large technology audit budget.
The NIST SP 800-184 Cybersecurity Event Recovery Framework (CSF) provides
a high-level framework for organizations to improve their posture by following a five-
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phase approach. Souppaya, Feldman, and Witte (2017) described the 800-14 as a
framework that is suited for improving policies and plans for recovering from evolved
threats. Shackelford, Proia, Martell, and Craig (2015) claimed the NIST framework had
the potential to improve international corporations that favor a voluntary approach to
cybersecurity. Souppaya et al. (2017) claimed the planning components of the 800-184
enables the organization to improve the risk scenarios activities by reviewing recent
cyber events to assist in the development or recovery playbooks. The 800-14 could
identify gaps to be addressed before the disaster is experienced. NIST released the SP
800-184 as a guide for cybersecurity event recovery and defines five functions of
identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery (Lindström et al., 2010;
Souppaya et al., 2017). Metrics generation is encouraged in this framework, and the
metrics are used to improve the quality of the response actions.
NIST SP 800-53 was defined as the framework for the Security and Privacy
Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (Montesino & Fenz, 2011).
Cardenas et al. (2009) noted the 800-53 framework consists of over 180 controls that are
not enforceable on federal systems but were designed to provide guidance. Ericsson
(2007) claimed the 800-53 was designed to influence a wider audience than just federal
systems and the largest challenge for organizations is to select the appropriate security
controls from a framework. Montesino and Fenz’s (2011) research found an advantage in
leveraging the 800-53 framework for other organizations in that 30% of the controls
could be automated by software solutions. The 800-53 framework provided a set of
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baselines that would allow an organization to find a section of countermeasures needed
for that vertical.
Yang et al. (2016) claimed the NIST 800-26 Security Self-Assessment Guide for
Information Technology Systems, established the foundation for standardization on
several levels of security status. Organizations choosing to align with the 800-26 can
leverage the framework to determine whether a described five levels are adequately
implemented by the security program. Johansson and Johnson (2005) asserted the 800-26
framework provided an extensive questionnaire that should be used to test security
controls against a classified or unclassified system.
CIS 20 Critical Controls, sometimes referred to as the Consensus Audit
Guidelines (CAG), is a framework of 20 prioritized actions to defend an organization
from known cyber-attacks (CIS, 2017; Montesino & Fenz, 2011). Lewis (2013) claimed
the NSA originally defined the initial list of controls from the active compromises they
were involved in remediating. Lewis pointed that the NIST frameworks are several
thousand pages which can create implementation barriers, but the CAG correlated the
most commonly used attacks along with defensive measures.
The Operationally Critical Threat Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
is a methodology developed by the Carnegie Mellon University to streamline the process
of assessing information security risks and the development of a security strategy. Yang
et l. (2016) claimed the OCTAVE offered an alternative approach specifically designed
to assess technology assets and the resiliency of the applied controls. Johansson and
Johnson (2005) described the advantages of the OCTAVE come from the business unit
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and technology staff working together to address the security needs of the organization.
The team drew on the collected knowledge to define the current state, major risks, and a
clear security strategy.
Iqbal et al. (2016), Lainhart (2000), and Yang et al. (2016) wrote that the Control
Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) could be deployed as a
supporting toolset to bridge the gap between information technology and top-level
decision making about business continuance planning. Von Solms (2005) evaluated the
COBIT framework against the ISO 17799 for security governance. Von Solms
summarized the COBIT was lacking in the detailed installation of controls and was
designed to guide a framework to be integrated into a wider IT governance program.
Lainhart (2000) claimed the main objective of COBIT was the creation of superior
policies and technical controls that would eventually lead to endorsement by auditors.
Ridley, Young, and Carroll (2004) wrote the highest concentration of COBIT adoptions
are found in the United States. The adoption base is understandable as the COBIT
framework was developed in the U.S. and aligned easily with IT governance drivers
found in industries such as the financial sector.
Information Security Forum (ISF) includes a standard of practices in five sections.
The ISF is broken out into 30 areas and 135 sections and offers advantages when
measuring the information security program in an organization (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010);
Kruger & Kearney, 2006). Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) claimed the ISF should guide
improve the security culture that provides an improved security behavior from
employees.
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Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a framework designed to
address IT service management and provide management guidelines for incident
response, capacity management, problem management, and others. Kanapathy and Khan
(2012) described the ITIL framework as a set of best practices that can increase IT
service management and enable IT departments to demonstrate strong systematic
execution of processes. Sharifi, Ayat, Rahman, and Sahibudin (2008) claimed the ITIL is
the most widely used, general IT framework in the world. Sharifi et al. (2008) claimed
organizations that have failed at implementing the ITIL framework were lacking in
management commitment, creating complicated processes, missing process owners, and
having a project team that was too ambitious. Kanapathy and Khan (2012) argued the
ITIL framework does not recommend a standard for the implementation of the controls
and their research found larger IT teams with established programs were more likely to
be familiar with ITIL.
The National Security Administration’s InfoSec Assessment Methodology (IAM)
(Cross, 2003; Yang et al., 2016) proposed by the National Security Agency provides an
analytical framework for information security. The InfoSec Assessment addresses three
tiers of quality and 18 distinct areas by which the program would be managed. NSA
(2002) noted the framework sought to improve vulnerability assessments and provide
quality guidelines to security programs. Cross (2000) claimed the strengths of the IAM
comes from the documentation, focus on awareness training, and standard operating
procedures found in the framework.
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The Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) method was developed by the SEI
CERT® Coordination Center. Yang et al. (2016) wrote the SSA is a process that provides
an advantage in the assessment of the survivability properties of a technology system.
The analysis is carried out at a high level and proceeds through a set of joint working
sessions to compile findings and recommendations for upper management decisionmaking.
The frameworks summarized in this section, along with the many supplemental
frameworks that can be found in the information security body of knowledge provided
many options for organizations to create a security program, measure the program for
maturity, achieve governance, provide awareness, and reduce risk to the organization
from technology risks. An organization should carefully choose which framework will
best fit the professional vertical and current state of the information security program.
Failure to properly align the framework with the organization may result in significant
vulnerabilities, a false sense of security, or a program operating in a lesser state than
optimal. Organizations with less than optimal security posture and exposing
vulnerabilities in the technology infrastructure increases the risk of a computer crimes
service interruption.
Current Research in Information Technology Disaster Recovery
Innovative technologies have been studied to improve preparedness for disaster
recovery planners, incident responders, and executive management. In the past,
information technology disaster recovery planners needed only to focus on keeping the
mainframe operating during a natural disaster, and ensure there was a good working set
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of backups. Alexander (2015) wrote that disaster planning must now evolve to face the
challenges of the technology age and understand the immediacy means of
communications available. Alexander stated another challenge is to ensure that the
increasing dependency on technology for the recovery of the organization does not create
a vulnerability in its right. Ee (2014) wrote that new technology threats are making
organizations more aware of the need for continuance planning but many organizations
do not reach a state of business resilience. To approach business continuity management
traditionally may not be enough to reduce modern risk scenarios such as computer
crimes. Bajgoric (2014) claimed the traditional approach focuses the organization to think
in limited aspects and leaving out different threat dimensions. Organizations failing to
reach a mature BCP will focus on past incidents, incomplete knowledge, perform weak
business impact analysis, and follow only portions of a framework. Ee (2014) wrote that
inadequacies in BCP could be solved through a standard approach and a commitment to a
BCM discipline by upper management. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016) wrote about the
importance of a strong connection between information security and disaster recovery. Al
Hamed and Alenezi claimed not all information security controls are part of disaster
recovery and not all DR measures are found in information security frameworks. Where
information security is primarily a preventative measure, disaster recovery is more
aligned to be preventative, repressive and corrective.
New cloud alternatives. Cloud computing has recently transformed the thinking
of backing up data in disaster recovery (Bisshoff et al., 2015). Alhazmi and Malaiya
(2013) claimed cloud technologies had provided an affordable alternative to disaster
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recovery plans for small and medium-sized organizations with no significant addition to
office or facilities cost. Razvi Doomun (2008) believed that cloud providers that offered
strong disaster recovery and security options could gain an organization a competitive
advantage. The advantages of cloud solutions come from the removal of many local
infrastructure dependencies. When the technology infrastructure is delivered from a cloud
computing provider, many traditional tasks such as backup and maintenance are
transferred to the solutions provider. Chang (2015) highlighted the need for contingency
planning in the cloud because of the need for a clear understanding of data management.
Outsourcing to a public or private cloud can move data off the local premises for cost
savings, but the risk of data loss has just shifted to the service provider. Chang argues the
risk of data loss applies regardless of whether the data is stored in the cloud or on
premises. Alhazmi and Malaiya (2013) pointed to a limitation of cloud disaster recovery
comes from the cloud provider serving as the DR component for many organizations and
the provider may become overwhelmed if it experiences a high demand from several
customers at once. Cloud-based disaster recovery may provide some advantages in cost,
but the redundancy of the data must be considered. Alhazmi and Malaiya wrote that
cloud services have a limited history to review and it is not clear how cloud providers
will respond to a serious disaster or a cybersecurity attack.
Disaster recovery communications. Improvements in ICT have allowed
organizations to improve the facilitation of the recovery during crisis response. Matar et
al. (2016) claimed the progress and fast rise of social media platforms for communication
had found application in disaster recovery incident management. Bortree and Seltzer
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(2009) research indicated that social media provided a positive means for two-way
communication between its users and entities to deliver vital information. Social media
features, in the disaster recovery context, provides the users, responders, and disaster
team management the ability to leverage native, mobile applications for a communication
channel. Matar et al. pointed to the success of communication via social media during
Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 in providing vital details to first responders and other
students. Research by Quang Tran, Kien, Borcea, and Yamada (2014) found an
advantage in connecting disaster responder mobile devices to surviving wireless access
points for a multi-hop wireless access network that effectively mitigated losses by
allowing connectivity to communications systems. Providing Internet connectivity to the
large disaster area can improve the emergency response by allowing video conferencing,
instant messaging, access to disaster plans in a cloud provider, and electronic mail with
disaster recovery coordination teams. Research by Suaybaguio (2016) found that Short
Message Service (SMS) was perceived as an optimal communication channel during a
disaster for the timely dissemination of information from disaster managers. SMS
messages do not require the mobile device to be activated for the user, and the messages
are transmitted with the same cell tower technology as voice calling. SMA can also be
sent from a computer to an ordinary mobile device using software automation and
scripting.
The ability to have users continue to operate during the loss of a facility or campus
can be advantageous for most entities. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks forced
organizations to rethink how employees could operate remotely during a disaster
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(Grigonis, 2002). Gartner used the phrase workforce resilience to describe the need for
employees to have remote access to commodity Internet using the power of mobile
devices and virtual private networking. Organizations that are location-specific have a
greater risk of being disabled. Grigonis (2002) claimed enterprises that have engineered
the ability for employees to work remotely are positioned to respond quickly in the event
of a disaster. Mobile work schemes offer the organization to put employees back to work
quickly. Lam (2002) wrote that traditional organizations would temporarily shore up
people resources with contract staff, call-out arrangements, rental offices, manual
procedures, and service forwarding agreements. Virtual Private Networking (VPN)
technologies can place employees anywhere and still protect the confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of the network transmission (Grigonis, 2002). One minimizing
the impact of a disaster is distributed computing, including end-user computing. Greene
(2006); Sprague (2015) wrote that although VPN technologies are not the only
mechanism for flexibility, VPN technology allows for organizations to accommodate
many displaced employees with minimal effort. Heng, Hooi, Liang, Othma, and San’s
(2012) research found a strong agreement in the VPN technology as a solution for
reacting to unseen events and still providing an adequate platform for normal business
operations. Organizations that use a VPN solution that can place the user base anywhere
that has Internet capability has an advantage when a disaster affects a location.
Need for technology integration. The review of the cybersecurity frameworks and
the disaster recovery frameworks highlighted commonalities but also revealed gaps in the
disaster recovery incident response to computer crimes. Johansson and Johnson (2005),
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Lindström et al. (2010), and Souppaya et al. (2017) wrote that although multiple
frameworks had components for disaster recovery, there was a gap in focusing on
recovery for cybersecurity. Figure 4 was created to describe a potential improvement to
the disaster recovery response process.

Figure 4. The improved disaster recovery response workflow.
Johansson and Johnson (2005) research compared multiple security frameworks and
found that while certain frameworks were strong in planning, others were strong in
controlling, and others were strong in governance. Johansson and Johnson claimed that
that depending on the framework chosen, organizations will receive different levels of
information security controls and recovery. Bartock et al. (2016) wrote it is important to
understand that a cybersecurity incident response plan should be developed as part of a
larger contingency plan. Gupta, Chaturvedi, and Mehta’s (2011) research found that
organizations should be better prepared to handle cyber-attacks if the security program is
part of an overall, mature information technology program. A strategic focus on risk
management strategies should help the organization to reduce the effect of materialized
risk. Lindström et al. (2010) claimed one of the more important issues in disaster
recovery comes from IT and cybersecurity planning. Top managers may not have the
proper understanding of information security which can lead to decisions that do not
improve the organization responds to a computers crimes type of interruption. The BCP
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should include other procedures for reducing a service interruption risk to business
functions. Iqbal et al. (2016) wrote there is a benefit to organizations that can manage and
monitor its information technology program by better benchmarking to improve the
service availability. Cardenas et al. (2009) argued that the current tools of information
security not provide a sufficient defense in depth system to protect specific organizations
such as those with control systems (SCADA). Lindström et al. (2010) wrote that
information security management standards focus on mature processes and not the
content of what they are securing. The ISO, GASPP, and SSE-CMM are popular in use
and practitioners face a limitation in focus on ensuring processes exist while being less
focused on how the processes accomplish improving the security stance of the
organization. Barber (2001) noted the ISO 17799-1 is being explored by companies to
provide a framework to manage cyber risk and judge the security controls in place.
Integrating information security responders with disaster recovery first responders should
have advantages. Loui and Finn (2016) claimed cross-training system administrators and
first responders is essential to be sure the correct coverage will be available when disaster
strikes. Organizations that can find opportunities to integrate the cybersecurity incident
responders, Security Operation Center (SOC) monitoring, disaster recovery planners, and
disaster recovery first responders should experience improved recovery over
organizations that do not integrate.
Summary and Conclusions
The literature review included the concepts of emergency management, crisis
communications, types of disaster recovery, laws affecting disaster recovery, disaster
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risks to organizations, disaster recovery frameworks, and information security
frameworks. Disaster recovery efforts have evolved from simple people management and
planning for the effects of natural disasters to adhering to federal regulations and
managing the risks of technology interruptions such as computer crimes. A common
theme found in the disaster recovery body of knowledge was that there are risk factors
that planners and first responders must prepare for to expect an optimal recovery. Those
risk areas were natural, human-made accidents, terrorism, and technology. The more
detailed information technology disaster recovery literature detailed the influence of
computer crimes and the need to account for the risks. Although there were many
strategies discussed for managing disaster recovery efforts, there were only a few sources
that presented strategies to combat computer crimes interruptions. Bird (2015), Brown,
(2016), Dines, (2012), Ferdinand (2015), Ignatius (2015), Marinescu (2015), and
McCreight and Leece (2016) provided studies that assisted in the analyzing the gap. This
research reinforced the necessity to understand the emerging threats that computer crimes
have on organizations and the need for disaster recovery programs. Chapter 3 includes
the research methodology to investigate how information technology disaster recovery
can be modified to better respond to emerging threats.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how information
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response
to a computer crime caused business interruption. The problem statement highlighted in
Chapter 1 was the lack of knowledge organizations have to recover from some computer
crimes interruptions given the maturity level of existing disaster recovery programs.
Guidry et al. (2015) and Ferdinand (2015) discussed the lack of a set of control
procedures to allow understanding of how business management can bolster disaster
recovery programs to account for this type of interruption. The literature reflected the
importance of planning for disasters and incident responders understanding the
significant disaster risks to the organization. I did not find where there was a
comprehensive framework developed to collaborate information technology disaster
recovery and cyber security controls to combat this disaster risk. In this study, I focused
on how organizations can better plan and build procedures to improve the recovery of an
organization from a computer crimes disaster. This chapter includes a review of the
research design, the role of the researcher, selection of the participants, use of the
instrument, explanation of data collection, analysis of the data, challenges of the method,
and any threats to the validity of the findings.
Research Design and Rationale
I sought to understand what factors significantly affected the ability of technology
responders in responding to computer crimes caused disasters. Cybersecurity experts,
disaster recovery researchers, and incident responders represent a participant pool that
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holds an understanding of the current events affecting disaster recovery. An expert
participant pool may create new knowledge to improve the process of responding to
computer security interruptions. A qualitative research inquiry has exploratory and theory
building attributes. Many of the qualitative paradigms could be used to generate a better
understanding of how disaster recovery responders and planners should respond to a
computer crime interruption. The rationale for this study is provided based on a review of
the qualitative research methods that may apply to answer the stated research question.
Choosing a phenomenological research study could provide generalizations about
how disaster planners, disaster responders, and cybersecurity experts view the specific
interruption caused by cyber attackers. The generalizations would provide the viewpoints
and the shared experience of the targeted groups (Babbie, 2007) but the generalizations
would not develop the cause and effect relation, nor the theory building needed to
improve the process. A case study method would include how and why the service
interruption happened, in a small sample size of one to three organizations, which had
experienced a computer crime caused disaster (Yin, 2011). A disaster case study would
involve extensive interviewing and observation of a disaster recovery team that had
recovered from a computer crimes disaster. Organizations may be reluctant to approve to
conduct a study when the team had failed to recover from the incident properly. The case
study would allow for real-life situations to provide in-depth data collection. A researcher
would be limited in that the qualitative data gathering would focus on the specific cases
selected (Yin, 2011) and any conclusions may not apply to all disaster recovery
programs. A narrative research inquiry would seek to understand the motivation and
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experiences of disaster recovery planners and incident responders as they are recovering
the organization from a technology-caused disaster. The narrative design would provide
an understanding of factors that allow for successful incidence response, but narrative
methods are usually limited to a few individuals and would not suffice for broad theory
generation (Maxwell, 2005). Ethnographic research would focus on cultural groups
(Babbie, 2007), which would limit the type of disaster responders and planners used in
this study. The technology field of disaster recovery consists of multicultural workers
(Niederman, 2004) and would severely limit the understanding that could be gained by
narrowing to a single cultural group. The desire to have multiple perspectives, expert
experience, and ability to conduct theory building aligns with the use of the Delphi
design.
A Delphi design was selected over other qualitative approaches because of the
accuracy of forecasting (Linstone & Turoff, 1975) and goal of the study was prediction
and theory building. Skulmoski et al. (2007) argued that the design can be used when
there is an incomplete understanding of a problem and should be used to explore what
does not exist. The Delphi design allows for the identification of controls or alternative
frameworks (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004) that may be used to improve the process by
analyzing feedback from experts in the field of disaster recovery. The Delphi design is
based on a formal process for collecting and disseminating expert knowledge through a
series of qualitative questions with controlled moderation (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). The
Delphi design is a useful form of communications and anonymous consensus building to
facilitate group judgment. The findings from the Delphi data collection activity were
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triangulated from the responses of the participants and research conducted during the
literature review (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Skulmoski et al.,
2007). The study was exploratory because of the small number of studies on the topic of
computer crimes as they affect information technology disaster recovery. The use of the
Delphi design in this study was to create new strategies for responding to computer
crimes caused service interruptions. The Delphi technique provides quantitative data to
quantify the participant's responses and potential for consensus (Linstone & Turoff, 1975;
Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, I held multiple roles during this study. I assembled the panel of
experts with the experience in disaster recovery, incident response, and cybersecurity. I
designed the questionnaire with questions relevant to the study of disaster recovery and
grounded in the literature review from Chapter 2. The questions were designed to be
qualitative, and I administered each of the three rounds of surveys and analyzed the
responses. Based on the responses, the next survey allowed for the participants to revise
their original responses and answer other questions based on the previous group feedback
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). I reiterated this process until the participants reached a
consensus in providing themes or disparities. When disparities were recorded from the
collected judgments, interviews were conducted with the participant to gain an
understanding of the deviation from consensus. In the case of nonresponses during any
the three rounds of the Delphi, I communicated to the panelist to obtain assurances of
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participation and move the process along. When participants dropped out, I filtered the
data from the collected responses.
To mitigate any research bias, I can disclose that I am neither affiliated with nor
employed by any of the participants. The panel was recruited by a snowball sampling of
suggestions from experts I consulted with about this research. While I may be known to
some of the experts, there was no employment relationship with any of the participants.
Methodology
The Delphi design was developed by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s and was
intended to be a technique for the collation of judgments on a specific subject (Skulmoski
et al., 2007). Linstone and Turoff (1975) and Skulmoski et al. (2007) claimed the Delphi
design is typically executed through a set of designed, sequential surveys mixed with the
summarized feedback of earlier responses. Donohoe and Needham (2009) wrote the
Delphi design is best used when complexity and uncertainty are present, and there is
imperfect knowledge. The Delphi design is primarily used in cases where judgmental
information is valuable, and the procedure uses a series of questionnaires interspersed
with controlled opinion feedback (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Okoli and Pawlowski
(2004) claimed researchers could apply the Delphi design to situations as a tool for expert
problem solving and long-range forecasting. The design does not require the expert
panelists to be in any single location making it a viable option to be conducted by
electronic means such as the Internet. Internet communications is an advantage in that
participants can be from geographically disperse areas and still collaborate
simultaneously (Skulmoski et al., 2007). Linstone and Turoff claimed three rounds are
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sufficient to attain consensus in the expert responses. Skulmoski et al. and Okoli and
Pawlowski wrote that additional rounds beyond three offer only small changes to the
analysis and becomes repetitious to the panelists. Fowles (1978), Linstone and Turoff
(1975), and Skulmoski et al. described the following steps for the Delphi design:


The researcher will design a team to undertake and monitor a Delphi on a given
research subject.



The researcher selects panelists to participate in the exercise. Panelists are chosen
by the expertise in the area to be researched.



The researcher develops the first round of questions to begin the study.



The questionnaire is tested for ambiguities, vagueness, and appropriateness.



The researcher submits the first questionnaire to the panelists, over a predefined
communications method, to collect the qualitative data.



The researcher collects the data from all panelists and analyzes the first-round of
responses.



Preparation is made for the second-round questionnaires based on the answers
from the previous round. Feedback is provided in the previous rounds to allow the
experts to provide clarity if they deemed necessary.



The researcher submits the next round of questionnaires to the panelists for data
collection.



Analysis of the responses and developed questions based on the data is reiterated
as long as it is necessary to achieve consensus in the results. During each round,
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the experts are provided feedback on their responses to ensure the researcher has
fully understood the answers that were submitted. This includes arguments.


A report by the researcher or team is generated to present the conclusions of the
exercise.

Linstone and Turoff (1975) claimed an important issue in the Delphi process is the
understanding of the aim of the exercise by all expert panelists. When the panelists
understand the goal, they become less frustrated and less likely to lose interest. Linstone
and Turoff argued that technical experts must be convinced that their judgments may
need to be made before all aspects of the problem are available which may be different
from their standard decision-making process. The experts should be persuaded that the
judgments are still a valuable piece of data.
Anonymity for participants is an important factor in the Delphi process. Okoli and
Pawlowski (2004) wrote that the participants are always anonymous to each other but not
the researcher. Habibi, Sarafrazi, and Izadyar (2014) wrote that in groupthink exercises
some members could dominate weaker members and pressure the weaker members to
confirm that results in ineffective problem-solving. The anonymity principle of the
Delphi design solves this problem (Habibi et al., 2014; Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
The initial set of questions were carefully crafted. Linstone and Turoff (1975) and
Skulmoski et al. (2007) pointed to the need for the researcher to decide at the beginning
of the design if the initial set of questions will be focused or broad and open-ended.
When the questions are focused, the participants are guided to a certain goal. When broad
questions are designed, I could collect more data and from a wider range of responses.
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For this study, I asked a broad set of open-ended questions to allow for a range of
qualitative responses. Each subsequent round narrowed the results. The filtered results
may lead to an improvement in controls and processes necessary for response to a
computer crime caused business interruption.
Participant Selection Logic
The Delphi design does not require a statistical sample that attempts to be
representative of a population but instead is intended as a groupthink mechanism that
uses qualified experts who hold specific knowledge of the subject being studied (Okoli &
Pawlowski, 2004). Skulmoski et al. (2007) cautioned that as the panel size increases with
experts, the more cumbersome the analysis of the data becomes. The Delphi technique
allows a panel of about 15-18 experts to collaborate to generate themes, disparities, or
reach consensus (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). A requirement for
the Delphi to be valuable comes from the selection of the qualified experts.
Approximately 70 experts were invited to participate in this study. The final panel size of
22 was large enough to determine patterns in the responses without the data becoming
overwhelming. This sample size was large enough to see patterns in responses but not
large enough to overwhelm the data analysis process of all responses. Five experts were
selected to represent disaster recovery first responders, five experts were selected from
disaster recovery researchers, and five experts were selected from a cybersecurity
background. The disaster recovery responders in the panel were selected from disaster
recovery programs of businesses that are large enough to fund a full-time disaster
recovery program, properly plan, conduct testing, and have experienced an interruption
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from computer crimes. The disaster recovery researchers must have multiple published,
peer-reviewed papers on disaster recovery. The DR researchers that authored publications
need their research to study current trends in disaster recovery. Each participant was
selected based on interviews, recommendations, or their visibility as a researcher in this
subject matter. The diversity of knowledge was considered an important selection factor
along with the field of expertise when the participants were asked to join the research.
This panel included an adequate number of experts who are interested in identifying a
successful strategy for disaster recovery. Organizations including Information Systems
Audit and Control Association (ISACA), Information Security Certification (ISC2),
Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), and
the InfraGard were contacted for applicable participants in the United States. Experts
from the disciplines of emergency management, information technology disaster
recovery, and cyber resiliency were asked to rate qualitative indicators using the Delphi
design.
Potential expert participants received an email invitation to participate (see
Appendix A). The research topic and description of the study was explained. The email
described the protection of the expert’s identity. Each expert panelist was asked to agree
to a consent form (see Appendix A). The anonymity of the panel experts is protected
because the only expert opinion will be collected. Participant identity was not be revealed
in the study. The consent form includes an explanation of the study in clear language as
outlined by the Walden’s Institutional Review Board (12-11-17-0500644). The consent
form included a description of the importance of the study, the research process, and the
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Delphi expectations. The form also includes a note that participation in the study is
voluntary and that the expert participant can leave the study at any time.
Instrumentation
When sufficient information about the topic is available, it is appropriate for the
researcher to create the first round of questions and streamline the process for the
panelists (Hsu & Sanford, 2007). Delphi is used to develop a consensus from independent
judgments on the research topic or identify discourse for follow-up interviews. The
following questions were used for the study regarding best practices and understanding
from the disaster recovery literacy:
1. What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in
responding to computer crimes caused disasters?
2. How successful can disaster responders be when following traditional technology
disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused business
interruption?
3. What steps could be an improvement for resumption from a computer crimes
disaster?
4. What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover
differently than a traditionally planned recovery?
5. What differences can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions
caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not?
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6. What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could
have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology
disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework?
The design includes a note for the disaster recovery and cybersecurity experts with
questions for the first round of the Delphi study. The participants were provided their
understanding of forecasting trends and analysis of possible controls that can improve the
disaster response. A final list was created by a pilot study.
Pilot Study
Linstone and Turoff (1975) suggested the researcher pilot the study on any willing
expert participants, including the sponsor, before finalizing each round. Okoli and
Pawlowski (2004) wrote that pretesting appeared to be an important reliability attribute
for the Delphi design but argued that the test-retest reliability is not relevant since it is
expected that participants will revise their answers to the surveys based on feedback from
the other participants. Skulmoski et al. (2007) claimed the pilot is important for
inexperienced researchers who may underestimate the survey and participant response.
This pilot intended to determine if the instructions are understandable, if the
questions are clear and concise, can the pilot participants provide suggestions for the
improvement of the materials provided, and if the data that was collected aligned with the
intent of the study. The pilot can improve the process by working out any procedural of
comprehensive problems. The pilot study was conducted with an open-ended list of
initial questions described in the instrumentation section above. The final revision of the
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questions for the first round was created during the pretest by the experts in the pilot
study.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to understand how information
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response
to a computer crime caused business interruption. The outcome should provide new
mitigating controls that can improve the response when a technology disaster is
experienced. The Delphi design and participant recruitment for this study were conducted
using electronic mail. An advantage of a Delphi design is the ability to conduct the study
entirely over the Internet (Skulmoski et al., 2007). As the researcher, I received the
emailed responses during each round and crafted the feedback that was sent back to the
panel. The Delphi was scheduled to be conducted over three rounds with an expert panel
of between 15 and 20. For each round, the panelists will be asked to respond within one
week. After a week of no responses, I contacted the nonparticipants to encourage their
responses or confirm their exit from that round. As described in the participant selection
logic, the number of experts asked to participate in the Delphi was designed to allow for
participants to drop out of the study and still allow the study to provide valuable
knowledge and consensus. As the Delphi was conducted via email, the data remained in
the panelist’s original responses in the existing digital format. Feedback, individual
responses, and further clarifying questions were communicated over email and retained
as data to be analyzed. Participants were notified that the study had ended after the third
round of the Delphi has completed and all feedback had been accepted.
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Data Analysis Plan
Quantitative Delphi responses are tabulated by the mean or median score from
each round of questions. The median is considered the most valuable when tabulating
quantitative scores (Dalkey, 1967). Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) wrote
qualitative Delphi responses start with expert judgment about the research questions and
will set the direction for the future rounds. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) claimed the
Delphi surveys could solicit quantitative, qualitative, or both and the research then
analyzes the usable responses to investigate the research questions. The qualitative
judgments serve the purpose of providing empirical data for the next round and
increasing the understanding of the expert’s factors (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Linstone
and Turoff (1975) wrote that each of these surveys would indicate an index of
desirability, computed by the expert responses, will favor a consensus. The first set of
responses from Round 1 was deduplicated, and a recording was made of the expert’s
judgments. A group of factors was generated into categories to make it easier for the
experts when the next round was initiated. These feedback factors are not used for
analysis by the researcher. The feedback was provided to the experts in brief explanations
to validate the responses. The second round asked the experts to verify the interpreted
responses and that their judgments are in the proper categories. The panelists could
provide additional thoughts that may not have been recorded initially. The next two
rounds narrowed down the factors that reflect the judgments of the experts. The list of
responses was rated by the panelists on a 6-point Likert-type scale. The responses were
calculated using a group means to score. The experts were asked to rank the factors. For
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each factor, the consensus level was set at 80% of expert agreement. The third round
presented the completed, consolidated list of judgments to the panel and allowed for
reconsiderations. During the third round, the panelists were asked to reconsider any
questions where group consensus was not found.
The qualitative data collected during the three rounds were analyzed using the
NVivo computer software program. Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2011) and Zamawe (2015)
claimed the qualitative researcher is the main tool for analysis and computer-assisted
qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software is only a tool for assisting the researcher by
providing multiple views of the data. The CAQDAS is used so that underlying
relationships can emerge and can allow the analysis to yield more details than if the
analysis was conducted manually (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011). Zamawe (2015) wrote
that NVivo CAQDAS software, created by QRS International, is used to analyze
qualitative designs such as grounded theory, ethnography, literature reviews,
phenomenology, and mixed methods. NVivo allowed the data to be examined and
increased the understanding of the judgments and codes reviewed in the study. NVivo
was also used to manage the storage and catalog of judgment data. The NVivo features of
word count and classical content analysis were used to understand underlying themes
from the judgments provided by the experts (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011).
Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability are qualitative
research concepts that describe the level of findings that represent a quality inquiry. To
address these concepts, I have outlined the elements that are incorporated into this
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research that met the requirements of a quality study. Each section includes how the
concepts are followed by the Delphi design or my role as a researcher.
Credibility
Credibility is associated with the concept of truthfulness. Linstone and Turoff
(1975) wrote that the initial Delphi qualitative questions are broad and open-ended. Extra
care must be made by the researcher to ensure the initial set of qualitative questions set
the proper path for the research and do not lead the panelists down a predetermined path.
The researcher may see limitations in the research by not executing Delphi with a proper
set of initial questions, not populating the panel with the correct expertise, and not
correctly communicate the requirements of the participants. To address these limitations,
I worked with the committee to refine the initial round of questions, conduct a pilot round
to solidify the questions and instructions, diligently seek the proper panel members, and
carefully craft communications to each participant. I expected that not all the participants
will complete the multiple rounds of the Delphi design in the proposed time frame. The
number of participants that were chosen amounted to a number large enough to allow for
the loss of multiple panelists as well as to obtain data saturation (Day & Bobeva, 2005).
Day and Bobeva (2005) and Skulmoski et al. (2007) wrote the appropriate number of
participating experts helps to strengthen the credibility of the study. The Delphi data
collection procedure supports the development of improvement to the disaster response
from computer crimes. The participants will have the opportunity during each round to
contribute to the development of the disaster recovery factors and provide suggestions on
how to improve the process.
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Transferability
Clibbens, Walters, and Baird (2012) claimed the most common means of
increasing the validity of Delphi study is to test the instrument with a pilot test for the
first round of questions. The transferability of the items in the instrument was achieved
by a smaller panel of disaster recovery and cybersecurity expert chosen from my network
of colleagues that do not take part in the formal study. The pilot panel reviewed the first
round of content for relevance and clarity and provided feedback for improving the
questions. The Delphi design can employ further construct transferability when asking
the panel experts to validate the researcher’s interpretation and factor variables. Linstone
and Turoff (1975) claimed the validity of the combined group judgment is typically
measured regarding consensus of the experts. While findings of this Delphi study may
not apply to all disaster recovery programs, I made every effort to ensure the expert
judgments and researcher coding from this study aligned with other research found in the
literature.
Dependability
Dependability in qualitative research can be obtained from the role of the
researcher in data collection, clear communication with the participants, and quality
checking of the collected data (Patton, 2015). Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that
dependability of the Delphi is demonstrated in group statistical summaries of the
responses. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) wrote that the pilot testing is also a dependability
method for a Delphi study. Both the pilot panel and the formal panel should show the
same direction in their qualitative data judgments for solving the disaster recovery
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scenario. Skulmoski et al. (2007) highlighted that audit trails help to confirm
trustworthiness of a study’s findings and the methodological process of the Delphi has
this attribute. I captured all questions, responses, feedback, calculations, and coding for
each round of the Delphi. A clear decision trail was recorded from the beginning to the
end of the study. The research was further triangulated by follow-up evaluation
interviews when outliers were recorded. Day and Bobeva (2005) claimed a Delphi could
maximize the quality of the outcome and confirm results with an electronic survey and
evaluation interviews. The Delphi questions were clearly defined with an alignment from
the review of the literature in Chapter 2 and were incorporated into the first round to
improve dependability.
Confirmability
Conformability requires the researcher to be explicit about the methods executed
in data gathering, data analysis, participant selection, and the forming of the conclusion
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). In the Delphi design, the researcher is a facilitator
and not a participant (Day & Bobeva, 2005). This allowed the data collection to come
directly from the participants and reduce the impact of researcher bias. Linstone and
Turoff (1975) claimed the Delphi design could lend a greater than objectivity than other
qualitative inquiries from the methods used in the data collection and revisions by the
panelists. Donohoe and Needham (2009) wrote the systematic method allows participants
to express their opinions which ensure rational and reflexive opinions that are not
influenced by a dominating panelist. Donohoe and Needham wrote that no study is free
of bias and researchers using the Delphi design must consider critical design decisions in
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pretesting and the potential for misinterpretation. Linstone and Turoff pointed out that
since panelists are encouraged to suggest new questions and modify existing ones the
potential for research bias is low. Statements that comprise the Delphi can reflect cultural
opinions, and subjective bias from the researchers that formulate them and I will seek to
remove any bias in the process of the survey creations. To enable confidence in the data,
a rationale was provided to show how the initial set of questions was initially crafted.
This rational combined with the audit trail assists with dependability and confirmability.
Ethical Procedures
Ethical considerations for qualitative research include the proper treatment of the
participants, securing, and handling of the collected data. The topic of information
technology disaster recovery activity resulting from computer crimes does not raise an
ethical concern for the participants or from the organizations they are employed. The
panelists were not identified with a business, even to each other, so that there could be no
negative perceptions of an entity or employer. Disaster responders and technology
management are not considered a traditional protected class in scientific research. The
judgments made by the expert panel sought to better respond to a technology interruption
caused by computer crimes. The judgment data collected from the experts was not a
confidential data set. The data collected were the opinions of the experts, and all data was
being stored in an encrypted format while being analyzed. After the data was analyzed
and summarized, it is electronically destroyed after 5 years. Research by Goodman et al.
(2012) pointed out the requirements that employees may have to protect the intellectual
property of their employer. During this study, I ensured confidentiality was maintained
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for both participants and their organization to protect any negative effect that could arise
from participating in this study.
Summary
Disaster recovery planners, incident responders and cybersecurity experts used
their knowledge and understanding of disaster recovery and computer crimes
interruptions to identify strategies and mitigating controls to use when developing
improved plans for responding to disasters. The Delphi design is an effective and
efficient group think the approach to solving technical problems. The expert panel had
the experience to provide judgments on improving disaster recovery strategies to combat
emerging technology threats. The Delphi instrument provided anonymity and an efficient
technique for the panelists to communicate with the researcher. Chapter 3 includes a
review of the Delphi design and details on how participants were selected. This
explanation supports how the panelists will collaborate and provide qualitative data to the
researcher. The results of the Delphi study are discussed in Chapter 4. The study details,
expert comments, coding, and scores will be included.
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Chapter 4: Results
Chapter 4 includes the results and findings from the Delphi panel of experts on
disaster recovery and cyber security of computer crimes interruptions. The Delphi study
intended to document the expert opinion on how organizations can improve the disaster
recovery process when responding to computer crimes. Data were collected using
questions corresponded over electronic mail or LinkedIn messaging. For the second and
third round, data were collected using a 6-point and 5-point Likert scale. The group
median for the research questions was communicated to the panel to allow for feedback,
additional trends, and expert analysis. With a growing threat of technology disasters that
can significantly affect organizations, this study might assist in improving processes to
remediate and recover business operations.
This Delphi used qualitative seed questions, developed from the literature review,
to populate the first round. The following Round 1 questions guided the study and were
used in the pilot:
1. What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in
responding to computer crimes caused disasters?
2. What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover
differently than a traditionally planned recovery?
3. In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional
technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused
business interruption?
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4. What steps could be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery
procedures to resume the organization from a computer crimes disaster?
5. What differences can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions
caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not?
6. What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from computer
crimes?
7. What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could
have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology
disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework?
8. What type of expertise should be recruited to build a successful disaster recovery
program that could better respond to computer crimes?
9. What cybersecurity processes could improve disaster response if any?
10. What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cybersecurity risk
and controls in information technology disaster recovery frameworks?
The open-ended Round 1 questions focus on multiple disaster recovery themes.
The first three questions presented in the first round seek to understand attributes that can
positively or negatively affect the resumption of the organization. The following three
questions inquired about processes or procedures that improve the response. The
remaining questions collected judgments on improving an existing DR framework and
opinion on needed organizational expertise for disaster recovery teams. This chapter
includes a review of the pilot design, the research setting, demographics, data collection,
analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, and the study results.
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Pilot Study
To assist in the trustworthiness of this research, a pilot study was used. The pilot
study consisted of three experts who met the eligibility criteria used to select the
participants for the main study. One expert from each demographic consisting of disaster
recovery researcher, disaster recovery incident responder, and cybersecurity expert was
used. The purpose of the pilot was to collect feedback to verify, clarify, and refocus any
directions or questions for the first round of the Delphi study. The pilot study used the
predefined study directions and 10 research questions to understand how each pilot
participants would navigate the returning of the first round’s data. After I analyzed the
pilot submissions, each expert was given feedback and the opportunity to make changes
or suggestions to improve the questions and instructions that would be used in the main
study. The participant’s expertise provided feedback to improve the initial instructions by
including a definition of information technology disaster recovery and modifying the
ninth seed question to describe better the intent of the questions focus on cybersecurity.
Research Setting
The data collection for the Delphi were electronic instead of observations, focus
groups, personal interviews, or action research. One advantage of the participants
submitting electronic data was that the data was not being physically written down or
transcribed by the researcher. The electronic data collection prohibited me from recording
conditions that may have biased or influenced the participants while they contributed to
the study. No other data were collected about the participants other than their initial
consent to the study and the qualitative data they provided. The Delphi instrument did not
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inquire about demographics, organizational conditions, or personal preferences that could
have influenced the analysis of this data. Although there was a vetting process for each
expert, the expertise of each participant was not recorded in this study.
Demographics
The request for expert panelists was successful in confirming 25 of 98 contacted
for the study. The participant background was represented by:


Disaster recovery researchers were recruited into the group.



Expertise in the disaster recovery profession was recruited into the group.



Expertise from the cybersecurity was recruited into the group.

The disaster recovery responders in the panel were selected from disaster recovery
programs of businesses large enough to staff a full-time disaster recovery program,
properly plan for, conduct testing, fully fund, and have experienced an interruption from
computer crimes. The disaster recovery researchers had published, peer-reviewed papers
on disaster recovery. The disaster recovery researchers that authored publications had
their research study current trends in disaster recovery. Each participant was selected
based on interviews, recommendations, or their visibility as a researcher in this subject
matter. The diversity of knowledge was considered an important selection factor along
with the represented field of expertise. This panel included an adequate number of
experts who were interested in identifying a successful strategy for disaster recovery.
Twenty-two experts agreed to join this study. Of the 22, 17 participants completed
the first two rounds of the study. Eight participants left the study after the second round,
and nine participants completed the last round. Participants that were late with their
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submission were contacted after a short timeframe. The participants were encouraged to
complete the study but allowed to leave if necessary.
Data Collection
Recruitment
While waiting for IRB approval, I crafted a list of potential experts using multiple
sources. LinkedIn and snowball sampling offered a successful source of experts for
recruitment of expert participants. I planned to complete recruiting in a 3-week
timeframe. The weeks provided sufficient time to confirm the requirements with the
participants and requested phone calls with potential experts that wanted more detailed
information about necessary expertise. Invitations were sent to roughly 96 individuals
with a copy of the approved IRB consent form. Two of the prospective participants
recommended additional experts that could satisfy this study’s edibility requirements.
Five experts were added to the participants from the snowball sampling. Twenty-two
experts agreed to participate reaching an optimal target panel size. Additional participants
were accepted in anticipation of a small number of participants abandoning the study
before the completion of the third round. The Delphi followed the schedule found in
Table 1.
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Table 1
The Participant Delphi Schedule
Event

Start Date

End Date

Delphi Round 1

12/24/17

1/4/17

Round 1 analysis

1/4/18

1/6/18

Delphi Round 2

1/14/18

1/20/18

Round 2 analysis

1/20/18

1/22/18

Delphi Round 3

1/23/18

1/29/18

Round 3 analysis

1/29/18

1/30/18

Delphi Round 1
After consent was obtained, participants were provided the instructions and
expectations needed to complete the study in a Microsoft Word format. Each expert was
recognized for accepting to participate and for contributing to the technology community.
The changes were made to the Round 1 questionnaire that was identified in the pilot test
and on December 24, 2017, the first-round was initiated. The 22 participants were given a
week to provide their responses to the qualitative seed questions that made up Round 1.
Participants were instructed to record their responses in the document. A spreadsheet was
used to record each participant’s submissions. Each participant was assigned an
alphanumeric number to allow for analysis of confidentiality. Statements by the
participants were collected from the 10 seed questions. The statements were coded,
deduplicated, and, after considering the conceptual framework, I identified several
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themed statements for the second Delphi phase. The themed statements were sent back to
the participants to discover if a consensus could be found in the statements.
Delphi Round 2
The codes and themed statements that can impact disaster recovery were shown in
the participants’ Round 1 submission. The second round provided the participants with
the statements that stemmed from the first-round submissions. Linstone and Turoff
(1975) provided a common 6-point Likert scale for Delphi judgments following the first
round of submissions as explained in Table 2.
Table 2
Agreement Scale Used for the Round 2 Judgment
Scale

Agreement

6.

Strongly agree

5.

Agree

4.

Slightly agree

3.

Slightly disagree

2.

Disagree

1.

Strongly disagree

The participants were asked to provide a 6-point Likert scale on the themed
statements. Each participant could comment on the coding that was created by their
submissions to facilitate member checking. For submissions ranked at a 2 or less, it was
encouraged for the participant to provide feedback for a better understanding of the
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judgment. Participants were encouraged to qualify why they disagreed with the themed
statement. Appendix D lists the Round 2 questions. In interpreting what a group means, a
value of 3.5 is considered the natural point and anything above a 4 is an agreement by the
panel. A mean value of 4.5 to 6 results in a general agreement. An 80% agreement from
the participants, an interquartile range below 2.5, and a standard deviation below 1.5 are
commonly used for consensus measurement (Giannariu & Zervas, 2014). The data
collected from the participants were placed into a spreadsheet and analyzed for percent
agreement, mean, standard deviation, and the interquartile range. The consensus
statements were used to build the third round of the Delphi.
Delphi Round 3
The third round of the study was used to identify the importance of the consensus
statements identified in Round 2. The participants were instructed to judge the statements
on how important that statement would be for the organization to implement with the
intent of improving recovery from computer crimes. For the third round of the Delphi, an
importance 5-point Likert scale was used. Table 3 defined the Likert scale used for
participant agreement. The third round sought to understand what importance the
participants would place on applying the consensus statement collected in Round 2. The
instructions with the third-round questions asked for a judgment on the importance of the
presented statements in influencing the ability of the organization to respond to computer
crimes. See Appendix E for a copy of the Round 3 questionnaires.
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Table 3
Importance Scale Used for Likert Judgment
Scale

Agreement

5.

Very Important

4.

Important

3.

Moderately Important

2.

Slightly Important

1.

Not Important

Data Analysis
The thematic analysis in qualitative research is used to pinpoint, examine, and
record patterns within the data collected (Maxwell, 2005). Thematic analysis was used in
this study to create the statements used in the second round of the Delphi. The first round
allowed for the participants to answer open-ended questions about disaster recovery and
how organizations may better respond to an interruption. Several of the statements
submitted were duplicates which were removed. I then used thematic analysis to create
the statements for consensus building among the experts. After studying the participant’s
open-ended statements, I coded the data into categories. For this coding process, I did not
bring a set of codes into the study. Multiple reviews were conducted of the statements,
and the themed statements were placed into rows of a spreadsheet. Commonly used
words, phrases, and acronyms were groups into themed statements. After each participant
submitted responses, the themed statements were added to the Round 2 questionnaires or
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modified to describe the coded themes better. This process was used to analyze down the
hundreds of statements into 110 statements that were grouped by the 10 seed questions.
Appendix D contains the themed statement that resulted from this process.
Linstone and Turoff (2002) claimed the objective of the original Delphi study was
to obtain the most reliable consensus of a judgment from a panel of experts. Most Delphi
studies include descriptive statistics put together of the median and frequencies collected
from a survey of expert judgment. Giannariu and Zervas (2014) claimed that there is not
a common practice in the Delphi literature to reach consensus. Giannariu and Zervas
wrote that 51% of participant agreement, a specified distance from the mean, using
standard deviation measurements, interquartile ranges, and coefficient of variation are all
found in Delphi literature for computing consensus.
The Interquartile Range (IRQ) was described by Frankfort-Nachmias and LeonGuerrero (2015) as a measure of variation for interval-ratio variables. FrankfortNachmias and Leon-Guerrero defined the IRQ as the difference between the upper and
lower quartiles by showing what the width of the middle 50% is. The interquartile range
score was defined as the difference between the highest data point and lowest median
obtained within a given set of data. Howard (2008) pointed out that the IRQ will point
out scores that are heavily dependent on extreme scores. The IRQ assists in Delphi
research by identifying where participant’s judgments are widely different in the
distribution.
Linstone and Turoff (2002) and Giannariu and Zervas (2014) described where the
standard deviation and calculated means are commonly presented for consensus in a
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Delphi. The standard deviation described by Howell (2008) is the positive square root of
the variance of the sample collected. The standard deviation is commonly used to
understand how many of the scores in the sample fall a deviation above or below the
mean. For reasonably symmetric distributions, it can be stated that two-thirds of the
sample will fall within one standard deviation of the mean. This measurement allows for
the researcher to understand how closely together the Delphi participants have scored a
question.
For this study, the mean, standard deviation, 80% participant agreement, and
interquartile score were used in combination to reach a consensus. In interpreting the
group means, a value of 4 and above is considered an agreement by the panel. Consensus
for this study was obtained by four measurements used in combination:


An 80% agreement from the participants was recorded.



An interquartile range below 2.5 was recorded (Giannariu & Zervas,
2014).



A standard deviation below 1.5 was recorded (Giannariu & Zervas, 2014).



A mean score of greater than 4.0

The mean scores of the round one statements falling below 4.00 were eliminated
from the third round of the Delphi. The analysis of the data also recorded a strong
consensus measurement among the expert panel judgments which measured an 80% or
greater of 5 and 6-point Likert scale on any specific statement that reached consensus.
When a Delphi has a third round, the round is often used to evaluate data that falls
outside the median or to prioritize statements (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). The third round
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in this study did not continue to evaluate consensus but allowed each participant to apply
their opinion of importance in implementing the consensus statements.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The objective of credibility is to describe the concept of truthfulness in the
research findings. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that Delphi questions must be
carefully chosen by the researcher to allow the panelists to set the direction of the
judgments instead of following a predetermined path. To address Delphi credibility
limitations, I worked with the pilot participants and the committee to refine the seed
questions, diligently sought the proper expert panel members, and carefully crafted
communications to each participant.
Day and Bobeva (2005) and Skulmoski et al. (2007) wrote that obtaining the
correct number and expertise of participants strengthens the credibility of the study. The
number of expert participants in the study allowed for the loss of panelists without
impacting the ability to obtain data saturation (Day & Bobeva, 2005). The data collection
of this study supported the development of improvements to the disaster response from
computer crimes. For each round, participants had the opportunity to contribute to the
development of the disaster recovery factors and provide suggestions on how to improve
the process. The feedback returned ensured the data that was coded and analyzed by the
researcher had the expected intent of the participant. Before the second and third rounds
were initiated, all submitted feedback was collected and confirmed for correctness if
necessary.
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Transferability
The most common means of increasing the transferability of a Delphi is to test the
instrument with a pilot exercise for the initial round (Clibbens et al., 2012). The
transferability of the items in the Delphi was achieved by a small panel of disaster
recovery and cybersecurity expert. The pilot panel reviewed the Delphi first round of
content for relevance and clarity. Feedback was provided for improving the questions in
clarity and a better understanding of the intent of the research. Transferability was
increased by asking the panel experts to validate the researcher’s interpretation and factor
variables. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote the validity of the Delphi judgment can be
measured by consensus of the experts. Given the small and nonrandom sample of
participants, this study may not be readily transferable. Additional studies with other
participants may likely improve transferability.
Dependability
Patton (2015) claimed that dependability could be obtained by the researcher in
proper data collection, providing clear communication with the participants, and attention
to accuracy in the collection of data. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that dependability
could be found in a Delphi study by the calculation of group statistical summaries of the
judgments. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) wrote that the pilot testing is another mechanism
to show dependability in a study. Skulmoski et al. (2007) claimed an audit trail could
confirm dependability of a study’s findings and the methodological process. Day and
Bobeva (2005) wrote that a Delphi would maximize the quality of the outcome and
confirm the results of a study with an electronic survey.
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In this study, the pilot participants and the study participants indicated the same
themes in their judgments for solving the technology disaster service interruptions,
providing the correct expertise in personnel, and alignments with technology security
frameworks. The audit trails retained in the Delphi technique captured all questions,
responses, feedback, calculations, and coding for each round. A clear decision trail was
recorded from the beginning to the end of the study. Additionally, the research was
triangulated by follow-up evaluation questions with two participants. The initial 10
questions were clearly defined with an alignment from the review of the literature in
Chapter 2.
Confirmability
Miles et al. (2014) wrote that conformability in a qualitative study requires the
researcher to explicitly define the methods used for data gathering, analysis, selection,
and conclusion. Linstone and Turoff (1975) claimed the Delphi method has clearly
defined processes that are easily followed and clearly produces data that can be reviewed
by additional researchers. The use of the thick description and audit trail allows for the
conformability in the Delphi.
Day and Bobeva (2005) summarized that the researcher facilitating a Delphi
method is not a participant. The Delphi method allows for data collection directly from
the participants and minimizes researcher bias. The Delphi method will include a greater
than objectivity to alternative methods because of the ability for revisions by the panelists
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975). The systematic method allowed the expert participants to

122
express their opinions on their judgments without being influenced by a dominating
participant.
It can be a difficult statement to claim a study is free of bias, and a researcher
using the Delphi should place considerations on design decisions (Donohoe & Needham,
2009). The ability for the panelists to modify the questions based on their judgments
lowers the potential for research bias. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that Delphi
panelists are encouraged to suggest new questions and modify existing ones. Researcher
statements made in the Delphi were carefully crafted to remove cultural opinions and
subjective bias. Confidence in the data was found by rationale provided to show how the
initial set of questions are initially crafted. This rational combined with the audit trail
assists with dependability and confirmability.
Study Results
Round 1
Four hundred and thirty-one statements were collected from the participants in
Round 1. The collected statements fell into five significant categories related to
information technology disaster recovery:


factors that come from computer crimes



improvement steps



planning for computer crimes



integrating cybersecurity



necessary job skills
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After collecting and coding the data, considering the conceptual framework, and
reducing duplicate answers, several statements were developed for Round 2 consensus
building. The Round 1 coding activity produced 16 themes that were used in the
construction of the Round 2 statements. Most every participant provided multiple,
duplicate statements to one or more of the seed questions.
Table 9
Round 1 Statements
Category
Significant factors
that come from
computer crimes

Round 1
Statements
107

Improving the ITDR
response

94

ITDR planning for
computer crimes

81

Integrating with
cybersecurity

105

Necessary Skillsets
for responders

44

Appendix F includes the removal of duplicate statements made. The statements
were coded by being placed in a spreadsheet for sorting and a color application. 16
disaster recovery themes were generated and are listed in Table 4.
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Table 4
Round 1 Codes From the Seed Questions.
Code/Category

Frequency

Lack of understanding or confusion

18

Management support

6

Prover versus poor funding

6

Skills, roles, and training

26

Lack of scope

5

Traditional playbook weakness or strength

21

Testing / Lessons learned

14

Root cause analysis

9

Aligning with cybersecurity

16

Enterprise risk assessment

15

Poor versus proper planning

26

Capacity planning

3

Co-location – data resilience

15

ITDR team cooperation with cyber

21

Toolsets

5

Policy or regulatory requirements

9
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The data provided by the participants were grouped into 110 statements
developed from the first round of open-ended questions. The people skills and roles,
proper planning, and cyber security cooperation categories created the largest number of
codes. The capacity planning, toolsets, project scoping, funding and management support
categories held the least amount.
Round 2
The Round 1 data collection included 431 statements from the 10 qualitative,
open-ended questions. The 431 statements were analyzed ad themed into 110 statements
relating to the seed questions. The themes were broken up into multiple statement relating
to the questions as described in Table 5. Appendix D contains the complete list of Round
2 questions sent to the participant panel. Participants could provide additional comments
on the statements to clarify their answers better. Three participants provided additional
reasoning and explanations. I did not receive any feedback on the need for a greater
explanation of the statements or how the statements were generated.
Table 5
Themed Statements Created From Round 1 Analysis
Seed Questions

Themed Statements

Consensus found

Question 1

13

11

Question 2

7

5

Question 3

12

8

Question 4

13

11

Question 5

6

5
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Question 6

15

12

Question 7

11

7

Question 8

12

6

Question 9

12

8

Question 10

9

6

Of the 110 statements sent to the participants, the consensus was found on 79
statements. Table 6 includes the statements that met the consensus requirements outlined
in this study. Questions 7, 8, 9 and 10 recorded the most amount of statements lacking the
criteria needed for consensus. The theme of Questions 7, 9, and 10 included cybersecurity
frameworks that may apply to disaster recovery. Question 8 statements included
perceived job skills needed for a computer crimes business interruption.
Table 6
Participant Consensus From the Round 2 Analysis
Delphi Statement
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT
makes it difficult to anticipate the impact of the
recovery.

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

5.40

0.99

0.93

1.00

The organization must have adequate planning for
computer crimes.

5.07

1.03

0.93

2.00

Critical IT services must be available to conduct a
recovery.

4.60

1.06

0.80

1.00

A lack of management support and poor funding will
negatively impact this response.

5.07

1.03

0.93

2.00

5.33

0.65

0.93

1.00

If the organization does not staff skilled resources,
the response will suffer.
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The untested recovery process from computer crimes
will negatively impact the recovery process.
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the
ITDR team comes on the scene will be an issue when
the cause is computer crimes
IR teams must be trained for such a scenario.
Delphi Statement
Organizations conducting lessons learned will
improve their response.
Critical data must be protected and available from an
alternate source to protect from computer crimes
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in
responding to this type incident.
Organizations may need to document their computer
crimes recovery differently for compliance/legal/law
enforcement reasons.

5.17

1.03

0.87

1.25

4.71

1.20

0.80

2.00

5.07

0.73

1.00

0.75

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

4.93

0.73

1.00

0.75

5.25

0.87

0.87

1.00

5.17

0.83

0.93

1.25

3.86

1.21

0.80 2.00

Computer crimes can render critical systems unable
to support a recovery where traditionally it would.

5.00

1.00

0.93 0.50

It will be hard to identify compromised versus
uncompromised systems for recovery.

4.57

0.98

0.87 1.00

4.71

1.11

0.93 1.50

4.45

1.04

0.87 1.00

4.82

1.08

0.87 1.00

4.14

0.90

0.73 1.50

A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to
multiple activities of containment outside of the
recovery process.
Computer crime related recovery is much more
variable, and it is very difficult to determine the
variables effectively.
If a data backup/alternative is not available,
traditional recovery will not be successful or
extremely time-consuming.
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has
not scoped, it will trip upon the response.
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When a breach occurs, the organization may lack the
ability to anticipate and quantify the damage. This
would hamper the recovery.
An organization may not have outside resources
available to assist with a computer crimes
interruption. For example, an organization may not
have an InfoSec resource on retainer.
Delphi Statement

5.14

0.90

1.00 1.50

4.63

1.30

0.87 1.25

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

The organization has a lack of alignment with IT
goals and business goals.

4.14

0.69

0.80 0.50

A Traditional DR playbook may not eradicate the
intrusion correctly.

5.09

0.70

1.00 0.50

5.29

0.76

1.00 1.00

4.86

0.90

0.93 1.50

5.00

1.07

0.87 1.50

4.86

1.07

0.80 1.00

4.63

1.06

0.80 1.25

4.71

0.76

0.87 1.00

4.29

0.95

0.80 0.50

The DR team may have a poor understanding of the
attack which could cause the activation of the wrong
recovery solution, delaying, or stopping the overall
business resumption.
If organizations do not test for the computer crimes
scenario, it will fail to recover on time.
Computer crimes are more complex and involve
greater communication and collaboration outside of
IT and the IT Security team.
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the
main company environment so that it cannot be
hacked.
Craft procedures where data is lost or corrupted and
recovery have to be initiated using physical backups.
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime that
takes into consideration the risks of computer crimes
interruptions.
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations
would improve recovery from a computer crime
interruption.
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An improvement would come from lessons learned
and cause analysis sessions.
Security architectures must use technology in support
of business objectives, and accurately model
dependencies to prioritize resources.
Organizations must focus on people,
communications, tools, and facilities to improve
from computer crimes interruptions.
Delphi Statement
Preventive and testing measures must be taken
continuously for computer crimes.
Containment and eradication procedures for
computer crimes will need to be included in
playbooks.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the ITDR
program.
I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a
typical disaster recovery effort and fail completely
when attempting to recover from a computer crime
event.
The prepared organization will not rely on one
solution to protect everything.
Companies more heavily invested in preparing for
computer crime-based interruptions have greater
integration with their Information Security
counterparts and have a management team that
understands the risks posed by computer crimes and
are willing to devote more money and attention to
prevention and preparation for computer crime
interruptions.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with
computer crimes in their ITDR are opening
themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions
caused by computer crimes.

5.00

0.82

0.93 1.00

5.14

0.69

0.87 0.50

4.71

0.76

1.00 1.00

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

4.71

0.95

1.00 1.50

5.29

0.76

0.93 1.00

4.29

1.50

0.87 2.00

4.71

0.76

0.87 1.00

4.86

0.90

0.93 1.50

4.87

1.19

0.87 1.50

5.13

0.99

0.87 1.00
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Organizations must provide a robust awareness
program to ITDR teams to help mitigate computer
crimes risks.
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes
recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led the
response to better respond to computer crimes.
Delphi Statement

5.00

0.82

1.00 1.00

5.47

0.83

0.93 1.00

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk reaction to
throw money at a problem without first grasping
what that problem is and then smartly coming up
with the solution.

5.14

0.90

0.93 1.50

Organizations must avoid open source systems for
critical business applications to better respond to
computer crimes.

3.36

1.21

0.40 1.00

Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned
and root cause analysis will not improve to better
respond to computer crimes.

5.29

0.76

1.00 1.00

Organizations should avoid placing a low value on
quality management in DR to better respond to
computer crimes.

4.71

0.95

0.81 1.50

Organizations must avoid architectures that lack
redundancy or resiliency attributes to better respond
to computer crimes.

5.00

0.58

0.93 0.00

Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected
from computer crimes.

5.43

0.53

1.00 1.00

Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of
computer crimes interruptions.

5.13

0.99

0.93 1.50

Organizations must not focus on speed but instead
focus on the assessment phase to better respond to
computer crimes.

4.57

0.98

0.80 1.00
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Organizations must avoid having missing
cybersecurity policies to better respond to computer
crimes.

4.43

0.98

0.87 1.00

Organizations must avoid operating DR functions
without the proper funding to better respond to
computer crimes.

4.57

0.98

0.93 1.00

Delphi Statement

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in
different silos to better respond to computer crimes.

5.53

0.64

1.00 1.00

A well-developed cybersecurity framework supports
the ITDR, and the opportunity for a technical
interruption is reduced.

4.80

0.77

1.00 1.00

A coordinated process alignment between Disaster
Recovery and Information Security frameworks is
vital to reducing the recovery of this type.

5.27

0.59

1.00 1.00

DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle
processes, so that like steps are executed together,
and participation is integrated.

5.29

0.76

1.00 1.00

Developing an ITDR set of practices and different
playbooks will reduce the response.

4.14

0.90

0.80 1.50

Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency
models to reduce the response to this interruption.

4.29

0.76

0.87 1.00

Advanced preparation will reduce a computer crimes
response.

5.00

1.15

0.80 1.50

There is not much alignment between DR and
InfoSec frameworks, and that is a problem.

4.73

1.10

0.80 1.50

A deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT
environment will improve the response to computer
crimes.

5.27

0.59

1.00 1.00
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A business-focused understanding of the
organization will improve the response to computer
crimes.

5.00

1.15

0.87 1.50

A risk-based focus on the business will improve the
response to computer crimes.

5.33

0.72

1.00 1.00

Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
will improve the response to computer crimes.

4.57

0.79

0.80 1.00

Delphi Statement

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

A basic understanding of the layers of protection,
prevention, policy management, operations,
monitoring, and response will improve computer
crimes recovery efforts.

4.29

0.49

1.00 0.50

Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to improve
the response to computer crimes.

4.57

0.79

0.87 0.50

Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the
ITDR process

5.20

1.08

0.93 1.00

InfoSec training for ITDR teams

4.57

0.79

1.00 1.00

Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO
responsibilities into ITDR planning activities.

4.00

1.15

0.87 1.50

Formal lessons learned and future prevention, which
may help lessen the severity of future incidents.

4.71

0.76

1.00 1.00

Establishing a baseline of security configurations is
another cybersecurity process that extends to ITDR.

4.71

0.76

0.93 1.00

Asset inventory processes.

4.57

0.53

0.80 1.00

Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing

5.00

1.00

0.80 0.50

CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the
recovery.

4.57

0.53

0.87 1.00

Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR
frameworks.

5.13

0.92

0.93 1.00
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If done well, clearly following an ESRM program
and linking the outcomes of the framework to the DR
framework offers organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.

5.00

1.00

0.87 1.00

Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself
will be lacking.

4.86

0.69

0.93 0.50

Delphi Statement

MEAN

SD

CON

IRQ

If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will
identify the DR systems as one of the most businesscritical systems in the organization.

4.33

1.45

0.80 1.00

Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in
your disaster recovery process may allow it to easier
identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a
“system malfunction.”

4.71

0.49

0.93 0.50

A cybersecurity framework integration could provide
an advantage in that it provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of
risk management to the disaster recovery framework.

4.43

1.40

0.80 1.00

Round 3
In this study, 29 statements of the 110 fell below the combined measurements
needed to reach consensus and were not used in the third round. Of the 79 statements that
reached consensus, 71 statements could be used to understand the importance of applying
that statement to an organization to improve a computer crimes response. The eight
statements that were filtered out in round three were not statements that could apply to
improving an disaster recovery response to computer crimes. The filtered statements
pointed to important knowledge on disaster recovery but did not directly apply to an
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improvement action an organization could take. Appendix E lists the entire list of Round
3 questions.
During Round 3, the participants were given the opportunity to rank the
importance of the consensus questions identified in round two. Of the 71 consensus
statements, 32 statements reached a consensus on the importance to the organization.
Table 7 includes the statements that reach a consensus on the importance to be
implemented in an organization.
Table 7
Round 3 Consensus Statements on Importance
Round 3 statements

MEAN

SD

CONS

IRQ

Lack of understanding of the interdependencies
in IT makes it difficult to anticipate the impact
of the recovery. Improve understanding.

4.63

0.7

.88

.025

4.50

0.8

.88

1

4.25

0.7

.88

1

4.25

0.7

.88

.25

4.63

0.7

.88

.25

4.25

0.7

.88

1

A lack of management support and poor funding
will negatively impact this response.
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the
ITDR team comes on the scene will be an issue
when the cause is computer crimes.
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT
goals and business goals.
The DR team may have a poor understanding of
the attack which could cause the activation of
the wrong recovery solution, delaying, or
stopping the overall business resumption.
Security architectures must use technology in
support of business objectives, and accurately
model dependencies to prioritize resources.
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Organizations must focus on people,
communications, tools, and facilities to improve
from computer crimes interruptions.

4

0.5

.86

0

4.38

0.7

.88

1

Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the
ITDR program.

4.5

0.8

.88

1

Round 3 statements

MEAN

SD

CONS

IRQ

The prepared organization will not rely on one
solution to protect everything.

4.6

0.7

.88

.25

4.38

0.5

1

1

4.38

0.5

1

1

4.13

0.6

.88

.25

4.25

0.7

.88

1

4.63

0.7

.88

.25

4.75

0.7

.88

0

Containment and eradication procedures for
computer crimes will need to be included in
playbooks.

Companies more heavily invested in preparing
for computer crime-based interruptions have
greater integration with their Information
Security counterparts and have a management
team that understands the risks posed by
computer crimes and are willing to devote more
money and attention to prevention and
preparation for computer crime interruptions.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with
computer crimes in their ITDR are opening
themselves up to additional risks, and
interruptions caused by computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take
into consideration the current state of the
systems to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations that do not conduct lessons
learned and root cause analysis will not improve
to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack
redundancy or resiliency attributes to better
respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid thinking they are
protected from computer crimes.
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Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of
computer crimes interruptions.
A well-developed cybersecurity framework
supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for a
technical interruption is reduced.

Round 3 statements
A coordinated process alignment between
Disaster Recovery and Information Security
frameworks is vital to reducing the recovery of
this type.

4.5

.08

.88

1

4.5

0.5

1

1

MEAN

SD

CONS

IRQ

4.75

0.5

1

.25

0.7

.88

1

4

0.5

.88

0

4.5

0.8

.88

1

4.38

0.7

.88

1

4.38

0.7

.88

1

4.63

0.5

1

1

4.5

0.5

1

1

DR and InfoSec should be aligning their
lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
4.38
together, and participation is integrated.
Resilience efforts should be folded into
dependency models to reduce the response to
this interruption.
There is not much alignment between DR and
InfoSec frameworks, and that is a problem.
Create alignment.
A deep understanding of interdependencies in
the IT environment will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A business-focused understanding of the
organization will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A risk-based focus on the business will improve
the response to computer crimes.
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral
thinking will improve the response to computer
crimes.
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A basic understanding of the layers of
protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response will
improve computer crimes recovery efforts.

4.25

0.7

.88

1

4.25

0.7

.88

1

4.38

0.5

1

1

Round 3 statements

MEAN

SD

CONS

IRQ

Organizations should include InfoSec risks in
ITDR frameworks.

4.50

0.5

1

1

0.7

.88

1

0.5

1

1

Implement Enterprise Security Risk
Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process.
Deploy InfoSec training for ITDR teams.

If done well, clearly following an ESRM
program and linking the outcomes of the
framework to the DR framework offers
4.38
organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls
in your disaster recovery process may allow it to
easier identify attacks that would otherwise be
4.38
considered a “system malfunction.”

The consensus statements made in this round provided a viewpoint on the
perceived actions that an organization should consider at high importance. The 32 Round
3 statements represent only 40% of the round two statements that the participants felt
were important enough to place a higher priority on implementation of the theme.
Appendix G provided the analysis of the third-round submissions. In addition to the
ranking of importance, the participants had the opportunity to provide feedback or
comments on their submissions. Six participants submitted to the third and final round of
the study. There were no comments or feedback given in this round by the participants.
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Summary
Chapter 4 included the collection and analysis of three rounds of the Delphi study
to understand the effects of computer crimes in the management of disaster recovery. The
results of the study recapitulate the data collected from expert participants in the field of
disaster recovery and cybersecurity. The results of this research communicated the insight
of the experts and supported the practices that possibly could improve the response to
computer crimes caused service interruption.
The qualitative statements and subsequent judgments provided by the first round
of the Delphi produced 410 qualitative statements. The considerations involving
planning, modification of disaster recovery playbooks, improving skills of the disaster
recovery teams, and cooperation with cyber teams were identified as the top four largest
coding categories as highlighted in Figure 5. Having toolsets, scoping exercises, funding,
and management support were the least coded categories. The second round presented
110 themed statements for the participant's judgment. The judgments resulted in 79
consensus statements. The 79 statements focused on significant factors of computer
crimes, problems of an unplanned response, improvement steps, planning for computer
crimes, integrating cybersecurity into disaster recovery processes, and necessary job
skills needed in the disaster recovery team.

139

Figure 5. Top 4 categories in the round one coding.
Round 3 was used to solicit the expert opinions on the importance of the
consensus statements from Round 2. Participants considered the statements for
organizations to implement to improve the disaster response from computer crimes. Of
the 79 statements that reached consensus in the second round, 71 were presented to the
participants in the third round. Of the 71 statements, only 32 or 45% meet the
requirements for consensus to satisfy the importance for an organization to implement.
The key findings of this study suggest:


Organizations should dedicate effort to have a better understanding of the
intricacies that technology has on business processes.



Planning for computer crimes is crucial for the success of the recovery
process.



Alignment of disaster recovery and cyber security should improve the
response to siloed activities.
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Cybersecurity training of disaster recovery teams will improve the planning
and response to computer crimes interruptions.



Lessons learned for computer crimes interruptions will improve the response
activity for future events.



An enterprise based risk management strategy, considering computer crimes,
will improve the planning in the disaster recovery program.

Chapter 5 includes the conclusion of this research, implications, interpretations,
limitations, and recommendations for this study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
A large majority of organizations rely on technology for critical processes and
service interruptions of any type may severely affect their offering. A review of the
literature indicated a limited knowledge on how to effectively respond to computer
crimes because of the relative newness of the attack and missing competencies needed by
the disaster recovery team. The purpose of this qualitative study was to identify
improvements that could be made to the resumption of an organization that experienced
an interruption involving computer crime. Woods et al. (2016) described qualitative
research as the combining of knowledge, experience, and understanding of a topic to
allow the researcher to build an understanding of a phenomenon. A qualitative inquiry
was chosen because it was the most appropriate design for gaining an understanding of
the problem computer crimes interruptions cause to disaster recovery programs. The
Delphi was selected over other qualitative approaches because of the desire for prediction
and theory building in disaster recovery. This study allowed for the identification of
controls, planning, processes, and skillsets that could be used to improve the resumption
process. The Delphi allowed this study to contribute to the body of knowledge on disaster
recovery as it pertains to the viewpoints of disaster recovery researchers, practitioners,
and cybersecurity experts.
The results of this study included consensus statements by the panel on five
central topics that described factors affecting recovery efforts from (a)computer crimes,
(b) processes for improving the disaster recovery response, (c) disaster recovery
planning, (d) integration with cybersecurity, and (e) desirable job skills. The key findings
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of this study suggested that (a) organizations should have a better understanding of the
intricacies that technology has on business processes (b) management support is essential
for the recovery, (c) planning for computer crimes is crucial, (d) alignment of disaster
recovery and cyber security should improve the response, (e) skillsets of responders
should be considered, and (f) a risk-based focus on computer crimes will improve the
planning in the disaster recovery program.
In this chapter, I explain inferences and themes that may be drawn from the
Delphi results. I discuss the possible changes that can be made to a disaster recovery
program to improve recovery times from a computer crimes interruption. The remaining
sections of Chapter 5 are comprised of interpretations of the findings, limitations of the
study, recommendations, and implications.
Interpretation of Findings
The results of this study included consensus statements by the participant panel on
five central topics that produced 79 consensus statements on the effect of computer
crimes in disaster recovery. Four hundred and thirty-one statements were collected in the
first round of the study and themed down into 110 statements. In the second round, 31 of
the original 110 statements did not reach the consensus formula that consisted of a mean
of 4.0 or greater, 80% agreement, IRQ of less than 2.5 and SD less than 1.5. Table 8
contains the statements and consensus found from each round of this Delphi.
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Table 8
Overall Delphi findings
Category
Significant factors
that come from
computer crimes

Round 1
Round 2
Statements Statements
107
21

Round 2
Consensus
16

Round 3
Round 3
Statements Consensus
10
5

Improving the ITDR
response

94

27

19

19

7

ITDR planning for
computer crimes

81

22

17

15

8

Integrating with
cybersecurity

105

32

21

21

10

Necessary Skillsets
for responders

44

13

6

6

5

The key findings of the study indicated that organization’s disaster recovery
leadership needed to focus on greater risk assessments of critical technology
infrastructures outside of the traditional fire, flood, and loss of power. Planning for
technology interruptions must now consider disruptions from technology vulnerabilities
that could be leveraged by attackers to bring down organization’s business processes.
Planners and responder’s skillsets must also be considered. Cybersecurity cross training
on incident response and identification will improve the response to computer crime. The
findings also pointed to integrating cybersecurity processes with a disaster recovery
framework.

144
Delphi Round 1
The first round of the study provided 10 open-ended, seed questions to the
participants. The original seed questions were derived from within the literature review.
Seventeen participants of the 23 that agreed to join the study responded to the
questionnaire. The initial 10 seed questions resulted in 431 statements corresponding to
the five main themes in Table 8.
Significant factors that come from computer crimes. The first two seed
questions collected factors from the participants that significantly affected the response to
computer crimes and how the disaster recovery playbook may be impacted. One hundred
and seven statements were submitted by the panel as factors to consider when responding
to computer crimes. The panelists recorded the most references to lack of knowledge,
management support, and responsibilities. The statements were coded and themed for the
Round 2 judgments.
Improving the Disaster Recovery response. The third and fourth seed questions
included judgments on the response aspects of recovery from computer crimes. Ninetyfour statements were submitted by the participants for their viewpoints on responding to
and improving the response to computer crimes. Determining the root cause of the attack,
disaster recovery alignment, recovering data, and updating the playbook were the most
frequently referenced.
Disaster Recovery planning for computer crimes. The fifth and sixth questions
collected judgments on the planning aspects that an organization should consider when
the disaster recovery team is building the playbooks. Eighty-one statements were
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collected from the participants on disaster recovery planning for computer crimes and the
way an organization may improve the process. Avoidance of a single solution, specific
planning for computer crimes, lessons learned, and the need for information security were
the highest themes analyzed for this category.
Integrating with cybersecurity. The seventh, ninth, and 10th questions focused
on the integration of cybersecurity processes with disaster recovery. One hundred and
five statements were submitted by the participants on the alignment of cybersecurity
frameworks alignment with disaster recovery, use of cybersecurity processes, and the
advantages of implementation of cyber security controls. Risk management, lessons
learned, cybersecurity training, and cybersecurity frameworks recorded the highest count
of themes in this category. Several participants cited information security frameworks
that could be aligned with disaster recovery and pointed to the need for alignment of
cyber with disaster recovery.
Necessary skillsets for responders. The eighth question focused on any skillsets
that could assist disaster recovery responders or planners for the recovery of computer
crimes. Forty-four statements were submitted by the panel for their viewpoints on the job
skills needing to be recruited for a successful recovery from computer crimes. A risk
mindset, cyber security expertise, and certifications were the highest coded responses.
Several experts expressed logical thinking and cyber security knowledge as a requirement
to be found in the disaster recovery team personnel. A focus on the understanding of
technology in the business was also highlighted as a skill needed to understand the impact
of the computer crimes.
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Delphi Round 2
The second round of the Delphi presented 110 themed statements analyzed from
the first round of data collection. The themed questions were broken up by the 10 seed
questions so that the participants could understand the root of the statement. Of the 110
statements sent to the participants, the consensus was found on 79 (72%) of the
statements.
Significant factors that come from computer crimes. For Questions 1 and 2
focusing on computer crimes factors, 21 themed statements were presented for judgment.
Of the 21 statements, 16 (76%) of the statements came to a consensus agreement. The
panel highlighted the need for understanding interdependencies, adequate planning for
computer crimes, needed availability of critical infrastructure, management support via
funding, testing a response for computer crimes, and critical data must be protected from
tampering.
Improving the disaster recovery response. Questions 3 and 4, concentrating on
the response aspects of recovery, provided 27 themed statements. Of the 27 statements,
19 (70%) of the statements reached a consensus agreement. Of the statements that
reached a consensus, having a clear scope of the response, quantifying the damage,
having external resources to assist in the recovery, needing an alignment with business
goals, revising the disaster recovery playbook for new threats, and testing for computer
crimes were viewed as steps the organization can take to improve the response.
Disaster recovery planning for computer crimes. The fifth and sixth questions
focused on the planning aspects of the recovery and provided 22 statements for judgment.
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Of the presented statements, 17 (77%) of the statements meet consensus. Specific
planning for computer crimes, understanding the cyber risk, the need for awareness
programs, considering the current state of technology in the organization, lesson learned
activities, adequate funding, and the need for information technology disaster recovery to
operate in the same business silo as information security were each identified by the
panel.
Integrating with cybersecurity. The seventh, ninth, and 10th questions focused
on the integration of cybersecurity processes with disaster recovery. Thirty-two
statements were presented to the participants for judgment, and 21 (53%) found
consensus. Alignment with a cybersecurity framework, resilience controls, the need for
enterprise risk management, and lessons learned was identified as the major themes. Al
Hamed and Alenezi (2016) highlighted the importance of a strong connection between
information security and disaster recovery and the need for organizational improvement
in business impact analysis.
Three participants provided additional feedback on the potential cost of
implementing cybersecurity into disaster recovery processes. The participants felt there
could be a disadvantage in that adding the cybersecurity components to the existing
process would require more time, technology, and expertise. This disadvantage could be
coming from a position of a leader that is already struggling to get funding for a DR
program and may find it difficult to expand the scope of computer crimes.
Necessary skillsets for responders. The eighth question focused on skill sets to
assist disaster recovery responders or planners for the recovery of computer crimes.
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Thirteen statements were presented to the participants for judgments. Six (46%) of the
proposed statements found consensus for the skillsets needed to recover from computer
crimes. Business-focused understanding, risk analysis, prevention, and cybersecurity
expertise were identified as necessary for the recovery effort. Toigo (1989) and Tucker
(2014) claimed risk assessment was a commonly misunderstood aspect of disaster
recovery planning, and without the proper cybersecurity knowledge, the risk assessment
may not contain the necessary understanding to identify the risks.
Delphi Round 3
The Round 3 questionnaire carried consensus statements over from the second
round of agreements. Five questions from the first category and two questions from the
third category were filtered from this round because the questions did not apply to the
application of control or process of an organization. Seventy-five consensus statements
were presented to the participants for judgment of a 5-point importance Likert scale to the
organization’s disaster recovery program.
Significant factors that come from computer crimes. Fourteen statements were
presented with five reaching the threshold for consensus. The participants highlighted the
need for management support, a clear understanding of technology interdependencies,
and the responders understand computer crimes attacks. These findings indicated that
responders must have a good grasp of the environment and at the same time an
understanding how computer crimes can affect that environment. This highlighted the
need for cybersecurity knowledge on the planning and response side of the disaster
recovery program. Statements not reaching a consensus concentrated on the availability
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of critical IT services, testing recovery processes, and lessons learned. This research
seems to indicate lessons learned, and testing is needed in a cyber response, but the
participants placed a higher priority on implementing cybersecurity knowledge over these
existing activities that may just need minor upgrading to meet the need.
Improving the disaster recovery response. Nineteen statements were presented
for the panel to provide a judgment on the importance of deployment in an organization.
Seven statements met the criteria for consensus. The panel highlighted the need for the
technology department to alignment with the business, a need for a clear understanding of
computer threats, a focus on responder’s knowledge, revising playbooks for new threats,
and embedding cybersecurity into disaster recovery programs. An analysis of the findings
resulted in the training of the disaster recovery responders and revision of the DR
playbook to respond to the emerging threat of computer crimes. The theme statements
that did not reach consensus focused on data backup techniques, a focus on quantifying
the damage, third-party resources, traditional disaster recovery playbooks,
communication, and cause analysis
Disaster recovery planning for computer crimes. Fifteen statements were
presented to the panel on planning for computer crimes. Eight statements reached a
consensus of importance. The participants highlighted the importance of a diversified
response to computer crimes interruptions, adequate funding, attention to risks, attention
paid to understanding the current state of systems, and resiliency of technology. The
concepts that did not reach a threshold of consensus focused on the computer crimes
problem being an IT problem, quick decision making without understanding the problem,
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and placing a low value on quality management. This research indicates knowledge of
cybersecurity will improve the risk management process and deployed controls to resume
the organization. Resiliency was also scored here with the intent of the participants
pointing to having data available following a computer crimes attack. Feedback was
provided by a participant that this might be a difficult problem to solve. Traditional
redundancy of data with synchronization or a backup medium has not always mitigated
computer crimes such as ransomware (Bhattacharya & Kumar, 2017).
Integrating with cybersecurity. Twenty-one statements were sent to the panel
for ranking that focused on cybersecurity integration with disaster recovery. Of the 21
statements, 10 (47%) achieved consensus. The participants indicated an information
security framework should integrate with disaster recovery and cybersecurity teams
should be aligned, disaster recovery teams should receive infosec training, and enterprise
risk management being important for organizations to consider. The themes that did not
reach a consensus of importance threshold included building advanced DR playbooks,
chief security officer responsibilities in disaster recovery planning, baselining security
configurations, penetration testing activities, risk management identification of critical
systems, and risk management. This research indicated the strong need for the integration
of cybersecurity with disaster recovery.
Necessary skillsets for responders. Six themed statements were presented for
ranking the skills that disaster recovery team members should exhibit. Of the six
statements from the second round, five statements reached a consensus on importance.
Understanding the technology environment, business-focused understanding of the
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organization, risk analysis, and basic information security skills was highlighted as
desirable skills for being better equipped to respond to computer crimes. This finding
correlates with many sections of this research regarding the training of cybersecurity
skillsets to disaster recovery planners and responders.
Limitations of the Study
This study had potential limitations. Although the Delphi participants were
provided qualitative questions about information technology disaster recovery, the
question attributes were limited to computer crimes by the researcher. The disaster
recovery body of knowledge is far reaching beyond information technology, and this
research was specifically limited to the disaster recovery of computer crimes caused
interruption. This research tried to understand how organizations might better respond to
computer crimes interruptions and if information technology disaster recovery alignment
with cybersecurity might improve the response. The research study findings did not
include the motive behind the cyber attackers, describe the type of individuals or groups
that comprise cyber hackers, or developed a method for preventing the attacks. The study
did not research the building of an disaster recovery team or how the team should be
funded.
The findings from this research may apply to organizations that currently follow
disaster recovery activities. The study would not apply to organizations that have a
limited technology footprint or do not find it necessary to have processes to recover
technology. The study was not focused on any organization, and the finding might have
different results depending on the purpose of the organization.
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This research was limited to the disaster recovery and cybersecurity participants
understanding of information technology disaster recovery and cybersecurity incident
response. A potential limitation might come from the recruiting of a panel that would fail
to include the viewpoints of recognized experts. To avoid including participants that
would not provide valuable data, I held to a strict guideline. Published disaster recovery
researchers, disaster recovery practitioners, and cybersecurity expertise were confirmed
from interviews and LinkedIn profiles. The snowball sampling technique provided
additional experts who were also queried for applicable expertise requirements that had
been set. The responses to this research may differ from experts that do not agree with the
need to integrate cybersecurity knowledge into disaster recovery.
Recommendations
The following recommendations were derived from this qualitative Delphi study.
The recommendations are intended to offer an improved understanding of disaster
recovery teams, social change, and contribute to the information technology disaster
recovery body of knowledge. This study was not confined to any organizational type or
geographic locations. The researcher focused on five categories relating to significant
factors, improving response, planning, integration, and skillsets. Researchers may wish to
conduct similar Delphi research on different organizations such as corporate 500,
nonprofits, or government agencies with a similar focus on these major categories.
A future Delphi on desirable skillsets of disaster recovery responders might yield
invaluable data on the needs of an increasingly complicated cyber risk. Attacks have
changed overtime and one section of industry may not see the same attacks as another.
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Due to different technologies, risks to cyber-attacks, computer crimes, and available
resources, a Delphi that focuses on one organizational sector, for example, finance, would
represent a viable option for research on the effects of computer crimes.
For future studies, researchers might change the eligibility of the study to include
potential participants from a software development background, cloud service
architecture, and c-level executives to seek new views on industry-specific experience.
The results of these future Delphi might provide new insight for comparison with this
study on new frameworks, responses, integrations or changes to the disaster recovery
team composition. There are a variety of potential avenues for Delphi studies that might
provide further insight into disaster recovery as it pertains to cyber threats.
Five panelists of this study indicated a lack of understanding of technology
interdependencies and how proper triage of computer crimes may be significant factors in
a recovery activity. Future qualitative studies could expand on the five panelists
judgement of disaster recovery responders lacking technical understanding for the
response. This study would center on successful triage techniques for containment and
remediation of computer crimes.
Six panelists highlighted the need for data resiliency. Another area of research
might seek to understand how vital it is to have data resiliency when an entity
experiences a computer crimes interruption and if the resiliency deployed is enough to
overcome the intentional attack. Disaster recovery scholars may wish to understand how
important it is to have defined disaster response roles when encountering a computer
crimes interruption. Existing DR plans may not have clear roles when the interruption is
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not conventional, and the team must leave the planner recovery procedures.
Understanding how roles with a veteran cyber skillset can improve the disaster recovery
process would be valuable to the body of knowledge.
Ninety three percent (93%) of this study’s panel highlighted the need for
enterprise risk management as it pertains to cyber risks. Guidry et al. (2015) and
Ferdinand (2015) claimed that the lack of organizational understanding of how a disaster
recovery program might modify measures to account for computer crimes interruptions.
Future researchers may find value in qualitative studies looking at how organizations
need to alter their disaster recovery planning to specifically accommodate technology
black swans such as the Petya crypto locker or the DyN DDoS attack (Shuler & Smith,
2017).
An analysis of the data indicated there would be an advantage with developing
cybersecurity expertise and when aligning disaster recovery frameworks with
cybersecurity frameworks. Comments from the experts pointed to the need for greater
visibility, monitoring, and incident response from cyber-attacks. The study did not
identify existing or applicable frameworks that would meet this need. Future research
should center on how to align components of a common cybersecurity framework to add
value to disaster recovery framework such as the ISO 22301, ISO 17999, NIST 800-34 or
BS25999 ((Bird, 2015; Brown, 2016). The cybersecurity frameworks 800-184 and CAG
20 are described as frameworks for improving policies and plans for recovering evolved
threats (Montesino & Fenz, 2011). Future studies might produce a hybrid control
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framework that would better position an organization to defend, identify and recover
from cyber threats.
An analysis of the data indicated the participants placed importance on
cybersecurity skills for responders. As expressed by the experts, there might exist a
considerable gap between traditional disaster recovery skillsets and the cyber skills
needed for responding to computer crimes. A potential Delphi would seek to understand
the desirable skillsets of disaster recovery responders that might yield invaluable data on
the increasingly complicated cyber risk response to computer crimes (McCreight &
Leece, 2016). Researchers may also conduct qualitative studies for the value of
penetration testing experience, encryption solutions, and security event monitoring.
Implications
The experience of disaster recovery and cybersecurity experts represents a section
of information which might facilitate a change in the response and recovery from
technology disasters. Technology disasters are a risk that is increasingly affecting
organizational survivability. Keeping an organization immediately viable following a
technology interruption will assist in the survivability or profitability of the organization.
Prepared organizations are better positioned to keep employees on the payroll and
remaining in the community instead of invoking evacuation plans and crisis
communications (Kuo & Means, 2011). By improving the disaster recovery response to
an event, a community that is relying on vital services from the affected entity will
experience a reduced interruption as opposed to a prolonged disturbance. Hospitals,
emergency response, local law enforcement, and transportation are examples of vital
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services that can leverage an improved information technology disaster recovery response
to service the local community.
Recommendations for Information Technology Disaster Recovery Teams
My research reduces a gap in the understanding of information technology
disaster recovery by focusing specifically on the consensus of experts in the field of
cybersecurity and information technology disaster recovery. Organizations across the
globe are experiencing interruptions due to unexpected computer crimes, and researchers
are predicting this trend to increase (Page, Kaur, & Waters, 2017; Liu, Li, Shuai, & Wen,
2017). Traditional disaster recovery has a significant amount of historical data to aid in
the planning and resuming of a system from fire, flood, and loss of power (Ferdinand,
2015); however, newer risks to the organization must now be realized from the threat of
computer crimes. Key decision makers must integrate cybersecurity efforts with disaster
recovery planning and procedures. Training information technology disaster recovery
planners and responders in general or specific cybersecurity techniques can improve the
planning phase and conceptual awareness during a computer crimes interruption. A
cybersecurity awareness can provide an insight into a risk management activity that may
not have been considered otherwise (Alexander, 2015; Grigonis, 2002; Iqbal, Widyawan,
& Mustika, 2016; Lam, 2002; Rittinghouse & Ransome, 2011). Organizations should
explore ways to integrate more cybersecurity into the disaster recovery lifecycle to
improve the ability to quickly and efficiently recover from business interruptions.

157
Conclusions
This qualitative Delphi research study included the viewpoints and knowledge of
disaster recovery researchers, disaster recovery responders, and cybersecurity experts as a
tool to understand how to improve the effects of computer crimes on disaster recovery
programs. Although disaster recovery was originally founded from the principles of
emergency management in responding to natural disasters (Alexander, 2015), the
research participants highlighted the need to advance the disaster recovery process to
include cybersecurity threats. The research pointed to the need for organizations to
implement cybersecurity knowledge in the disaster recovery process for planning, risk
management, lessons learned, and awareness improvement of the responders. The
emerging threats from cyber-attacks pose a serious risk to organizations (Vaidya, 2015)
and a building of understanding in cybersecurity should improve the disaster recovery
response from a computer crimes interruption.
This research also explored the use of a cybersecurity framework integration with
disaster recovery processes. The monitoring, defensive controls, and incident response
procedures found in popular cybersecurity frameworks can easily augment existing
information technology disaster recovery planning and response procedures. The research
participants highlighted advantages in several sections of this research in combining the
two concepts where it was applicable. Therefore, based on the results of this study,
organizations must explore ways to build knowledge in their disaster recovery teams of
cybersecurity techniques and should improve their disaster recovery programs through an
integration with a cybersecurity framework.
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter
Invitation to participate in a doctoral research project with consent
Project Title: The Effects of Computer Crimes on the Management of Disaster Recovery
Researchers:
Timothy Proffitt, doctoral candidate, Management
David Gould - Ed.D., Committee Chair, Walden University
Dear Madam/Sir,
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Walden
University. This information sheet describes the project. Please read this sheet carefully
and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to participate.
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted?
Timothy Proffitt is conducting this research as a doctoral requirement and Dr.
David Gould from Walden University will be the committee chair. The Walden
Institutional Review Board (IRB) has given their written support for this research. The
purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how information technology disaster
recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response to a computer
crime caused business interruption.
Why have you been approached?
You have been approached on the basis that you identify yourself as an expert in
disaster recovery or cybersecurity. You have not been approached randomly, but rather,
have been identified by one of the researchers or by one of your friends, family or
acquaintances that might be aware of you being an expert in these fields.
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed?
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study is to understand how information
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response
to a computer crime caused business interruption. A qualitative approach will focus on
information technology disaster recovery participants to develop a new framework of
response. A new model will be developed as an understanding of how the information
technology disaster recovery processes could be influenced by other frameworks tailored
for cyber security or computer incident response. A Delphi approach was chosen over
other qualitative research approaches, such as a case study, because the aim of this study
is to learn what factors affect a certain responses and to problem solve to improve the
disaster response process.
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do?
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Participation will require the full completion of three rounds of a Delphi
questionnaire that should take between 30 and 45 minutes of your time for each round.
The initial questionnaires will ask you about factors significantly affecting the ability of
disaster recovery programs in responding to computer crimes caused disasters. You are
asked to answer question in your expert opinion with the understanding that the next
round of questions will build on the previous answers. After each submission, you will be
provided feedback to be sure that your submission was clearly understood by the
researcher.
It is valuable to the study that all three rounds are completed by a participant. The
last round is important in reaching consensus or identifying new areas that need further
discussion.
What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation?
There are no foreseeable risks for your participation outside your normal day-today activities. Each of the three rounds will ask you judgments on questions around
information technology disaster recovery. The responses should be expected to take
between thirty to sixty minutes depending on your responses. The study should not be a
significant investment of your time.
What are the benefits associated with participation?
The results of the study will assist in improved disaster recovery planning and
response to an emerging threat to any organization relying on technology for vital
business functions. Billions of dollars and a number of organizations each year are lost
when they are unable to recover from a disaster. Your participation may improve the
resiliency of organizations around the globe.
What will happen to the information I provide?
Your completed questionnaire is anonymous and your name will be known only
to the researcher. No information will be place into the dissertation that can identify you
personally. Your questionnaire will be kept confidential for 15 years before being
destroyed. The summarized results may be published in disaster recovery journals, made
available to various technology groups, conferences, and various other sources.
What are my rights as a participant?
• You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time.
• You have the right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed.
• You have the right to have any questions answered at any time.
Is there a payment?
There will not be any compensation for participating in the study.
Statement of Consent
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to
make a decision about my involvement. By, replying to this email with the phrase, “Yes,
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I consent to this study.” You understand that you are agreeing to the terms described
above.
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Appendix B: List of Round 1 Questions


What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in
responding to computer crimes caused disasters?



What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover
differently than a traditionally planned recovery?



In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional
technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused
business interruption?



What steps might be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery
procedures to resume the organization from a computer crimes disaster?



What differences can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions
caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not?



What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from computer
crimes?



What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could
have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology
disaster recovery framework to align with a cyber security framework?



What type of expertise should be recruited to build a successful disaster recovery
program that could better respond to computer crimes?



What cyber security processes could improve disaster response, if any?
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What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cyber security
risk and controls in disaster recovery frameworks?
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Appendix C: List of Themes Build from Round 1


What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs



What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover
differently



What ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional
technology disaster recovery



What steps could be an improvement



What differences can be found from a business that prepared



What should organizations avoid to improve



Where could the modification of the information technology disaster recovery
framework to align with a cyber security framework?



What type of expertise should be recruited



What cyber security processes could improve disaster response



What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cyber security
risk
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Appendix D: Consensus Building from Round 2
Question 1: What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in
responding to computer crimes caused disasters?
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT makes it difficult to anticipate the
impact of the recovery.
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes.
Critical IT services must be available to conduct a recovery.
A lack of management support and poor funding will negatively impact this response.
If the organization does not staff skilled resources, the response will suffer.
The untested recovery process from computer crimes will negatively impact the
recovery process.
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene will be
an issue when the cause is computer crimes
IR teams must be trained for such a scenario.
Organizations conducting lessons learned will improve their response.
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source to protect from
computer crimes
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to this type incident.
The lack of an RTO and RPO will hamper the response for computer crimes.
Replacement equipment must be available and quickly replaced
Question 2: What interruptions caused by computer crimes could force an organizations
disaster response team to recover differently than a traditionally planned recovery
(playbooks)?
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal/law enforcement reasons.
A compromise of the IT administrators/ IT systems will force a different response.
Computer crimes can render critical systems unable to support a recovery where
traditionally it would.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery.
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment
outside of the recovery process.
Computer crime related recovery is much more variable, and it is very difficult to
determine the variables effectively.
A destructive data threat might require a more focused reaction than what a traditional
play book has.
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Question 3: In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following
traditional technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused
business interruption?
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful
or extremely time-consuming.
A compromise of the IT administrators system or credentials will force a different
response capability than recovery from water/power/storms.
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip upon the
response.
Attackers can purposely deceive the ITDR team with decoy interruptions to increase the
success of the attack.
When a breach occurs, the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify
the damage. This would hamper the recovery.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery.
A response would be difficult without the possession of endpoints, reliable
communications, or reliable utilities.
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer
crimes interruption. For example, an organization may not have an InfoSec resource on
retainer.
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals.
A Traditional DR playbook may not eradicate the intrusion correctly.
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which could cause the
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying, or stopping the overall business
resumption.
If organizations do not test for the computer crimes scenario, it will fail to recover on
time.
Question 4: What steps could be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery (i.e.
loss of power, fire, flood) procedures to resume the organization from a computer
crimes disaster (DoS, hacking, crypto locker, data destruction)?
Computer crimes are more complex and involve greater communication and
collaboration outside of IT and the IT Security team.
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that it
cannot be hacked.
Craft procedures where data is lost or corrupted and recovery have to be initiated using
physical backups.
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime that takes into consideration the risks of
computer crimes interruptions.
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations would improve recovery from a
computer crime interruption.
An improvement would come from lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions.
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources.
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implement a solution that can detect a change in data to encrypted state or data loss that
will prevent existing backups from being overwritten.
Organizations must focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities to improve
from computer crimes interruptions.
Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously for computer crimes.
Containment and eradication procedures for computer crimes will need to be included in
playbooks.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the ITDR program.
Leverage a cloud technology for an organization so that they are better secured and
recoverable.
Question 5: What differences can be found from an organization that prepares for
interruptions caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not?
I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a typical disaster recovery effort and
fail completely when attempting to recover from a computer crime event.
The prepared organization will not rely on one solution to protect everything.
Companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing
to devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime
interruptions.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by computer crimes.
Organizations may but subject to fines or lawsuits where they may not come from a
traditional disaster.
Organizations must provide a robust awareness program to ITDR teams to help mitigate
computer crimes risks.
Question 6: What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from
computer crimes interruptions?
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led
the response to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must place security controls on mobile phones to better respond to
computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without
first grasping what that problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of
the systems to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities to better respond to
computer crimes.
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Organizations must avoid open source systems for critical business applications to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not
improve to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR to better
respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions.
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid having missing cybersecurity policies to better respond to
computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding to better
respond to computer crimes.
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos to better respond to
computer crimes.
Question 7: What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption
could have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology
disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework?
A well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for
a technical interruption is reduced.
Adherence to policies and procedures will reduce the recovery from computer crimes.
A coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security
frameworks is vital to reducing the recovery of this type.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are
executed together, and participation is integrated.
Developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks will reduce the response.
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models to reduce the response to
this interruption.
Advanced preparation will reduce a computer crimes response.
Testing and segmentation with strict access control and secure baseline configurations
will reduce the response to computer crimes.
The computer crime prevention program must include the protection from internal
crimes.
Organizations must hold pre-event training processes to reduce computer crimes
responses.
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks, and that is a
problem.
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Question 8: What type of expertise (job skills and/or personal) should be recruited to
build a successful ITDR program that could better respond to computer crimes
interruptions?
Project management will improve the response to computer crimes.
People management will improve the response to computer crimes.
A deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment will improve the
response to computer crimes.
A business-focused understanding of the organization will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A risk-based focus on the business will improve the response to computer crimes.
Do not hire millennials will improve the response to computer crimes.
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response will improve computer crimes recovery efforts.
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk of
computer crimes recovery efforts.
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more
about access to other teams will improve the response to computer crimes.
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to improve the response to computer crimes.
Minor skills are needed such as Ethical Hacking, Encryption Solutions, Highly
Adaptable and Collaborative skills will improve the response to computer crimes.
Question 9: What common cybersecurity processes could improve recovery effort that
would not normally be found in an ITDR program?
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process
Password management is important
The All-hazards approach should include InfoSec interruptions
Standards-based Information security management systems life cycle
InfoSec training for ITDR teams
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning
activities
Formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of
future incidents.
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that
extends to ITDR.
Asset inventory processes
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated into the ITDR program
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery
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Question 10: What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining
cybersecurity risk and controls in disaster recovery frameworks?
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.
There could be a disadvantage to the organization by increasing the costs of additional
InfoSec controls into ITDR processes.
A cybersecurity framework adoption into the ITDR could result in minimal, or zero
interruptions to its business and could improve both productivity and brand image.
There does not appear to be any disadvantages to a cybersecurity framework integration
into ITDR.
Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself will be lacking.
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of
the most business-critical systems in the organization.
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process may
allow it to easier identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system
malfunction.”
A cybersecurity framework integration could provide an advantage in that it provides a
2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to the disaster recovery framework.
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Appendix E: List of Round 3 Questions
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT makes it difficult to anticipate the
impact of the recovery. Improve understanding.
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes.
Critical IT services must be available to conduct a recovery.
A lack of management support and poor funding will negatively impact this response.
If the organization does not staff skilled resources, the response will suffer.
The untested recovery process from computer crimes will negatively impact the
recovery process.
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene will be
an issue when the cause is computer crimes
IR teams must be trained for such a scenario.
Organizations conducting lessons learned will improve their response.
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source to protect from
computer crimes. There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to this
type incident.
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful
or extremely time-consuming.
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip upon the
response.
When a breach occurs, the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify
the damage. This would hamper the recovery.
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer
crimes interruption. For example, an organization may not have an InfoSec resource on
retainer.
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals.
A Traditional DR playbook may not eradicate the intrusion correctly.
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which could cause the
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying, or stopping the overall business
resumption.
If organizations do not test for the computer crimes scenario, it will fail to recover on
time.
Computer crimes are more complex and involve greater communication and
collaboration outside of IT and the IT Security team.
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that
it cannot be hacked.
Craft procedures where data is lost or corrupted and recovery have to be initiated using
physical backups.
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime that takes into consideration the risks of
computer crimes interruptions.
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Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations would improve recovery from a
computer crime interruption.
An improvement would come from lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions.
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources.
Organizations must focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities to improve
from computer crimes interruptions.
Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously for computer crimes.
Containment and eradication procedures for computer crimes will need to be included
in playbooks.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the ITDR program.
The prepared organization will not rely on one solution to protect everything.
Companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing
to devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime
interruptions.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by computer
crimes.
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led
the response to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without
first grasping what that problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of
the systems to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not
improve to better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR to better
respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions.
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid having missing cybersecurity policies to better respond to
computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding to better
respond to computer crimes.
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Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos to better respond to
computer crimes.
A well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for
a technical interruption is reduced.
A coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security
frameworks is vital to reducing the recovery of this type.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are
executed together, and participation is integrated.
Developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks will reduce the response.
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models to reduce the response to
this interruption.
Advanced preparation will reduce a computer crimes response.
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks, and that is a
problem. Create alignment.
A deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment will improve the
response to computer crimes.
A business-focused understanding of the organization will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A risk-based focus on the business will improve the response to computer crimes.
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response will improve computer crimes recovery efforts.
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to improve the response to computer crimes.
Implement Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process
Deploy InfoSec training for ITDR teams
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning
activities
Formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of
future incidents.
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that
extends to ITDR.
Implement Asset inventory processes
Deploy Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing
Implementing the CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery
effort.
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.

207
Without cyber being a part of that plan, the plan itself will be lacking.
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of
the most business-critical systems in the organization.
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process
may allow it to easier identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system
malfunction.”
A cybersecurity framework integration could provide an advantage in that it provides a
2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to the disaster recovery framework.
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Appendix F: Removal of duplicate statements
Question 1:
What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in responding
to computer crimes caused disasters?
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
Critical services must be available to conduct a recovery
poor funding will negatively impact this response
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat
response capability to computer crimes is cost-prohibitive
Management support
The organization does not staff skilled resources
untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process
ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene
IR team training for such a scenario
management support
conducting lessons learned
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
The organization does not staff skilled resources
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to an incident
untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source
The lack of a RTO and RPO will hamper the response
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
With computer crime, it is much more difficult to anticipate the impact.
poor funding will negatively impact this response
untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to an incident
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
Replacement Equipment must be quickly replaced
Critical services must be available to conduct a recovery
The lack of a RTO and RPO will hamper the response
Untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat will negatively impact this response
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Duplicates removed
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT make it difficult to anticipate the
impact
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes
Critical services must be available to conduct a recovery
A lack of management support and poor funding will negatively impact this response
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat will negatively impact this response
If the organization does not staff skilled resources the response will suffer
Untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process
ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene
IR team training for such a scenario
Organizations conducting lessons learned will improve their response
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to an incident
The lack of a RTO and RPO will hamper the response
Replacement Equipment must be quickly replaced
Question 2
What interruptions caused by computer crimes could force an organizations disaster
response team to recover differently than a traditionally planned recovery (playbooks)?
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal reasons
A compromise of the IT administrators will force a different response
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside
of the recovery process.
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal reasons
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside
of the recovery process.
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Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
Computer crime related recovery is much more variable and it is very difficult to
determine the variables effectively.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it
would.
A destructive data threat might require a more focused reaction that what a traditional
play book has.
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside
of the recovery process.
A compromise of the IT administrators/ IT systems will force a different response than
traditionally
Duplicates removed
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal reasons
A compromise of the IT administrators/ IT systems will force a different response
Computer crimes can render critical systems unable to support a recovery where
traditionally it would.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside
of the recovery process.
Computer crime related recovery is much more variable and it is very difficult to
determine the variables effectively.
A destructive data threat might require a more focused reaction than what a traditional
play book has.
Question 3
In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional
technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused business
interruption?
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal reasons
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful
A compromise of the IT administrators will force a different response
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If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the
response.
Attackers can purposely deceive the ITDR team with decoy interruptions to increase the
success of the attack
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not fully scoped, it will trip up the
response.
when a breach occurs the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify the
damage is impaired.
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
A response would be difficult without the possession of endpoints, reliable
communications, or reliable utilities
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer
crimes interruption
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals.
Traditional disaster recovery may not eradicate the intrusion correctly
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which would could cause the
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying or stopping overall business
resumption
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not fully scoped, it will trip up the
response.
If organizations do not test for this scenario it will fail to recover on time.
Organizations may not account for the time need to restore massive amounts of data to
recover systems.
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the
response.
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the
response.
Duplicates removed
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal reasons
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful or
extremely time consuming
A compromise of the IT administrators system or credentials will force a different
response capability
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the
response.
Attackers can purposely deceive the ITDR team with decoy interruptions to increase the
success of the attack
when a breach occurs the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify the
damage is impaired.
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery
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A response would be difficult without the possession of endpoints, reliable
communications, or reliable utilities
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer
crimes interruption
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals.
Traditional disaster recovery may not eradicate the intrusion correctly
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which would could cause the
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying or stopping overall business
resumption
If organizations do not test for this scenario it will fail to recover on time.
Question 4
What steps could be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery (i.e. loss of
power, fire, flood) procedures to resume the organization from a computer crimes disaster
(DoS, hacking, crypto locker, data destruction)?
computer crime are more complex and involved greater communication and collaboration
outside of IT and the IT Security team.
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that it
can’t hacked.
Craft procedures where data is gone or corrupted and recovery has to be initiated using
physical backups.
a separate set of procedures for cyber crime that takes into consideration the insidious
nature of the cyber attacker.
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations
Conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources.
Craft procedures where data is gone or corrupted and recovery has to be initiated using
physical backups.
implement a solution that can detect a change in data to encrypted state or data loss that
will prevent existing backups from being overwritten.
focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities.
preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously
preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously
Conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions
Containment and eradication procedures will need to be included in playbooks.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the DR program.
Leverage a cloud technology for an organization so that they are better secured and
recoverable
Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously
Computer crime are more complex and involved greater communication and
collaboration outside of IT and the IT Security team.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the DR program.
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Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously
Duplicates removed
computer crime are more complex and involved greater communication and collaboration
outside of IT and the IT Security team.
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that it
can’t hacked.
Craft procedures where data is gone or corrupted and recovery has to be initiated using
physical backups.
A separate set of procedures for cyber crime that takes into consideration the risks of
computer crimes interruptions.
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations
Conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources.
implement a solution that can detect a change in data to encrypted state or data loss that
will prevent existing backups from being overwritten.
Organizations must focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities.
preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously
Containment and eradication procedures will need to be included in playbooks.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the DR program.
Leverage a cloud technology for an organization so that they are better secured and
recoverable
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for
compliance/legal reasons
Question 5:
What differences can be found from an organization that prepares for interruptions caused
computer crimes as compared to those that do not?
I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a typical disaster recovery effort, and
fail completely when attempting to recover from a computer crime event.
Don’t rely on one solution to protect everything.
companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing to
devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime
interruptions.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
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Organizations may but subject to fines or law suits where they may not from a traditional
disaster.
organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
A prepared organization will have a realistic recovery plan that has multiple options for
recovery scenarios and reduced downtime from computer crimes.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
A prepared organization will have a realistic recovery plan that has multiple options for
recovery scenarios and reduced downtime from computer crimes.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
Organizations must provide a robust awareness program to help mitigate computer crimes
risks
Duplicates removed
I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a typical disaster recovery effort, and
fail completely when attempting to recover from a computer crime event.
The prepared organization will not rely on one solution to protect everything.
companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing to
devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime
interruptions.
organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks
Organizations may but subject to fines or law suits where they may not from a traditional
disaster.
A prepared organization will have a realistic recovery plan that has multiple options for
recovery scenarios and reduced downtime from computer crimes.
Organizations must provide a robust awareness program to help mitigate computer crimes
risks
Question 6:
What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from computer crimes
interruptions?
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led
response.
Organizations must place security controls on mobile phones
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avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without first grasping what that
problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of the
systems
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities
Organizations must avoid open source systems for critical business applications
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not
improve.
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase
Organizations must avoid having missing cyber security policies
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of the
systems
avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without first grasping what that
problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos
Duplicates removed
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led
response.
Organizations must place security controls on mobile phones
avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without first grasping what that
problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of the
systems
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities
Organizations must avoid open source systems for critical business applications
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not
improve.
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase
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Organizations must avoid having missing cyber security policies
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos
Question 7:
What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could have
been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology disaster
recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework?
a well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for a
technical interruption is reduced.
Adherence to policies and procedures
coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security
frameworks is vital
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
together and participation is integrated.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
together and participation is integrated.
developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
together and participation is integrated.
Advanced Preparation
Testing and segmentation with strict access control and secure baseline configurations.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
together and participation is integrated.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
together and participation is integrated.
The computer crime prevention program must include the protection from internal crimes.
Organizations must hold pre-event training processes
coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security
frameworks is vital
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks and that is a problem.
Duplicates removed
a well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for a
technical interruption is reduced.
Adherence to policies and procedures
coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security
frameworks is vital
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed
together and participation is integrated.
developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models.

217
Advanced Preparation
Testing and segmentation with strict access control and secure baseline configurations.
The computer crime prevention program must include the protection from internal crimes.
Organizations must hold pre-event training processes
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks and that is a problem.
Question 8:
What type of expertise (job skills and/or personal) should be recruited to build a
successful ITDR program that could better respond to computer crimes interruptions?
project management
people management
deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment
business focused understanding of the organization
Risk Based focus on the business
Do not hire millennials
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
Analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more about
access to other teams
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more about
access to other teams
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
Minor skills are needed such as Ethical Hacking, Encryption Solutions, Highly
Adaptable and Collaborative
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk
business focused understanding of the organization
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist
basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response
Duplicates removed
project management
people management
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deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment
business focused understanding of the organization
Risk Based focus on the business
Do not hire millennials
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk
Analytical, logical, and lateral thinking
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more about
access to other teams
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist
Minor skills are needed such as Ethical Hacking, Encryption Solutions, Highly
Adaptable and Collaborative
Question 9:
What common cybersecurity processes could improve recovery effort that would not
normally be found in a ITDR program?
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the
planning process
Password management
Computer crimes risks should be incorporated into an All-Hazard approach
Standards based Information security management systems life cycle
InfoSec training for ITDR teams would improve the program
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning
activities
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the
planning process
formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of future
incidents.
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the
planning process
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that
extends to ITDR.
Asset inventory processes
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated in the ITDR program.
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing
InfoSec training for ITDR teams would improve the program
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated in the ITDR program.
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Duplicates removed
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the
planning process
Password management
Computer crimes risks should be incorporated into an All-Hazard approach
Standards based Information security management systems life cycle
InfoSec training for ITDR teams would improve the program
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning
activities
formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of future
incidents.
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that
extends to ITDR.
Asset inventory processes
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated in the ITDR program.
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery
Question 10:
What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cybersecurity risk and
controls in disaster recovery frameworks?
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of
InfoSec controls into ITDR
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of
InfoSec controls into ITDR
The organization could have minimal or zero interruptions to its business and could
improve both productivity and brand image
There does not appear to be any disadvantages
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of
InfoSec controls into ITDR
There does not appear to be any disadvantages
Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself will be lacking.
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of
InfoSec controls into ITDR
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If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of
the most business-critical system.
integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process may
allow it to easier to identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system
malfunction”.
A Cybersecurity advantage is that it provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to
the disaster recovery framework
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of
InfoSec controls into ITDR
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks
Duplicates removed
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and objectives.
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of
InfoSec controls into ITDR
The organization could have minimal or zero interruptions to its business and could
improve both productivity and brand image
There does not appear to be any disadvantages
Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself will be lacking.
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of
the most business-critical system.
integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process may
allow it to easier identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system
malfunction”.
A Cybersecurity advantage is that it provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to
the disaster recovery framework
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Appendix G: Analysis of the third round of data

Round 3 statements
Lack of understanding of the
interdependencies in IT makes it difficult to
anticipate the impact of the recovery.
Improve understanding.
The organization must have adequate
planning for computer crimes.
Critical IT services must be available to
conduct a recovery.
A lack of management support and poor
funding will negatively impact this
response.
If the organization does not staff skilled
resources, the response will suffer.
The untested recovery process from
computer crimes will negatively impact the
recovery process.
The ability to triage the incident correctly
as the ITDR team comes on the scene will
be an issue when the cause is computer
crimes
IR teams must be trained for such a
scenario.
Organizations conducting lessons learned
will improve their response.
Critical data must be protected and
available from an alternate source to protect
from computer crimes. There must be a
clear list of responsibilities in responding to
this type incident.
If a data backup/alternative is not available,
traditional recovery will not be successful
or extremely time-consuming.
If an organization finds itself in a response
that it has not scoped, it will trip upon the
response.
When a breach occurs, the organization
may lack the ability to anticipate and
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quantify the damage. This would hamper
the recovery.
An organization may not have outside
resources available to assist with a
computer crimes interruption. For example,
an organization may not have an InfoSec
resource on retainer.
The organization has a lack of alignment
with IT goals and business goals.
A Traditional DR playbook may not
eradicate the intrusion correctly.
The DR team may have a poor
understanding of the attack which could
cause the activation of the wrong recovery
solution, delaying, or stopping the overall
business resumption.
If organizations do not test for the computer
crimes scenario, it will fail to recover on
time.
Computer crimes are more complex and
involve greater communication and
collaboration outside of IT and the IT
Security team.
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline
from the main company environment so
that it cannot be hacked.
Craft procedures where data is lost or
corrupted and recovery have to be initiated
using physical backups.
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime
that takes into consideration the risks of
computer crimes interruptions.
Real-time data synchronization to alternate
locations would improve recovery from a
computer crime interruption.
An improvement would come from lessons
learned and root cause analysis sessions.
Security architectures must use technology
in support of business objectives, and
accurately model dependencies to
prioritize resources.

3.38

0.92

1.25

0.63

4.25

0.71

1.00

0.88

3.63

0.74

1.00

0.43

4.63

0.74

0.25

0.88

3.88

0.83

1.25

0.63

3.88

0.83

1.25

0.63

3.50

0.53

1.00

0.50

4.00

0.76

0.50

0.75

3.25

1.16

2.00

0.50

3.50

0.93

1.00

0.57

4.13

0.99

2.00

0.63

4.25

0.71

1.00

0.88

223
Organizations must focus on people,
communications, tools, and facilities to
improve from computer crimes
interruptions.
Preventive and testing measures must be
taken continuously for computer crimes.
Containment and eradication procedures for
computer crimes will need to be included in
playbooks.
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the
ITDR program.
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The prepared organization will not rely on
one solution to protect everything.
Companies more heavily invested in
preparing for computer crime-based
interruptions have greater integration with
their Information Security counterparts and
have a management team that understands
the risks posed by computer crimes and are
willing to devote more money and attention
to prevention and preparation for computer
crime interruptions.
Organizations that are not prepared to deal
with computer crimes in their ITDR are
opening themselves up to additional risks,
and interruptions caused by computer
crimes.
Organizations cannot treat a computer
crimes recovery as just a “technical” or
“IT” led the response to better respond to
computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk
reaction to throw money at a problem
without first grasping what that problem is
and then smartly coming up with the
solution.
Organizations must avoid plans that do not
take into consideration the current state of
the systems to better respond to computer
crimes.
Organizations that do not conduct lessons
learned and root cause analysis will not
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improve to better respond to computer
crimes.
Organizations should avoid placing a low
value on quality management in DR to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid architectures that
lack redundancy or resiliency attributes to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid thinking they are
protected from computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid neglecting the
risk of computer crimes interruptions.
Organizations must not focus on speed but
instead focus on the assessment phase to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid having missing
cybersecurity policies to better respond to
computer crimes.
Organizations must avoid operating DR
functions without the proper funding to
better respond to computer crimes.
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and
InfoSec in different silos to better respond
to computer crimes.
A well-developed cybersecurity framework
supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for
a technical interruption is reduced.
A coordinated process alignment between
Disaster Recovery and Information
Security frameworks is vital to reducing the
recovery of this type.
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their
lifecycle processes so that like steps are
executed together, and participation is
integrated.
Developing an ITDR set of practices and
different playbooks will reduce the
response.
Resilience efforts should be folded into
dependency models to reduce the response
to this interruption.
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Advanced preparation will reduce a
computer crimes response.
There is not much alignment between DR
and InfoSec frameworks, and that is a
problem. Create alignment.
A deep understanding of interdependencies
in the IT environment will improve the
response to computer crimes.
A business-focused understanding of the
organization will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A risk-based focus on the business will
improve the response to computer crimes.
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral
thinking will improve the response to
computer crimes.
A basic understanding of the layers of
protection, prevention, policy management,
operations, monitoring, and response will
improve computer crimes recovery efforts.
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to
improve the response to computer crimes.
Implement Enterprise Security Risk
Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process
Deploy InfoSec training for ITDR teams
Organizations can integrate the RMO and
CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning
activities
Formal lessons learned and future
prevention, which may help lessen the
severity of future incidents.
Establishing a baseline of security
configurations is another cybersecurity
process that extends to ITDR.
Implement Asset inventory processes
Deploy Penetration testing and disaster
recovery testing
Implementing the CAG 20 Critical Security
controls would improve the recovery effort.
Organizations should include InfoSec risks
in ITDR frameworks
If done well, clearly following an ESRM
program and linking the outcomes of the
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framework to the DR framework offers
organizations the ability to see the
interdependencies between assets and
objectives.
Without cyber being a part of that plan, the
plan itself will be lacking.
If done properly, cybersecurity risk
management will identify the DR systems
as one of the most business-critical systems
in the organization.
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and
controls in your disaster recovery process
may allow it to easier identify attacks that
would otherwise be considered a “system
malfunction.”
A cybersecurity framework integration
could provide an advantage in that it
provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of risk
management to the disaster recovery
framework.
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